Indexed in: KCI, ESCI, SCOPUS
search for




 

Transition to a friendly neighbor: Saudi Arabia's Aid Odyssey
The Korean Journal of International Studies 22-3 (December 2024), 311-335
Published online December 31, 2024
© 2024 The Korean Association of International Studies.

Alanoud Aloufi and Hyojung KIM  [Bio-Data]
Received September 27, 2024; Revised October 15, 2024; Accepted November 19, 2024.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

For more information, see KJIS-Poicy-Open Access
Abstract
This study analyzes the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy by dividing it into two distinct periods: before and after 2015. To identify the key factors driving these changes, the 3i framework (ideas, interests, and institutions) is applied. By examining how different influences shaped ODA policy in each period, this research highlights a shift from a religiously-driven aid model to one increasingly influenced by economic and geopolitical considerations. The study also emphasizes the role of Saudi leadership, particularly through Vision 2030, and the adaptation of institutional frameworks to a changing global context. This analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of the ODA strategies employed by non-traditional donor countries like Saudi Arabia and provides insights into its growing role in the global donor community.
Keywords : Saudi Arabia’s Aid, Foreign Aid in Gulf countries, ODA, Non-DAC donors, Non-Traditional Donors.
INTRODUCTION

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a forum where major donor countries, along with some multilateral organizations, meet to coordinate and discuss their aid policies and practices. It serves as a platform for member countries to exchange information, set standards, and collaborate on various aspects of international development assistance. Consequently, DAC member countries are typically those that provide significant levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to support the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

However, despite the aid provided by traditional donor countries, many global issues remain unresolved. Additionally, persistent challenges such as the prolongation of wars and the deepening of humanitarian crises continue to emerge, which are difficult to address solely through the cooperation of DAC member countries. In this context, the international development cooperation community has initiated discussions regarding the participation of various actors. As discussions surrounding the aid contributions of non-DAC member countries gain momentum, there is growing interest in their development cooperation policies. Countries such as China, Brazil, and India have started to assume a more substantial role in foreign assistance, operating outside the conventional frameworks established by the DAC (Dreher et al., 2021; Zeitz, 2021; Cesarino, 2015). In this study, we classify countries that continue foreign aid practices without joining the DAC as ‘non-DAC countries’.

A particularly significant player in this evolving landscape is Saudi Arabia. Traditionally considered a generous donor, Saudi Arabia is now pursuing a significant shift in its foreign aid policy. Although it is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Saudi Arabia attained DAC participant status in 2018, underscoring its commitment to global development efforts. By participating in the DAC, Saudi Arabia aligns itself with various international development targets and adheres to DAC standards and recommendations. This involvement indicates a willingness to engage with, and potentially integrate, some established norms of international aid practices, even though it is not bound by DAC membership. However, Saudi Arabia does not fit the conventional model of a donor engaging in South-North Cooperation.

This study examines Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid policies as a case study within the broader context of non-traditional donor countries. By analyzing the distinctive characteristics of Saudi Arabia’s aid policies, it seeks to derive policy implications for non-traditional donors that do not fit the conventional ‘emerging donor’ classification. The year 2015 is identified as a critical turning point, marking a significant transformation in Saudi Arabia’s approach to international development cooperation. This research compares of Saudi Arabia’s aid policies before and after this transition, using 2015 as a reference point to investigate shifts in policy direction and priorities.

Saudi foreign aid data has been publicly available in the OECD statistics database since 2014, and the creation of the Saudi Aid Platform has made information about its foreign assistance more accessible. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has become more assertive and interventionist, driven by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, which aims to transform the kingdom into a modernized, economically diversified state. This shift is also driven by regional rivalries, particularly with Iran, as well as a broader strategy of recalibrating global alliances.

The Vision 2030, launched in 2016, focuses on reducing Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil exports and promoting its global influence through public sector reform and strategic international partnerships. These efforts have positioned foreign aid as a critical tool in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, leveraging aid not only to bolster regional stability but also to enhance its soft power and leadership role in the Middle East and beyond. Entering the war in Yemen in 2015 is also a key event that molded how Saudi aid has been utilized as a strategic foreign policy tool (Bordón & Alrefai, 2023).

This study aims to identify the factors influencing the ODA policies of non-traditional donor countries by comparing the changes in Saudi Arabia’s ODA policy before and after the transition. While various discussions have thoroughly examined the causes of the policy shift (Yaghi, 2024; Coates Ulrichsen, 2024; Sritharan, 2023), the focus of this research is to analyze the factors that influenced the policy during each period, centering around the turning point of the policy change. Additionally, this research serves as a cornerstone for applied research aimed at broadening the scope of donor nations. This research also has the potential to bridge the gap between traditional DAC members and emerging donors, fostering a deeper understanding of emerging donor practices. Lastly, this research may serve as a foundation for fostering future collaboration with Saudi Arabia in global development initiatives.

This paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The second section reviews the existing literature and explores the imperatives for studying non-DAC donors. The third and fourth sections apply the 3i framework to analyze Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid policy, focusing on the period before 2015 in the third section and after 2015 in the fourth. The final section presents the study’s implications and limitations.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE DONORS, BESIDES THE DAC

The DAC has established specific standards and criteria aimed at alleviating global suffering and promoting effective aid practices. These standards are crafted to ensure that aid delivery is both efficient and impactful, with a focus on crucial areas such as poverty reduction, sustainable development, and adherence to principles of good governance. However, the approaches and priorities of DAC and non-DAC donors often differ significantly.

