In recent years, the world economy has undergone a series of events that underscores the relevance of discussing open regionalism and interregionalism as enduring trends. In 2018, the mutual imposition of tariffs between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the world’s two largest economies, and the Trump administration’s actions in blocking the appointments to the Appellate Body in the World Trade Organization (WTO), made scholars wonder whether the liberal trading system was under attack and we were entering a new phase of protectionism worldwide (Hopewell 2021). The disruptions to global supply chains caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and an increased sense of geopolitical competition have also contributed to the popularization of trends such as nearshoring and friendly-shoring, making other experts to predict a comeback of discriminatory regionalism (Ruta 2023), as opposed to globalization, economic multilateralism and open regionalism.

In this sense, despite those developments, in 2022 the Pacific Alliance (PA) and Singapore formalized the accession of the latter as an Associate State of that trade bloc, with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea as candidates in the process of receiving a similar status. In an official press release from the Singaporean Ministry for Trade and Industry, announcing the conclusion of negotiations with the Pacific Alliance in mid-2021, Minister Gan Kim Yong stated that the agreement “represents the shared commitment by the Pacific Alliance and Singapore to persevere with greater economic integration and support the rules-based multilateral trading system. […and,] despite the pressures placed on economic multilateralism, we want to reach out to one another and create more opportunities for our people” (MTI 2021; emphasis added).

The PA, composed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, has long been considered a representative case of open regionalism in Latin America (Lima 2018; Pastrana & Castro 2020), and a persisting one. Despite the change and rotation of ruling parties with opposing ideologies within its member states, the PA has survived and continues in the process of adding new regional partners under the status of full members, and extra-regional partners under the status of Associate State. In this paper, we intend to apply a framework inspired by constructivism, to suggest that the notions of open regionalism and interregionalism have been internalized and embraced by the Pacific Alliance members and Singapore, as a reflection of shared values and an assumed identity that favors a type of economic integration that is open and relies in the promotion of high-standard free trade agreements. Joining previous bilateral and multilateral agreements between some of them, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), these states went further to formalize the inclusion of Singapore to the PA, which adds a new layer into their commercial and economic interactions.

Despite not being among each other’s top trading partners, nor having specifically identified material motivations to pursue a deeper integration between themselves, Singapore became the first Associated State of the Pacific Alliance. What are the factors that can help us understand this decision? This paper applies a process tracing method (Ricks & Liu 2018), typical of qualitative research, in which we advance the idea that, beyond the material incentives for completing negotiations for a new agreement between Singapore and the PA countries, we cannot ignore their espoused commitment to maintain a model of open regional integration and interregionalism, under a scenario of increasing uncertainty and competing views regarding trade and investment relations between states.

We think that those shared values, together with some other geostrategic motivations, are important elements that help us explain why Singapore successfully became the first Associated State of the Pacific Alliance, and the way this decision was intended to continue promoting open regionalism and interregionalism. By adding another label to the relations between the PA and Singapore, both sides could contribute to defend the practice of concepts associated with the promotion of a liberal trade system. For our analysis, we collected information from existing research works, official data from governments and international organizations, media reports and official speeches and statements, to trace this process and present this idea in a more compelling form (Figure 1).

Therefore, in the next section we briefly present the concept of open regionalism and its identification with the PA, as well as the gaps in the existing literature. Later, we present the developments leading to the creation of the Associated State status for the PA. This is coincidental with the sustained interest that Singapore has pursued on the promotion of interregionalism in its foreign policy, which we also introduce in the fourth section. The final part of that section also presents some descriptive data concerning other interests that Singapore possibly had in negotiating its inclusion in the PA, as well as to demonstrate that rival claims, as the ones contemplating material incentives, are not sufficient to explain this association between Singapore and the Pacific Alliance. Our final step was to collect and highlight segments of speeches by Singaporean officials when referring to their relations with PA countries, in which the idea of considering shared values and identities as a strong motivation gains more explanatory power.