While DAC members typically adhere to a set of guidelines emphasizing transparency, accountability, and a focus on least developed countries, non-DAC donors frequently employ distinct strategies and priorities in their aid programs, which may diverge sharply from traditional DAC practices (Doucette, 2020; Salem, 2020; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013). For instance, aid from emerging donors is often less contingent on political conditions or policy reforms and instead emphasizes pragmatic (Ye, 2022), project-based assistance. While this approach can increase recipients' bargaining power and choices (Zoccal, 2020), it also introduces new complexities into the international aid landscape, such as concerns about debt sustainability, governance, and alignment with global development goals (Woods, 2008; Reisen, 2007; Manning, 2006). The growing influence of these donors is thus reshaping the global aid landscape, challenging existing paradigms of international development assistance, and raising important questions about the future direction of global aid efforts.

However, not all donor countries appear to oppose the DAC, and in Saudi Arabia's case, it demonstrates greater adherence to DAC norms in more areas than even DAC participant countries. The interaction between DAC and non-DAC donors underscores the evolving nature of global development assistance and highlights the need for inclusive dialogue to harmonize various aid strategies for broader global impact. Yet, there remains a critical gap in recognizing and understanding the role of these emerging donors in the global aid architecture (Mawdsley, 2012). Despite their growing contributions, non-traditional donors are often underestimated or overlooked by Western scholars and policymakers, who tend to focus on traditional Western-led aid models and face challenges in obtaining comprehensive data on non-DAC countries’ aid activities. Discussions on the necessity of interaction between DAC donor countries and non-DAC donor countries are increasing.

From the perspective of recipient nations, there is an increasing preference for development cooperation initiatives led by emerging donors over those from traditional donor counterparts (Saidi and Wolf, 2011). This is often due to the geographical and socio-cultural proximity of emerging donors to developing countries, which allows them to better localize projects and increase policy acceptance (Turhan, 2021). Given the anticipated proliferation of non-traditional donor countries in the international arena and the projected expansion of their aid budgets, there is an urgent need for greater scrutiny of their ODA strategies.

Although non-DAC donors often deviate from the established norms and guidelines of the DAC, they are making significant contributions to global aid efforts (Udvari, 2014). As these donors continue to assert their influence on the international stage, their contributions are not only diversifying the sources of aid but also prompting a reevaluation of existing aid models and the principles governing international development assistance. Continued research into donor nations that defy easy classification within traditional frameworks is essential for broadening our understanding of global development cooperation. In this context, Saudi Arabia stands out as a particularly significant non-DAC donor.

In this evolving landscape, Saudi Arabia stands out as a particularly significant non-DAC donor. Although not a formal member of the OECD, Saudi Arabia became a DAC participating country in 2018 and has demonstrated considerable adherence to DAC norms, in some cases surpassing the practices of traditional DAC members. The Kingdom has made efforts to disclose its ODA budget and align its aid policies with DAC standards. Yet, limited discussion exists around the factors shaping Saudi Arabia’s aid policies and practices, especially its gradual shift toward DAC-aligned standards (Harmáček et al., 2022).

An abductive reasoning approach is employed to identify the core elements of Saudi Arabia’s ODA strategies, concentrating on constructing the most plausible explanations based on available evidence (Douven, 2021). Abductive reasoning is especially effective in contexts where data access is limited, such as policy analysis in which multiple, complex factors interact. This approach enables the development of reasoned explanations using accessible data, which is critical in cases where comprehensive access to all decision-making factors may be restricted.

Given the inherent limitations in fully examining the complex decision-making processes shaping Saudi Arabia’s ODA policies, abductive reasoning is well-suited for providing an expansive yet precise explanatory framework. Accordingly, this study applies the 3i Framework (institutions, interests, and ideas) to identify and explain the key dimensions underlying Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid strategies, thereby aiming to offer the most comprehensive explanation of policy evolution within the context of limited data.

This study aims to divide Saudi Arabia’s aid policy based on the year 2015 and analyze the factors that influenced ODA policy during each period by applying the 3i framework. The 3i framework provides a comprehensive understanding of policy by examining the ideas underlying the policy, stakeholders participating in the policy formation and decision-making process, and the institutions responsible for its implementation. Notably, the 3i framework identifies the key factors influencing policy formation, making it a valuable tool for evaluating the primary drivers of a country’s policy and the roles played by each factor (Kim, 2023; Sandhu et al., 2021).

Historically, Saudi Arabia's foreign aid policy has been employed as both a political and economic instrument, as well as a tool for religious outreach (Bordón & Alrefai, 2023). The ideological foundations underlying this policy reflect a combination of political, economic, and religious objectives, often interwoven with the Kingdom’s strategic priorities. The 3i framework, which examines policies through the lenses of interests, institutions, and ideas, is particularly well-suited for analyzing the factors influencing Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid policy. By considering the interests that drive the policy, the institutions responsible for its implementation, and the ideas that shape its goals, this framework offers a comprehensive approach to understanding the motivations and mechanisms behind Saudi Arabia’s development assistance strategies (Sritharan et al., 2023). This approach not only illuminates how Saudi Arabia uses aid to further its national interests but also highlights the intersection of economic, political, and religious factors in shaping its foreign aid approach.

By analyzing the key drivers behind Saudi Arabia's ODA decision-making process, this framework can provide insights into the Kingdom's evolving role as a non-traditional donor. This examination not only sheds light on Saudi Arabia's unique position in global aid but also contributes to broader research on the policy processes of emerging donors. The following section will utilize the 3i framework to analyze Saudi Arabia's foreign aid policy prior to its significant shifts in 2015, offering a deeper understanding of the Kingdom's transition in aid strategy.

SAUDI ARABIA’S FOREIGN AID: LEADER IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Ideas

Ideas can be understood as beliefs, norms, values, and ideologies that shape a state’s behavior and policy choices (Béland, 2016). These encompass a wide range of factors, including cultural, religious, philosophical, and historical beliefs, which influence how states perceive their interests and interact with the international community. In the case of Saudi Arabia, its foreign aid policies, especially until 2015, were deeply informed by religious and cultural values rooted in Islamic principles, which set the Kingdom apart from traditional DAC donors.

Saudi Arabia's foreign aid policy, until the mid-2000s, was primarily shaped by its role as a leader in the Muslim world, underpinned by its religious ideologies and cultural influence. As the birthplace of Islam and custodian of its two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia sought to assert itself as a global leader for Muslims, using its foreign aid not only as a tool for material assistance but also as a means to promote Islamic values globally (Ahmed and Karim, 2024).

The Kingdom’s approach to foreign aid, particularly through its ODA efforts, was heavily grounded in Islamic principles, especially the values of Zakat (charitable giving) and Sadaqah (voluntary charity). The most essential concept in explaining Saudi Arabia's foreign aid until 2015 was Zakat. Zakat refers to an obligatory form of almsgiving and one of the Five Pillars of Islam. It requires Muslims who meet certain wealth criteria to donate 2.5% of their wealth or income to those in need, thereby promoting social justice. In the Quran, Zakat is frequently mentioned alongside prayer as a fundamental religious duty (e.g., Quran 27:3). Primarily intended to assist the poor and needy, Zakat constitutes a form of religiously motivated private aid.

In addition, Sadaqah refers to voluntary charitable giving motivated by compassion, love, or a sense of religious duty. Unlike Zakat, which is mandatory for Muslims and one of the Five Pillars of Islam, Sadaqah is voluntary and can be given at any time, in any amount. Another Islamic value reflected in Saudi Arabia’s aid policy is fairness. This principle, deeply rooted in Islamic philanthropic traditions and cultural values, plays a critical role in shaping the country’s aid allocation. The Quran emphasizes equality and justice in distribution, as well as the moral obligation to assist those in poverty (Khan, 2020).

This aligns with the Islamic concept of Fard Kifayah, which emphasizes shared social responsibility. Fard Kifayah refers to the collective obligation within Islam to support those who are materially oppressed (Wahb, 2021). Numerous Quranic verses encourage donations to the poor, underscoring the connection between Islamic spirituality and humanitarian aid (Khan, 2020). These values have likely influenced Saudi Arabia's generous ODA. As detailed in the forthcoming institutional analysis section, Saudi Arabia allocated \$3 billion in infrastructure loans within the first decade after establishing the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) in 1974. In this same period, Saudi Arabia contributed \$240 million toward founding the Islamic Development Bank and \$100 million to establish the Special Arab Fund for Africa (Saudi Aid Platform, 2023; Sritharan et al., 2023). Altogether, Saudi Arabia’s contributions to multilateral development bank during this time amounted to approximately \$2.15 billion, underscoring the generosity of Saudi Arabia’s aid approach.

However, while Zakat and Sadaqah were central to Saudi aid practices, they fell outside the scope of ODA as defined by the DAC, which views these forms of religious philanthropy as distinct from international development aid (Jaromir et al., 2022). As a result, Saudi Arabia’s actual contributions to foreign aid might be underreported, since much of its aid, particularly that driven by religious principles, is not included in DAC statistics. Despite this, Saudi Arabia has consistently ranked among the most generous donors globally, often exceeding the 0.7% ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) target as early as the 2000s (Tok, 2015). Over the decades, Saudi Arabia's ODA has generally followed an upward trend, with some fluctuations corresponding to changes in oil prices.

This generosity has been a key feature of Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid model, which has evolved separately from traditional DAC donors. While some critics have questioned the humanitarian motivations behind Islamic-based aid, such claims remain largely unsubstantiated (Harmáček et al., 2022). Rather, Saudi Arabia’s ODA strategy has been distinctively shaped by Islamic values and cultural norms, making it a unique case among non-DAC donors (Li, 2019).

Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid policy prior to 2015 was driven by a combination of religious principles, cultural identity, and its position as a leader in the Muslim world. These values not only distinguished its ODA from that of traditional DAC donors but also contributed to its evolving role in the international aid landscape, highlighting the need for a broader understanding of non-DAC donors and their contributions to global development.

Interests

Interests refer to the tangible goals, objectives, and preferences that guide states' behavior and decision-making processes (Yazdi-Feyzabadi et al., 2021). These interests can encompass economic goals, security concerns, political aspirations, and strategic considerations. While Saudi Arabia's foreign aid strategy is deeply rooted in religious values, its tangible interests also play a critical role in shaping its international assistance programs. Understanding these interests is essential for analyzing the Kingdom's foreign aid decisions and predicting its behavior in various policy domains.

While Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy may appear pragmatic, it has historically invested considerable resources in programs aimed at promoting Islamic development and religious diplomacy (Chikrizova, 2019). Through its aid programs, Saudi Arabia not only fosters recipients’ economic development but also advances its religious and cultural influence globally, particularly through Daʿwah activities, which represent its Islamic missionary efforts (Varagur, 2020). This demonstrated the intersection of religious and strategic interests, as Saudi Arabia has used foreign aid as a tool to enhance its leadership in the Muslim world while furthering its broader geopolitical goals.

A key indicator of Saudi Arabia’s strategic use of aid was its heavy reliance on bilateral aid, which allows for greater control over how funds are allocated and used. Bilateral aid often gave donor countries more influence over the policies of recipient nations, aligning them with the donor's strategic or ideological objectives. For instance, conditions could be attached to bilateral aid packages, requiring recipients to adopt reforms or policies that served the donor's interests. This contrasts with multilateral aid, which is typically viewed as more neutral and transparent, as it is channeled through international organizations like the United Nations or the World Bank, where decision-making is collective (Gulrajani, 2016).

However, Saudi Arabia's multilateral aid efforts were unique. Although some of its multilateral contributions go to international organizations such as the UN, a significant portion was directed toward regional bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Arab humanitarian and development programs. These institutions have aligned with Saudi Arabia’s broader religious and regional goals, further underscoring the Kingdom’s strategic use of aid within a multilateral framework that still reflects its national and ideological interests.