Post-Cold War U.S. trade policy significantly influenced the promotion of open regionalism around the world, and particularly in the Latin American region. The creation of a North American free trade area with Mexico and Canada, along with the establishment of APEC, were seen as American-led efforts to counter the type of regionalism embodied by the European Economic Community (Weeks and Allison 2022, 260-292). The conceptualization of open regionalism took place during those years, in which it was defined as a type of regional economic integration that does not discriminate against non-member countries, avoiding exclusivity and remaining open to global markets (Garnaut 1994; Kuwayama 1999). One of the main concerns during those years was that the formalization of regional integration mechanisms, like the EU, could counter the efforts to create a liberalized global trade regime, manifested in the creation of the World Trade Organization. Despite the claims that they could undermine its functioning, the WTO did not oppose the negotiation of regional trade agreements, as long as they were conceived as previous steps in the liberalization of national economies, leading to a later stage of global integration.

Therefore, from that time on, the concept of open regionalism is seen as relevant, offering states a way to pursue a type of regional integration that is non-discriminatory. As a result of their closer ties with the US, the places in which the notion of open regionalism became generally accepted was in some parts of Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. Kuwayama (1999) found that the concept varied across them, with Asia-Pacific states focusing on a type of non-discriminatory liberalization, and Latin America emphasizing outward- oriented approaches to boost their competitiveness at the regional and global stages. Similarly, it has been noted that the concept of open regionalism can be linked to the promotion of the so-called new trade and the Singapore Issues, with states being concerned to include issues such as services, investment, and infrastructure, as well as government procurement and trade facilitation in their regional agreements, which would qualify them as high-standard FTAs (Bergsten 1997; Kuwayama 1999; Wignajara et al. 2013).

Existing research on the contemporary practice of open regionalism in Latin America concerns the case of the Pacific Alliance. After the failure of creating a US-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in 2005, Washington shifted its strategy to promoting high-standard bilateral or multilateral agreements with counterparts in the Western Hemisphere that had supported the original project. Therefore, following various proposals from the Peruvian government since 2007, Latin American governments that sympathized with the idea of open regionalism sought to create an organization called the Pacific Arch. It was a few years later, in 2011, that they agreed to form a new trade bloc. Inspired by open regionalism, scholars argue that it was a response to other anti-hegemonic integration projects, such as the Venezuela-sponsored Bolivarian Alternative or ALBA (Castro 2022).

This can also be approached from a constructivist lenses of shared values and identities, in which those Latin American states wanted to demonstrate their commitment to an open type of regionalism. At a summit in Lima in 2011, the representatives of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru announced the creation of the Pacific Alliance. In the framework agreement text, signed in 2012, the PA members identified creating a regional integration area as one of their main goals, aiming to enhance their economies' growth, development, and competitiveness. Simultaneously, in addition to deepen their integration, the document establishes an equally outward-oriented aspect, particularly towards the Asia-Pacific region (Marchini 2019). Unlike Mercosur or the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance explicitly stated that the creation of a customs union or a supranational or intergovernmental organization was not its goal. Instead, it was designed to be flexible and open to any country in the region, through the creation of a high-level group. The primary requirement for entry is negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with each member or a multilateral treaty among all parties (Castro 2022).

Since its inception, the PA has organized annual heads of state summits and various ministerial meetings. The mechanism initially garnered significant international attention, with representatives from over 50 countries attending these events as observers. Beyond the four founding members, other states have begun negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with the bloc, including Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama. In January 2022, Singapore became the first Associated State of the PA after five years of negotiating an agreement with the bloc’s members. This process accelerated after several members joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Similarly, negotiations continued with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and later South Korea, which are also seeking to become Associated States (Castro 2022; Nelson, 2022).

After its creation, scholars studied the progress of this mechanism using different approaches (León-Manríquez & Ramírez-Bonilla 2014; Leví & Reggiardo 2016; Torres & Violante 2016; Suavé et al., 2019). Tremolada (2014) observed that the PA can be considered as an international organization limited to the regional orbit, operating as a bridge to the Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding efforts to portray itself as a flexible and pragmatic supranational mechanism, in practice, the PA looks more like an intergovernmental organization that still depends on the consensus and approval of its members, providing private actors with little room for maneuvering (Castro 2022). As a result, there has been a need to assess how feasible it was for such a mechanism to function as a forum in which its members spoke with a single voice, particularly in their interactions with the rest of the world, especially with states on the other side of the Pacific (Tremolada 2014, 742).