The religious dimension of Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid strategy was also evident in the geographic distribution of its aid recipients. As a leader in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia directed the majority of its funds to countries within the Arab region. For instance, between 2005 and 2014, the SFD provided \$2,472.73 million to Arab countries, followed by \$1,581 million to Asia and \$1,089 million to Africa, with other regions receiving only \$233 million (UNDP, 2016). This highlighted that Saudi Arabia’s aid strategy heavily favors countries with Islamic affiliations, further supporting its role as a promoter of Islamic values and solidarity.

The strategic focus on bilateral aid reinforced the Kingdom’s ability to maintain influence over the political and ideological direction of recipient nations. By prioritizing direct aid relationships, Saudi Arabia could ensure that its resources not only contribute to development but also bolster its standing as a global leader in the Muslim world, while simultaneously advancing its national interests (Blin, 2023).

Saudi Arabia's foreign aid policies before 2015 revealed a complex interplay of religious and strategic interests. While Islamic values undeniably shaped the Kingdom’s aid strategies, its reliance on bilateral aid and focus on the Arab and Muslim world reflect broader geopolitical goals. This alignment of ideology and pragmatism highlighted Saudi Arabia’s unique position within the global aid landscape, distinguishing it from both DAC and other non-DAC donors.

Institutions

Institutions refer to the formal and informal rules and structures that govern interactions among bureaucrats, decision-makers, and policy actors. These institutions shape the incentives, constraints, and opportunities that actors face, influencing their behavior and the outcomes of their interactions (Smith et al., 2014; Béland and Waddan, 2012). In the case of Saudi Arabia, institutional structures have played a crucial role in shaping the country’s approach to foreign aid, which differs from the legal frameworks and bureaucratic systems seen in many traditional donor countries.

Saudi Arabia’s significant role in international aid began in 1974 with the establishment of the SFD. However, the origins of its aid program were closely tied to the 1973 oil embargo, which prompted international criticism of the Kingdom. In response to this backlash, Saudi Arabia sought to reshape its global image by increasing its foreign aid contributions (Momani and Ennis, 2012). The creation of the SFD was part of this strategy, positioning Saudi Arabia as a generous donor and using aid as a tool to counter criticism, particularly in light of ongoing religious conflicts in the Middle East.

Unlike traditional donors, Saudi Arabia did not have specific legislation dedicated to ODA. Instead, its ODA activities were governed by broader policies and frameworks established by relevant government ministries and agencies. Much of Saudi aid was channeled through religious organizations, which reflects the Kingdom’s dual goals of providing humanitarian assistance and promoting Islamic values. One of the most influential institutions in this context was the Muslim World League (MWL), founded in 1962 by King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. The MWL played a key role in advancing Saudi Arabia’s religious and cultural diplomacy, particularly through the promotion of Islam (Blin, 2023).

The MWL’s mission has aligned with Saudi Arabia’s broader foreign policy objectives, which include spreading Islamic teachings, or Daʿwah, and fostering Islamic solidarity across the globe. Through the MWL, Saudi Arabia has been able to establish religious institutions, support Islamic education, and provide aid through an Islamic framework. A prominent offshoot of the MWL was the International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia (IIROSA), founded in 1975. This organization has grown into a significant humanitarian actor, with regional offices in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Benthall, 2018). The Saudi government initially delegated the management of IIROSA's funds to its embassies, further emphasizing the role of Islamic charitable principles, such as Zakat and Sadaqah, in the Kingdom’s aid activities.

Saudi Arabia's foreign aid, particularly when disbursed through the MWL, often reflected a combination of humanitarian and religious goals. Aid projects frequently included the construction of mosques, Islamic centers, and educational programs that integrate religious teachings with humanitarian assistance (Meuleman, 2011). This dual purpose of Saudi ODA—supporting development while advancing religious objectives—has allowed the Kingdom to project its influence across Muslim communities worldwide. By promoting Islamic solidarity through financial aid, Saudi Arabia not only fulfilled its religious duties but also enhanced its diplomatic and cultural presence globally.

The institutional landscape governing Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid has been shaped by both its religious mission and strategic objectives. The influence of organizations like the MWL and the IIROSA has allowed Saudi Arabia to intertwine its humanitarian efforts with its broader goals of spreading Islamic values and fostering solidarity among Muslim nations. This unique institutional framework of Saudi Arabia’s ODA from the more secular and bureaucratic approaches seen in traditional DAC donors further underscores its distinct role in the global aid architecture.

NAVIGATING SAUDI ARABIA’S NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TOWARD A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR

Ideas

In 2023, Saudi Arabia signaled a major shift in its foreign aid policy when Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan announced that the Kingdom would no longer provide unconditional foreign grants. Speaking at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, he explained that Saudi Arabia was changing the way it delivers development assistance, marking a departure from its past practices of offering substantial cash deposits and budget support loans, which had often been motivated by religious ideology (Sritharan et al., 2022). This policy shift reflects Saudi Arabia's broader reorientation under Vision 2030, a transformative agenda aimed at reducing the Kingdom's dependency on oil and diversifying its economy through global partnerships and foreign investment.

At the core of this change is the need to rethink Saudi Arabia's foreign relations, moving beyond traditional alliances and expanding its diplomatic and economic outreach to regions beyond the Middle East, including Asia, Europe, and other developing areas (Octopus, 2024). This global outreach has led to the development of new partnerships, especially with Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has expanded its aid to countries such as Cameroon, Gambia, Malawi, and Nepal—nations that are not predominantly Muslim. This shift marks a departure from the religiously motivated regional bias that had previously shaped Saudi aid policies.

The data in Table 1 highlight Saudi Arabia's significant ODA contributions to LDCs, where the Kingdom allocates a larger proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) to development aid than many DAC member countries. For example, while countries like Australia (0.07%), Canada (0.09%), and the United States (0.05%) contribute less than 0.1% of their ODA to LDCs as a share of GNI, Saudi Arabia’s contributions exceed these figures, signaling its growing role in global development.