Other scholars have been concerned with compiling a list of aspects for improvement and shortcomings that the PA has presented in its operation. Chaves (2018) states that, in practice, the bloc does not place enough emphasis on regional integration, opting instead for interregionalism with the Asia-Pacific (Chaves 2018, 26). León-Manríquez and Ramírez-Bonilla (2014) argue that the Pacific Alliance goes beyond economic issues. By stipulating that any prospective member must adhere to democratic principles, uphold the rule of law, protect human rights, and maintain constitutional order, the integration mechanism aims to send a signal to other parts of the region experiencing a rise in authoritarianism (León & Ramírez 2014, 37).¹ This is also coincidental with their shared identity of being committed to a specific type of open regionalism, concerning a liberal multilateral economic regime.

In this regard, several studies suggest that the PA differs from regional integration mechanisms like the European model of supranational integration or other Latin American post-neoliberal or anti-hegemonic integration approaches, by aligning with open regionalism (Quliconi & Salgado 2017; Pastrana & Castro 2020). Equally, other works highlight that despite the limited involvement of private actors and associations in the PA’s operations, the dissemination of ideas and norms has facilitated greater participation by transnational and intergovernmental networks. These networks have supported the negotiation of additional protocols and mechanisms within specific industries (Castro 2022, 39-43). Additionally, research indicates that some of the PA’s mechanisms have fostered a more conducive environment for social entrepreneurship among its member countries (García et al. 2020). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the PA still faces challenges related to fragile institutionalization, potential for improvisation, and the risk of not effectively responding when a member fails to fulfill established commitments (Chaves 2018: 41).²

In the existing literature, there remains a limited number of academic studies focusing on the concrete achievements of the Pacific Alliance and its contribution to Transpacific economic integration and ties to interregionalism (Pérez-Restrepo & Roldán-Pérez 2015; Rubiolo 2018). Despite the established goal of coordinating members’ policies to help amend the asymmetries that characterize their trade exchanges with other Asia-Pacific markets, the results have not been as good as expected (Marchini 2019). In theory, the original goal of the PA members was to create value-added supply chains, but in practice, given the limited prospects, it was eventually changed to that of improving existing productive links (Pastrana & Castro 2020). On the other hand, Rojas and Terán (2019) analyzed the existing bilateral agreements between the members of the PA and China, South Korea, and Japan. In their findings, the authors emphasize the importance given to certain economic issues over others, and the visible gain that Chile, Mexico, and Peru have, compared to the other member of the bloc, Colombia. Therefore, given the existing gaps in the literature, we think that it is essential to update the information and academic analysis regarding the PA, specifically in its second decade. By paying greater attention to the Associated State status and how it fits into the narrative of open regionalism and the Transpacific economic integration, through the role played by Singapore, we can emphasize how, beyond economic motivations, the issue of shared values and commitment to maintain an open regional integration through high-standard agreements across regions, could help us better understand this trend.

Due to its recent establishment, the Associated State status of the PA has not received adequate scholarly attention. This category was proposed at an inter-ministerial meeting in Viña del Mar, in 2017. Through other studies, we can suggest that the Associated State category was thought as an additional mechanism to keep alive the goal of Transpacific integration, with the Pacific Alliance serving as another vehicle to achieve it, once the US under Trump had withdrawn its support to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, or TPP (Pastrana & Castro 2017; Marchini 2019). While the PA ministers were in Chile to engage in discussions with other parties to define a roadmap, representatives from China and South Korea also attended the event as observers. As a result, the PA members agreed to create the Associated State status during the summit held in Cali later that year. Following that summit, Australia, Canada, Singapore, and New Zealand —members of the CPTPP— submitted their applications to obtain this status. The PA also announced its objective of incorporating 10 additional partners by 2030 (Pastrana & Castro 2020: 15). In 2018, the four candidates for Associated State status met with PA members in New Zealand, and a year later, the First Cooperation Forum took place in Lima, attended by all observer countries as well (Marchini 2019). For the case of South Korea, it expressed its intention to become Associated State of the PA in 2018, but negotiations of an FTA between them started on June, 2022 (PA 2022).

However, despite the expectations raised by the announcement of the new Associated State status, incorporating these members has proven to be a slow process. Castro (2022) argues that the inclusion of extra-regional partners has coincided with the slowdown that trans-governmental networks began to show in previous years. The Pacific Alliance initially demonstrated pragmatism and a commitment to achieving rapid, tangible results. However, this feature seemed to be missing when Canberra and Ottawa demanded the inclusion of more progressive rules in the agreements under consideration. Thus, leaders of specific domestic sectors and industries within the PA members showed reluctance and even open opposition to accept those proposals (Castro 2022: 47-48). As a consequence, five years after its announcement, only one out of the candidates, Singapore, had completed the process and officially became the first Associated State of the Pacific Alliance.

In 2021, Singapore completed the negotiations of an FTA with all the PA members, which made it obtain the Associated State status in 2022. According to official reports consulted in 2023, New Zealand is about to conclude negotiations (MFAT, n.a.). In this case, Colombia's absence from the CPTPP bloc has also made it difficult for other candidates to obtain such status. This is because the other PA members and the Associated State candidates are part of the CPTPP, and have officially interacted through their participation in the APEC forum. Therefore, despite the shared values towards open regionalism from the PA member states’ bureaucracies, resistance and difficulties in accepting more progressive trade norms and rules usually come from competitive sectors likely to suffer increased competition from other markets. This has been exemplified by Arias (2023, 65), for the Colombian case. Nonetheless, Bogota has been trying to catch up, as evidenced by sharing the physical space with the Mexican embassy in Singapore, where both countries maintain their diplomatic representation (Tremolada 2014, 739).

Interregionalism and Singaporean Foreign Policy

In the tracing of the process of Singapore becoming the first Associated State of the PA, as well as the implications it has for the future of such figure, it is relevant to go through some key concepts in the foreign policy of this Southeast Asian country and its ties to Latin America. Since its first years as an independent state, Singaporean decision makers have been guided by geopolitical considerations and their policies can be associated with notions from the realist school of international relations (Yeo 2017, 6). The large difference in size between Singapore, on the one hand, and Malaysia and Indonesia on the other, were determinant for Singaporean rulers’ decision to implement developmental policies inspired by those adopted in other parts of East Asia (Lim 1990).

Motivated by the successful industrialization process and postwar economic recovery of Japan, Singapore’s officials, following a commissioned report of the World Bank from 1963, began to design industrial policies that allowed the state apparatus to have a major role in the economic development of the country, with a strong engagement between the state and foreign capital (Haggard 1990, 113-114). Singapore’s strategic location as a major waterway and entry port to Southeast Asia was immediately perceived as an ideal opportunity, not only to develop local manufacturing industries, but also to become a world-class financial hub. Therefore, attracting international capital was a necessary precondition to achieve those goals. As a result, Singapore attained an increased relevance before the eyes of policymakers in the West, contributing to the state’s goal of survival and security from any potential threat from its neighbors. The country’s successful growth strategy also resulted in a sustained increase in defense expenditures, modernizing its armed forces and safeguarding the state’s autonomy and influence in the region.

On the regional front, the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with Singapore as a founding member, was coincidental with those states’ needs to protect themselves, not only against the threat of communism but also from being caught between the interests of superpowers and their rivalry (Ahmad 2012, 159). Singapore’s participation in ASEAN is in tune with two of its main foreign policy goals. The first corresponds to the institutionalization of relations with its neighbors (Cockerham 2010). The second goal is making Southeast Asian countries speak with a unified voice in their interactions with extra-regional powers and other regions of the world. Through mechanisms such as ASEAN+6 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Southeast Asian states present themselves as a unified actor, combining their power resources and balancing the influence of larger powers from outside the region, keeping the organization in the “driver’s seat.” In that regard, the influence of realist concepts such as balancing and bandwagoning is visible (Goh 2008, 131; Corning 2011, 263).

Similarly, Singapore has played an important role in moving ASEAN to maintain dialogue and cooperation with other regions and sub-regions of the world, contributing to the increasing trend towards interregionalism, and also playing a key role in the process of Transpacific economic integration. The continuity of ASEAN and the enlargement of its goals after the end of the Cold War, from a security instrument to encompass long-term economic integration, allowed Singapore to use it as a platform to approach other parts of the globe in a more effective way. By creating dialogue mechanisms between ASEAN and other regions, Singaporean officials and representatives can negotiate with a multiplicity of actors from different countries at the same time. This strategy saves time and resources but also contributes to Singapore’s goal of sustaining a high economic growth through diversification and access to new markets and investments destinations (Lee et al. 2016, 24-25).