Moreover, Table 2 shows that Saudi Arabia consistently ranks among the top 10 global humanitarian donors, underscoring its evolving identity as a key player in international aid. This expansion in humanitarian assistance is part of a broader strategy to reshape Saudi Arabia's diplomatic reputation, positioning the Kingdom as a benevolent power dedicated to promoting peace, stability, and development in the global community (Ahmed and Karim, 2024).

Despite these changes, Zakat and Sadaqah—Islamic principles of charitable giving—continue to play a role in shaping Saudi Arabia’s aid strategy. This analysis highlights the complex interplay between religious ideology and Saudi Arabia's broader development goals. While rooted in Islamic values, Saudi Arabia’s evolving aid policy increasingly reflects strategic development objectives, positioning the Kingdom as a pivotal player in international diplomacy and humanitarian efforts. This transformation underscores Saudi Arabia's ambitions to be recognized as a positive mediator on the global stage, contributing to peace and development while maintaining its unique cultural and religious identity.

Interest

Prior to 2015, Saudi Arabia's foreign aid was primarily driven by religious objectives, aiming to spread Islamic values and influence. However, recent years have seen a significant shift in the Kingdom’s ODA strategy, which is now heavily influenced by economic and geopolitical interests. This shift is closely tied to Saudi Arabia’s status as a major oil producer and its ongoing efforts to diversify its economy, as outlined in initiatives like Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan. These initiatives aim to reduce the Kingdom’s dependency on oil by leveraging ODA to foster economic partnerships and open new markets, aligning foreign aid with broader economic diversification goals (Moshashai, Leber, and Savage, 2020).

One of the clearest examples of this shift is the allocation of aid to countries such as Egypt and Yemen. As shown in Figure 2, between 2015 and 2022, these two nations received the largest share of Saudi Arabia’s ODA. Aid to Egypt, a key trade partner, reflects the Kingdom’s economic interests, particularly in relation to the NEOM project, a cornerstone of Vision 2030. NEOM, a futuristic city project located in Saudi Arabia's Tabuk Province near the Egyptian border, is designed to drive technological innovation and economic growth. Since its inception in 2017, Egypt has consistently ranked among the top recipients of Saudi aid, receiving 78% of the Kingdom's aid in 2021 and 83% in 2022. This high concentration of aid highlights the strategic alignment between ODA distribution and Saudi Arabia's development goals, with NEOM playing a pivotal role in cementing economic ties between the two countries (Farag, 2019).

In contrast, Saudi aid to Yemen is primarily driven by security concerns. Yemen's ongoing civil conflict and its strategic location along the Gulf of Aden pose significant threats to Saudi Arabia's stability. The Houthi insurgency and the subsequent takeover of Sanaa in 2015 escalated security crises, including widespread humanitarian issues such as food insecurity, displacement, and the spread of diseases like cholera. These factors make Yemen a focal point of Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid efforts, as instability in Yemen not only threatens the region but also provides a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism (Salim, 2022). By channeling ODA into Yemen, Saudi Arabia seeks to stabilize the country, bolster its security forces, and combat terrorist groups. This surge in aid reflects a blend of humanitarian concern and geopolitical strategy, where Saudi Arabia uses bilateral aid as a tool to influence outcomes and forge alliances in the region (Elayah and Al-Awami, 2024).

Saudi Arabia’s evolving use of ODA reflects a broader shift in its foreign policy under King Salman, characterized by a more assertive and pragmatic approach. Since his ascent to the throne, Saudi foreign policy has embraced a more progressive stance, with initiatives such as multinational security coalitions (MSCs) playing a central role in advancing the Kingdom’s geopolitical interests. These MSCs are crucial in countering regional threats, balancing rival powers like Iran, and projecting Saudi influence across the Middle East (Rich and Moore-Gilbert, 2019). In this context, foreign aid has become a primary tool of Saudi diplomacy, often surpassing religious motives in terms of importance and impact.

Furthermore, while other Gulf countries such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait tend to rely heavily on bilateral aid, Saudi Arabia has increasingly shown a preference for multilateral aid. This shift is particularly significant among Gulf donors, as Saudi Arabia’s investment in multilateral initiatives reflects a growing recognition of the value of collaborative, global approaches to development. As Saudi Arabia moves away from its traditional, religion-based aid model, this preference for multilateral aid suggests a strategic rebranding of its foreign assistance as a tool for diplomacy, regional stability, and global cooperation (Elayah and Al-Awami, 2024).

Saudi Arabia’s ODA strategy post-2015 reflects a significant departure from its previous religiously motivated aid model. The Kingdom’s foreign aid is now a sophisticated blend of economic, security, and geopolitical interests, demonstrating how Saudi Arabia uses ODA not only to support development but also to assert regional influence and address security challenges. This realignment highlights Saudi Arabia's shift toward a more pragmatic and diversified foreign policy, driven by both Vision 2030 and a desire to play a larger role in the global community.

Institutions

Saudi Arabia's ODA strategy is shaped by its evolving institutional frameworks, which have played a crucial role in centralizing the administration and implementation of its foreign aid programs. A significant turning point occurred with Mohammed bin Salman’s ascent to Crown Prince in 2017, marking the beginning of a new era of centralized decision-making across the Kingdom’s policies, including ODA (Alhussein, 2022). As Saudi Arabia consolidated control over its ODA strategy, many religious organizations previously involved in foreign aid either disappeared or shifted their focus (Blin, 2023). This centralization allowed Saudi Arabia to align its foreign aid programs with international standards, such as the United Nations Financial Tracking System, DAC-OECD, and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), ensuring transparency and global credibility in its aid distribution.