Therefore, it is possible to identify Singapore as one of the main drivers behind the idea to create the Forum of East Asia and Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) during a summit hosted by the city-state in 1999 (Dosch 2021, 222). That mechanism encompasses 16 countries from East Asia, including all ASEAN members, and 20 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. The forum is an example of an institution based on the idea of interregionalism, and according to its official statements, it holds meetings at four levels: foreign ministers’ meetings (FMM), high officials’ meetings (SOM), working groups meetings (WG), and coordination meetings, (FEALAC 2023). The forum’s digital secretariat is currently located in Seoul, making South Korea, together with Singapore, key players in the functioning and maintenance of FEALAC. Nonetheless, besides FEALAC, the Singaporean government has also been characterized by its efforts to unilaterally approach other regional institutions in Latin America, particularly the PA, taking advantage of the latter’s emphasis on open regionalism.

Interests and motivations behind PA and Singapore as its Associated State

The APEC summits and meetings became an important communication channel between Singapore and Latin American members. After the adhesion of Mexico, Chile, and Peru, the multilateral institution extended its reach to the southern part of the Western Hemisphere. More than three decades have passed since its creation, but the goal of institutionalizing an APEC-wide free trade area has not been achieved. The 1994 Bogor Declaration on Asia-Pacific trade liberalization originally contemplated 2010 as the first deadline for the opening of advanced economies, and 2020 for the rest of the emerging economies (Pérez-Restrepo & Roldán-Pérez 2015, 2-3). In 2004, given the limited progress on those goals, Singapore joined Chile, together with Brunei and New Zealand, to negotiate a high-depth FTA. This agreement was considered a blueprint for the rest of APEC members and became known as the P-4 or Trans-Pacific Partnership, and demonstrate the shared interest of those countries to proceed with economic integration inspired in the notion of open regionalism (Gao 2012).

Considering that document as a base, its enlargement and transformation into the CPTPP was also endorsed by Mexico and Peru, members of the PA. Before negotiations concluded, Singaporean negotiators also had accumulated experience with counterparts from Latin America. Since 2000, Mexico started talks with Singapore to negotiate a bilateral FTA. In the case of Peru, a bilateral agreement with Singapore was ratified in 2009 (MTI 2022). Based on the experience of other East Asian countries in their negotiations with those countries in Latin America, it is possible to identify some common goals. According to Wise (2016), China became interested in negotiating FTAs with economies such as Chile and Peru, based on the latter’s experience in implementing high-depth agreements, and the complementarity of their markets. That could help Chinese negotiators improve their know-how and become more confident in the negotiations of FTAs with other major and more developed economies, which would require a further liberalization of strategic sectors (Wise 2016, 80).

This reasoning could also be applied to the case of Singapore, which rapidly became an enthusiastic promoter of high-depth agreements worldwide in recent years. Their efforts in the pursuance of open regionalism can be illustrated by the reported number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) negotiated both by Singapore and the Pacific Alliance members (Table 1). Chile is one of the countries with the largest number of bilateral and multilateral FTAs in the world, and Singapore has followed its steps in recent years. Besides possessing some of the most extensive networks of FTAs in the world, they are founding members of the P-4, hence being pioneers in the interregionalism behind the Transpacific integration process.

For the case of the PA members, it is interesting to note that the implementation of open regionalism strategies has served to make those countries be perceived as reliable partners and not a threat to the opening of strategic sectors in countries from East Asia. Nonetheless, the same cannot be said when this type of logic is used for the other candidates to become associated states. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, different from Singapore, count mining and agricultural industries as strategic sectors, which puts them in direct competition with some of the main exporting sectors of PA countries. In this sense, we observed that Singapore has one of the highest trade complementarity index with each one of the members of the Pacific Alliance (Table 2). Compared with other candidates, Canada and South Korea stands higher, while Australia and New Zealand lag behind, meaning that the latter two countries’ exports compete intensively with those from other PA countries.

When looking at the case of Canada, which also presents a high complementarity with PA members, Arias (2023, 54) suggested that the strict labor legislation in the North American country represents a major contention issue with the emerging markets from the PA, together with the challenges derived from looser environmental regulations and large informal sectors. Therefore, these differences can help us elucidate how negotiations with Singapore, with a much smaller economy and highly specialized in services, did not arise many obstacles in the form of organized groups or sectors located in the other parties’ domestic economies (Arias 2023).

Singapore’s main exports, including high-tech goods and financial services, do not compete directly with strategic industries in those Latin American countries that embraced open regionalism. Having a small territory and scarce natural resources, Singapore is also interested in diversifying its sources of commodities, and the South American economies offer an attractive opportunity. Looking at official figures reported to the World Bank, we could also note that for 2022, the largest number of exports from Singapore to the Pacific Alliance countries were capital goods, while the largest percentage of imports is concentrated in consumer and intermediate goods (Table 3). It is noteworthy the volume of intra-industry trade in the sector of machinery and electronics, which accounts mostly for the bilateral trade between Mexico and Singapore. On the other hand, exports from Singapore to the other PA countries are also concentrated in that sector (Figure 2), while imports from those PA members in South America are much more diversified, with fuels and animal products being important in the case of Chile, stone and glass for Peru, and metals for the case of Colombia (Figure 3).

Then again, the experience of those Latin American officials in negotiating high-standard FTAs with more mature economies has been appreciated by their East Asian counterparts. In fact, two other states that are in the process of being admitted as full members of the PA, Costa Rica and Panama, have also negotiated bilateral free trade agreements with Singapore (Dosch 2021; MTI 2022). Nonetheless, it is also relevant to note how Singaporean officials have also approached officials from other Latin American countries associated with alternative regional integration mechanisms.

Such is the case of Mercosur that started negotiations with Singapore in 2018, and completed the signature of an FTA on December, 2023 (Mercopress 2023). Applying a common external tariff, Mercosur is not a case of open regionalism, since it opposes its members negotiating agreements with outside parties separately, but its agreement with Singapore signals an interest in supporting interregionalism. In another example of that support, ASEAN and Mercosur celebrated a couple of ministerial meetings in 2008 and 2017. Furthermore, they agreed to the creation of a Mercosur-ASEAN Chamber of Commerce, which explores the possibilities of enhancing trade between regions, and set up offices in all of the Mercosur member countries, as well as in the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam (MACC n.d.).

Using official data from Singaporean authorities and the World Bank, it is possible to trace the evolution of Singapore’s trade with countries from both the PA and Mercosur (Table 4). Looking at different years, a sustained growth in bilateral trade has become evident for the past couple of decades. Nonetheless, for most of the observed years, trade between Singapore and the PA countries exceeds that between Singapore and Mercosur. For both blocs, bilateral trade with Singapore is mainly concentrated in each group’s largest economies. In 2021, for the Pacific Alliance, 88% of Singaporean trade was done with Mexico; for Mercosur, 95% was with Brazil. Nonetheless, it is also relevant to note how, in the case of the PA, trade between Singapore and those countries with a previous FTA showed an initial growth, followed by a phase of stabilization, and even stagnation, although more analysis is needed to find causal relations. Looking at the size of their economies, we can perceive that Colombia, Chile and Peru show higher volumes of bilateral trade with Singapore than their Mercosur counterparts, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

It is also noteworthy how trade between Singapore and the PA members reached a historic height between 2011-2013, followed by a decline, and later stabilization, even before the outbreak of Covid-19 (Figure 4). Another relevant observation is the evolution of bilateral trade between Singapore and Colombia. Despite the lack of previous trade agreements, Singapore’s trade with Colombia began to surpass the levels of its trade with Chile and Peru since the mid-2000s. This led to a significant increase in Colombian exports to Singapore. As a result, and different from the other PA members, Colombia has tended to report a continuous surplus in its trade with Singapore in recent years (Table 4; Arias 2023, 55).

Alternatively, more studies are needed and a more comprehensive quantitative analysis is in place to demonstrate whether the existence of a previous FTA was utilized successfully by different firms in Singapore to increase their exports to Chile and Peru, in contrast to the situation in Colombia, where there was none. By contrast, Singapore’s reported trade deficits with the PA members are not as marked as its deficit with Mercosur, particularly with Brazil. In this sense, future research could also pay attention to prove whether a less unbalanced bilateral trade was conducive to smoothen negotiations between Singapore and the Pacific Alliance.