The most prominent agency in this centralized framework is the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSrelief), which was established by royal decree on May 13, 2015. This Center’s mission is to provide relief and humanitarian aid to communities affected by natural disasters, conflicts, and other crises, focusing on essential areas such as food security, healthcare, education, and shelter. Since its founding, KSrelief has been a key player in delivering aid to regions like Yemen, Syria, and other conflict zones. Through its operations, KSrelief plays an integral role in Saudi Arabia's broader strategy of using humanitarian aid as soft power, promoting the Kingdom’s leadership in the Islamic world while contributing to global development efforts.

One of KSrelief's innovative initiatives is the Sahem Platform, a hub connecting businesses, non-profit organizations, and individuals with social development projects across Saudi Arabia. This platform allows various stakeholders to participate in volunteer opportunities, donation campaigns, and corporate social responsibility programs. By integrating private sector involvement in aid initiatives, Sahem reflects Saudi Arabia's strategic shift away from foreign aid tied to Daʿwah and towards a more inclusive and neutral aid model.

KSrelief adheres strictly to the principles of neutrality and international humanitarian law, partnering with global organizations like the United Nations and local NGOs to ensure effective and timely aid delivery (UNDP, 2022). Since its establishment, the organization has implemented thousands of projects in over 80 countries, directly benefiting millions of people worldwide. This shift toward institutionalized and globally recognized aid practices highlights Saudi Arabia’s efforts to professionalize its foreign aid system and establish itself as a responsible global donor.

Previously, KSrelief explicitly stated their purpose as promoting “our values” globally. However, in a notable shift, the language used by these organizations was revised in August 2024, changing from the emphasis on “our values” to the “preservation of the right to charity.” This adjustment signals a subtle but meaningful shift in Saudi Arabia’s aid policy, moving away from an overt focus on religious values.

In parallel, the Ministry of Finance plays a pivotal role in Saudi Arabia's ODA system. It is responsible for managing the financial aspects of foreign aid, including budgeting and the disbursement of funds. The Ministry ensures that ODA initiatives align with national economic priorities and diplomatic objectives. It also works closely with other government ministries to create coherent policies that integrate foreign aid with broader development strategies, reinforcing Saudi Arabia’s economic and geopolitical interests.

Although Saudi Arabia is not a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), it has attained DAC’s official provider status and actively participates in the Arab-DAC dialogue. This platform fosters collaboration between 10 members of the Arab Coordination Group, 30 DAC members, and six Arab countries, including Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This engagement underscores the unique role that Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern donors play in global development cooperation. Unlike many emerging donors, Saudi Arabia demonstrates a willingness to align with DAC principles, enhancing its influence within the international aid community. Saudi Arabia’s approach to foreign aid now reflects a pattern of cooperation with the DAC, marking a significant departure from its earlier, religion-based aid strategy implemented through the MWL. This shift indicates a move toward more globally recognized standards and practices in its ODA(Yaghi, 2024).

Saudi Arabia’s institutional frameworks for ODA are closely aligned with the Kingdom’s broader objectives of economic diversification, regional influence, and global leadership. The centralization of its aid policies, combined with its participation in global aid dialogues, highlights the Kingdom's commitment to being a major player in international development. Saudi Arabia's approach blends economic reforms, humanitarian efforts, and strategic diplomacy, positioning the Kingdom as a key non-DAC donor with growing global influence.

CONCLUSION

While the study of Saudi Arabian ODA is not new in academic circles, there has been a growing need for updated analysis that reflects the changing dynamics within the Kingdom. Given the recent global developments, understanding Saudi Arabia’s evolving ODA allocations has become increasingly relevant. Although this research appears straightforward, it holds substantial importance in the broader discourse on international development.

Since King Salman ascended to the throne in 2015, Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid policy has undergone a significant shift. Before 2015, Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid was largely driven by Islamic values, with institutions and frameworks in place to promote these principles. However, since then, the Kingdom’s leadership has initiated a transition influenced by Vision 2030—a national agenda that prioritizes economic diversification and security. The Kingdom began efforts to remove religious elements from its aid strategy, a change reflected not only in its foreign aid but also in its broader foreign policy. Although Saudi Arabia has long been recognized as a generous donor, often criticized for using aid to promote religious beliefs, it now appears to be moving away from emphasizing religious undertones in its ODA. Despite these shifts, it is important to note that religious principles still play an influential role. Economic and security objectives are now closely intertwined with Saudi Arabia’s religious norms, which continue to shape the Kingdom’s ODA policies.

Consequently, Saudi Arabia's foreign aid is characterized by a unique fusion of philanthropy, strategic interests, and religious diplomacy. This blend has created what is often referred to as the ‘Khaleeji mode’ of development cooperation—a model that reflects the Gulf states’ generosity while aligning with their national and regional objectives (Tok, 2017). Under this approach, aid typically comes with fewer conditions than traditional models, as Gulf states like Saudi Arabia provide ODA without imposing strict requirements related to governance, human rights, or economic reforms. The Khaleeji mode emphasizes equal partnerships and highlights historical and cultural ties, with Islamic principles framing aid as both a religious obligation and a commitment to Islamic solidarity and charity.

In this study, we assert that Saudi Arabia’s ODA policy embodies a complex interplay between religious motivations - such as Islamic values of Zakat and Sadaqah - and economic modernization goals tied to national interests. Our findings illustrate how these elements coexist and mutually reinforce Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid strategy, rather than existing in conflict. To provide greater clarity, we can further contextualize Saudi Arabia’s approach within the Khaleeji mode, a unique Gulf framework that harmonizes traditional values with strategic objectives. By situating Saudi Arabia’s ODA within this Gulf-specific model, we highlight how its religious and economic aims function cohesively, creating a distinct model among non-DAC donors.

Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a prominent donor, particularly within the Arab and Islamic worlds, leveraging foreign aid as a strategic tool to enhance its soft power and strengthen diplomatic relationships. Its ODA policy reflects a careful balance between religious leadership, economic interests, and the pursuit of regional stability. While categorizing Saudi Arabia within the broader donor community poses challenges due to its unique approach and priorities, its growing influence as a donor is unequivocal.