On the other hand, outward direct investments from Singapore into Latin America are another major component in our analysis. Since the mid-1980s, Singaporean authorities deemed it necessary to design and implement long-term strategies to turn its economy into a significant exporter of services, mainly in the financial and business sectors. As a result, Singapore successfully became one of the leading offshore financial centers in Asia. A few years later, in 1993, the government approved the creation of a special committee promoting the presence of Singaporean firms overseas, looking for access to land, labor, and markets in third countries (Lee 2016, 24-25). Through the recommendations made by the committee, Singaporean outward direct investment (ODI) started circulating around the world. Since then, the largest beneficiaries have been, naturally, the closest markets to Singapore, i.e., the largest ASEAN economies and China (Lee 2016). However, using data from Singapore’s Department of Statistics (DOS), the trends of Singaporean ODI to Latin America and the Caribbean can also be traced (Table 5).

Between 2001 and 2021, multiple enterprises from Singapore reported an accumulated investment of more than US\$1.8 billion in the Latin American and Caribbean. Nonetheless, as it is possible to observe for other countries’ investments made in that part of the world, around 90% of the total were made in the British Caribbean territories. Places like the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda are usually identified as tax havens. Unsurprisingly, most of the reported ODI by Singapore in that region is located in financial institutions in the Caribbean. Conversely, of the remaining US\$191 million, one-third is concentrated in only three countries, i.e., Mexico, Peru and Brazil. Those are the destinations identified by the official data from the DOS (2023).

Since the mid-1990s, due to NAFTA, Mexico became an important destination for Singapore’s ODI in Latin America. Given its geographical proximity to the US, Singaporean firms and other companies from the more mature economies in the Asia-Pacific, have landed in Mexico to improve their access to North American markets. Singaporean investments in Brazil, on the other hand, are interested in the large size of its economy, the increasing purchasing power of its middle classes, and the sustained development of its agricultural and mining exporting sectors. Nonetheless, the most significant case is that of Peru. In less than 15 years, the Peruvian economy managed to attract a much larger amount of Singaporean ODI than the total accumulated by Brazil in 25 years. In this context, after the implementation of the Peru-Singapore FTA we can see a substantial increase in Singaporean ODI in the South American economy, although more research is needed to see whether a causal relation exist between those variables (Figure 5). Unfortunately, the DOS does not offer specific data for Chile. Hence, it is not possible to see if there are any similarities with the case of Peru. There is also an absence on specific figures for Singapore’s ODI in Colombia.

However, if we take the case of Chinese and other East Asian firms as a parameter, it is likely that Singaporean enterprises have found Peru to be an attractive destination, due to the openness in strategic sectors, such as mining and fishing (Zhang 2018). The fact that those FTAs between Singapore and Latin American countries that have embraced open regionalism are high-standard agreements, encompassing the liberalization of their financial sectors and the extension of national treatment for Singaporean firms, supports the idea that open regionalism has been an attractive element for Singapore’s authorities and entrepreneurs.

This is also found in official statements by key actors in Singapore. To illustrate the constant emphasis on ideas and values associated with an open and rules-based multilateral trade system, which are also important elements in open regionalism, as well as one path to increase interregionalism, we collected speeches and statements from Singaporean officials between 2018 and 2023. This period corresponds to the announcement of the creation of the Associated State status for the PA, all the way to the process of negotiations and conclusion of the PASFTA, as well as one year into its process of ratification. The data was found in three major news sources from the region (Asia News Monitor ; The Business Times ; and, The Straits Times), and the main parts of the speeches in which we can analyze and identify references to the relevance for Singapore and its promotion of a liberal trade system, as well as the suggestion of shared values with the Pacific Alliance are contained in Table 6.