The findings of this study contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Saudi Arabia’s role in international development cooperation and offer valuable insights for fostering effective partnerships with the country. To achieve meaningful collaboration, it is imperative to identify the key drivers of Saudi Arabia’s aid policy, encompassing both its internal motivations and external strategic objectives. Simultaneously, ensuring international oversight and promoting greater transparency and accountability in Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid initiatives will be crucial to maximizing their effectiveness and alignment with global development goals.

Future research should focus on tracing the policy trajectories of Middle Eastern nations to enhance global cooperation and shared development objectives. One limitation of this study is its reliance on literature-based research; future studies should include interviews with policymakers involved in ODA, providing deeper insights into the Kingdom’s foreign aid strategy. Moreover, future comparative studies with other non-DAC donor countries similar to Saudi Arabia will be essential to provide a deeper analysis of the policy characteristics unique to non-DAC donors.

Figures
Fig. 1. Saudi Arabia’s bilateral ODA vs. multilateral ODA
Fig. 2. Accumulated ODA amount by recipient country from 2015 to 2022
Tables
Table. 1. Saudi Arabia’s ODA to LDC from 2015 to 2022
Table. 2. The largest donors to international humanitarian assistance (2018~2022)
Table. 3. Change of the KSrelief’s Mission
References
  1. Ahmed, Zahid Shahab, and Umer Karim. 2024. Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan. Journal of Political Power, 17 (1), 42-64. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2024.2341024
    CrossRef
  2. Alhussein, Eman. 2022. Saudi Arabia’s Nation-Branding Strategy. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. https://agsiw.org/saudi-arabias-nation-branding-strategy/
  3. Béland, Daniel, and Alex Waddan. 2012. The Politics of Policy Change: Welfare, Medicare, and Social Security Reform in the United States, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001145
    CrossRef
  4. Benthall, Jonathan, The Rise and Decline of Saudi Overseas Humanitarian Charities (September 12, 2018). CIRS Occasional Paper No. 20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248344
  5. Blin, Louis. 2023. Recent trends in Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Aid Policy, paper presented at the conference Impact of Gulf State’s foreign aid on protracted crises, June 23, 2023. https://blogs.eui.eu/medirections/recent-trends-in-saudi-arabias-foreign-aid-policy/
  6. Bordón, Javier, and Eyad Alrefai. (2023). Saudi Arabia’s foreign aid: the singularity of Yemen as a case study. Third World Quarterly, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2231899
    CrossRef
  7. Chikrizova, Olga Sergeevna. 2019. Saudi Model of Development for the Islamic World: Peculiarities and Limits. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 19(4): 545-565. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2019-19-4-545-565
    CrossRef
  8. Coates Ulrichsen, K. 2024. The changing role of Gulf-based non-state actors in foreign aid. Third World Quarterly, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2024.2307552
    CrossRef
  9. Doucette, Jamie. 2020. “Anxieties of an emerging donor: The Korean development experience and the politics of international development cooperation.” Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space. 38(4): 656-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420904082
    CrossRef
  10. Douven, Igor, 2021. “Abduction.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/abduction/.
  11. Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2021. "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 13 (2): 135-74. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180631
    CrossRef
  12. Elayah, Moosa, and Hasan Al-Awami. 2024. “Exploring the Preference for Bilateral Aid: Gulf Oil States’ Aid to Yemen.” Third World Quarterly: 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2024.2327451.
    CrossRef
  13. Farag, Alshimaa Aboelmakarem. 2019. The Story of NEOM City: Opportunities and Challenges. In: Attia, S., Shafik, Z., Ibrahim, A. (eds) New Cities and Community Extensions in Egypt and the Middle East. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77875-4_3
    CrossRef
  14. Fuchs, Andreas & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati. 2013. “The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid Motives.” World Development. 44(c): 110-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.012
    CrossRef
  15. Gulrajani, Nilima. 2016. “Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels: Strategic choices for donors.” ODI report. March 2016. https://odi.cdn.ngo/media/documents/10492.pdf
  16. Harmáček, Jaromír, Zdeněk Opršal, and Pavla Vítová. 2022. “Aid, Trade or Faith? Questioning Narratives and Territorial Pattern of Gulf Foreign Aid.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 24(5): 772-794. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2022.2037958
    CrossRef
  17. Khan, Nazir. 2020. A Sacred Duty: Islam and Social Justice. https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/a-sacred-duty-islam-and-social-justice
  18. Kim, Hyojung. 2023. International Development Cooperation Policy Process in Emerging Donor Countries: Focusing on Kazakhstan’s Ideas, Interests, an d Institutions (3i). OUGHTOPIA, 38(2): 117-159. DOI : 10.32355/OUGHTOP IA.2023.10.38.2.117
    CrossRef
  19. Li, Yi. 2019. Saudi Arabia’s Economic Diplomacy through Foreign Aid: Dynamics, Objectives and Mode. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13 (1), 110-122. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1586367
    CrossRef
  20. Mawdsley, Doctor Emma. (2012). From recipients to donors: emerging powers and the changing development landscape. Bloomsbury Publishing. DOI:10.5040/9781350220270
    KoreaMed CrossRef
  21. Manning, Richard. 2006. “Will ‘Emergind Donors’Change the Face of International Co-operation?” Development Policy Review. 24(4): 371-385 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2006.00330.x
    CrossRef
  22. Meuleman, Johan. 2011. Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, 167(2/3): 236-269. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003591
    CrossRef
  23. Momani, Bessma, and Crystal A. Ennis. 2012. Between caution and controversy: lessons from the Gulf Arab states as (re-)emerging donors. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25 (4), 605-627. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.734786
    CrossRef
  24. Moshashai, Daniel, Andrew M. Leber, and James D. Savage. (2020). Saudi Arabia plans for its economic future: Vision 2030, the National Transformation Plan and Saudi fiscal reform. British journal of Middle Eastern studies, 47 (3), 381-401. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2018.1500269
    CrossRef
  25. Octopus. 2024. Geopolitical Look at Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Moves: Deciphering Their Playbook (08/01/2024) https://www.octopusintelligence.com/geopolitical-look-at-saudi-arabias-strategic-moves-deciphering-their-playbook/
  26. OECD Statistics. Accessed April 18, 2024. https://stats.oecd.org/.
  27. Reisen, Helmut. 2007. “Is China actually helping improve debt sustainability in Africa?” G-24 Policy Brief 9. Paris: OECD Development Centre. http://www.g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/G24-Policy-Brief-9.pdf
  28. Rich, Ben, and Kylie Moore‐Gilbert. 2019. “From Defense to Offense: Realist Shifts in Saudi Foreign Policy.” Middle East Policy 26, no. 3 (September): 62-76. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12438.
    CrossRef
  29. Saidi, Myriam, Christina Wolf. 2011. “Recalibrating Development Cooperation: How Can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Partners?”OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 302. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5kg83kvgnz0v-en.pdf?expires=1645544647&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=51A885520AD68FA9C002A4B627E0B06E
  30. Salem, Saber. 2020. “Chinese Foreign Aid to Fiji: Threat or Opportunity.” China Report, 56(2): https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445520916875
    CrossRef
  31. Salim, Fajri. 2022. “Analysis of Saudi Arabia Intervention in Decisive Storm Operations in Yemen.” Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs 3(1): 93-107. https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.vol3.iss1.2022.93-107
    CrossRef
  32. Sandhu, Ravinder, Saini Guneet, Elizabeth Alvarez. 2021. “Using the 3I+E Framework to assess provincial policy decisions for the sale of cannabis in Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec.” Health Policy and Practice, 2(1): https://doi.org/10.33137/utjph.v2i1.34726
    CrossRef
  33. Saudi Development Fund. Board of Directors | SFD Portal. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2024, from https://www.sfd.gov.sa/en/board-of-directors-view
  34. Saudi Aid Platform. 2023. “Saudi Aid Platform General statistics.” Retrieved November 8, 2024, from https://data.ksrelief.org/Projects/
  35. Sritharan, Narayani, Ammar A. Malik, and Asad Sami. 2023. Continuity and change in Saudi Arabia’s development and humanitarian aid. Third World Quarterly, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czw052
    Pubmed KoreaMed CrossRef
  36. Smith, Neale, Craig Mitton, Alan Davidson, and Iestyn Williams. 2014. A politics of priority setting: Ideas, interests and institutions in healthcare resource allocation. Public Policy and Administration, 29(4): 331-347. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076714529141
    CrossRef
  37. Sritharan, Narayani, Ammar A. Malik, and Asad Sami. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Saudi Arabia’s Development and Humanitarian Aid.” Third World Quarterly, December 15: 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2288852.
    CrossRef
  38. Tok, M Evren. 2015. “Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda: Towards a Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation.” Tokyo: Centre for Policy Research. United Nations University, 2015.
  39. Tok, M Evren. 2017. “Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation.” Gulf Affairs: Foreign Policy Trends in the GCC states. Autumn: 1-5, https://ibir-api.hbku.edu.qa/node/55495
  40. Turhan, Yunus. 2022. “Turkey as an emerging donor in the development community: The Turkish-type Development Assistance Model (TDAM).” Development Policy Review. 40(4):e12583 (https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12583).
    CrossRef
  41. Udvari, Beata. 2014. “Realignmant in International Development Cooperation: Role of Emerging donors.” Society and Economy. 36(3): 407-426. https://doi.org/10.1556/socec.36.2014.3.5
    CrossRef
  42. UNDP. 2022. UNDP and KSRelief forge a new strategic partnership to enhance coordination of development and humanitarian efforts in crisis settings (22/09/2022). https://www.undp.org/arab-states/press-releases/undp-and-ksrelief-forge-new-strategic-partnership-enhance-coordination-development-and-humanitarian-efforts-crisis
  43. Varagur, Krithika. 2020. How Saudi Arabia’s religious project transformed Indonesia. The Guardian (16.Apr. 2020). https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/apr/16/how-saudi-arabia-religious-project-transformed-indonesia-islam
  44. Wahb, Yousef. 2021. “Fard Kifayah: The Principle of Communal Responsibility in Islam.” https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/fard-kifayah-the-principle-of-communal-responsibility-in-islam\
  45. Woods, Ngaire. 2008. “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs). 84(6)/l:1205-1221. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x
    CrossRef
  46. Yaghi, Mohammad. (2024). 9/11 and branding the Gulf States’ foreign aid. Third World Quarterly, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2024.2304219
    CrossRef
  47. Yazdi-Feyzabadi, V., Bazyar, M. & Ghasemi, S. 2021. District health network policy in Iran: the role of ideas, interests, and institutions (3i framework) in a nutshell. Arch Public Health 79, 212. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13690-021-00737-7
    Pubmed KoreaMed CrossRef
  48. Ye, Min. 2022. The Dragon's gift: an empirical analysis of China's foreign aid in the new century. International Trade, Politics and Development, 6(2), 73-86. https://doi.org/10.1108/itpd-06-2022-0010
    CrossRef
  49. Zeitz, Alexandra O. 2021. Emulate or differentiate? Chinese development finance, competition, and World Bank infrastructure funding. The Review of International Organizations. 16, 265-292. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09377-y
    CrossRef
  50. Zoccal, Geovana. 2020. “Triangular Cooperation: Enabling Policy Spaces.” The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda. pp. 583-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8_27
    CrossRef


22-3 (December 2024)
Full Text(PDF) Free

Social Network Service
kakao talk line line
Services

Author ORCID Information