Therefore, the different data presented in this paper help us to trace the process of Singapore becoming an Associated State of the PA. Based on the official declarations, the emphasis on the opening of the service sector, including maritime, financial and investment is a key element in the understanding of Singapore concluding negotiations with the Pacific Alliance sooner than other candidates. This goes in hand with the trade complementarity scenario, as it is highlighted in the mention of strengthening Singaporean supply chains, including the food supply chain. Furthermore, the constant mentions to their shared commitment towards the perceived benefits from a liberal trade regime are connected to their notions of open regionalism and interregionalism. The emphasis on an open international trade system and connectivity for the survival of Singapore could also be seen as an important element, especially in comparison with other candidates to be granted the category of Associate State. For the cases of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the existence of competing sectors and interests with those of their South American counterparts, such as agricultural and mining sectors, can be seen as a potential reason for constant frictions and delays during negotiations with the PA members, as well as their emphasis in the discussion of other topics concerning environmental protection and labor rights (Arias 2023: 53). For the case of South Korea, negotiations started after Singapore was officially granted the category of Associated State, in 2022, which makes it a more difficult case for comparison. However, we can wait and observe how fast this process unfolds, and whether it could become an Associated State faster than the other candidates. Likewise, the first years of Singapore as partner of the Pacific Alliance and the evolution of trade and investments are steps in the direction of a process of an open Transpacific economic integration.

The Pacific Alliance is a mechanism of integration associated with the concept of open regionalism and contributing to the Transpacific economic integration process. Despite the coincidental arrival of left-leaning governments in all member countries, and therefore reluctant to the principles of neoliberalism that originally accompanied the creation of the bloc, the PA project has been maintained. Following previous works that suggest that the trade bloc was designed to serve as a depoliticized mechanism for economic integration, we can see that its sustenance and expansion coincide with the assumed shared values of their members to persevere in the initial goals of using the PA as a platform for open regionalism and interregionalism with the Asia-Pacific. Thus, Singapore’s accession as an Associated State highlights the desire to expand the bloc, particularly with other actors on the other side of the Pacific.

Although the evolution of the PA and the interests of those involved in creating the Associated State status are addressed in this article, specifically for the case of Singapore, it is too soon to sustain that open regionalism will lead to the successful economic integration of its members. Thus, it is more feasible to consider that, for the PA countries, the expansion of the mechanism towards other Asia-Pacific members has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it aligns with the foundational goal of the institution, positioning its members in a more favorable situation vis-à-vis the markets on the other side of the Pacific, as well as reorienting their export sectors towards that part of the world. On the other hand, it reinforces the perception of these economies as having accumulated experience in negotiating high-depth trade agreements, aiming to position them as attractive destinations for FDI, mainly from more mature economies.

The case of Singapore is a useful learning tool because, for the past four decades, it has had the goal of diversifying its economy and becoming a major exporter of services, particularly in the financial sector. This has led it to be Southeast Asia’s primary FDI source. For countries like Mexico and Peru, while Singaporean investments do not reach the levels reported for those from the US or the European Union, they rank at the top among Asian investors, behind Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean firms. The latter have also negotiated a series of FTAs with some of the PA members, suggesting that Singapore sought to go one step further in obtaining the status of Associated State, and remains at the forefront of Transpacific economic integration.

It is also important to note that the Singaporean economy’s size and composition presents significant complementarities with all of the Pacific alliance member-economies. This is crucial for understanding the longer time it has taken for the other official candidates to achieve this status, and can present interesting lessons for South Korea in its path to be granted a similar category. Canada and Australia are significant producers and exporters of minerals, putting them in direct competition with these sectors in Chile, Peru, and Mexico. Other agro-exporting sectors in Australia and New Zealand also directly compete with Chilean, Mexican and Colombian firms. Therefore, the future direction of negotiations with these countries and the likely inclusion of other PA members and new Associated States need to be studied in greater detail.

Finally, a deeper quantitative analysis needs to be performed to see whether the signature of an FTA between Singapore and Peru is related to the increase in the former’s investments in the Peruvian economy. Similarly, when new Associated States are formalized, it would be necessary a more in-depth analysis to compare them with Singapore, and gain insights into the challenges and benefits from obtaining that category. Future research could also go deeper into the application of theoretical notions from critical constructivism, to see how states are socialized and become convinced of embracing notions like open regionalism and interregionalism. This will allow us to learn more about the theory and practice of open regionalism, represented in the figure of the Pacific Alliance and its other Asia-Pacific partners, which can become a crucial subject in a changing geopolitical landscape and the potential alterations to a liberal rules-based global trade regime.