Japan’s postwar period has been characterized by efforts to redefine its national identity and gain recognition from the international community. Since gaining independent status at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, Japan has strived to break free from the constraints of its postwar period. This process involved economic recovery, postwar relations with Asian countries, and defence law reform.

On the economic front, the first economic white paper in 1956 declared that “It is no longer the postwar period,” marking Japan’s rapid economic growth and restoration to prewar levels. However, ongoing conflicts over historical issues indicate that Japan has not completely moved beyond its postwar period, resulting in continued uncertainty.

In terms of defense policy, Japan has faced challenges in transitioning to a post-postwar era. Following its defeat in 1945, Japan adopted pacifism, limiting its military capabilities and focusing on self-defense through the Self-Defense Forces rather than adopting an offensive military posture. The postwar defense security regime, anchored by the U.S.-Japan alliance, has been a cornerstone of this policy. The Abe administration sought to overcome these limitations by promoting “departure from the postwar system” and “proactive pacifism,” with initiatives such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In line with this stance, Kishida Fumio’s administration plans to increase defense spending to 2% of its GDP by 2027, further relaxing previous restrictions. The interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which emphasizes demilitarization, has sparked controversy and debate, reflecting a shifting understanding of peace.

Japan’s activities in international organizations like the G7 and its pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council underscore its efforts to expand influence and redefine its global role. The diversity and complexity of Japan’s postwar national identity are partly rooted in the atomic bombings, which have shaped its narrative as both victim and proponent of peace. The country’s experience of defeat and the bombings has been central to its advocacy for denuclearization and its transformation into a global power.

Two central phrases to Japan’s postwar identity are “the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war” and “peace-loving nation.” These narratives have been instrumental in Japan’s transformation from a defeated nation into a peaceful one. Understanding postwar Japan’s struggle for recognition as a great power involves examining how it has justified its foreign policy by emphasizing its national identity as a peaceful nation.

Key figures in Japan’s foreign policy, such as Abe Shinzo and Kishida Fumio, have played crucial roles in this transformation. Abe laid the groundwork for departing from postwar regimes, while Kishida, from Hiroshima, emphasized Hiroshima’s legacy in reshaping Japan’s identity. As foreign minister, Kishida facilitated President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, and as prime minister, he organized the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit. Japan has stressed cooperation among free, open, and rule-based countries.

This study examines the Japanese government’s strategies for changing its diplomatic identity, focusing on its transition from the “only A-bombed country” to a “peaceful nation.” The analysis considers Japan’s entry into the international community and its rise as a global leader, highlighting the perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers, especially Abe and Kishida. Additionally, it explores the representation of Japan as a bombed nation, particularly concerning “nuclear” and “Hiroshima,” and the transformation of its diplomatic identity into that of an active, peaceful nation. Finally, the study addresses the cognitive dissonance between Japan’s ideal of a nuclear-free world and the reality of its security policies, exploring how this struggle for recognition may unfold in the future.

Recognition is a fundamental concept for understanding human societies and international relations, often reflecting a desire to escape neglect, discrimination, or achieve equal rights. The history of all international societies can be viewed as a history of the struggle for recognition (Lindemann and Ringmar 2012).

The theory of recognition, as developed by Axel Honneth, builds on Hegel’s model of the “struggle for recognition” and George Herbert Mead’s social psychological theory (Mead 1962). Hegel, Mead, and Honneth emphasized the importance of self-consciousness in the process of recognition. Hegel, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, explained the dynamics of recognition through the dialectic of “lordship and bondage” (Hegel 2013). He stated, “Self-consciousness is simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else” (Hegel 2013). Hegel conceptualized recognition in terms of the relationship between the “I,” “being-for-self” and the “other,” highlighting the importance of mutual recognition or knowing oneself in the other (Honneth 1995).

Mead further elaborated on the social aspects of self-consciousness, positing that the self is constructed in relation to other individuals. Mead explained recognition through the interaction between “me” and “I” (Mead 1962). According to Mead, the relationship between self and other is built through social processes, with recognition being formed through self-centered self-identification.

Recognition fundamentally relies on the interplay between self and other. The ego has a strong drive to be acknowledged by itself, and its willingness to acknowledge others can vary. Recognition plays a crucial role in determining which states the international community acknowledges and in defining the boundaries between “us” and “them” (Oh 2023).

This study examines Japan’s national identity as the only A-bombed country and its struggle for recognition as a peace-loving nation. It focuses on self-identification, reflecting on Japan’s self-consciousness concerning its national identity. By analyzing speeches and records of national leaders, the study highlights Japan’s emphasis on promoting a world without nuclear weapons, using Hiroshima as a symbol of its peace-loving identity (MOFA 2024a). As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan has the responsibility to lead international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons (MOFA 2024a). Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, achieving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community. Japan’s security policy is grounded in this path (MOFA 2023b).

The existing research on the recognition of Hiroshima victims is categorized into three main approaches. First, there are individual and legal approaches. Studies focusing on the records of victims’ testimonies are representative of this approach (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 2024; Jung 2005; Korean Nuclear Victim Association 2024). Although the study of Japanese victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has centered on testimonies and eyewitness accounts, recent studies have shown that Japanese victimhood is not homogeneous and static but rather contested, negotiated, and in a state of permanent transition (van der Does 2023).

Second, there are social and collective approaches that analyze the historical narratives shaping Hiroshima’s identity as a city of peace and examine its transformation from a military city to a symbol of peace (Katayanagi and Kawano 2023). The process and implications of change in collective identity in the context of peace building are discussed. The creation of the dual social perception of nuclear weapons and nuclear power (Yamamoto 2023), with studies indicating that governments and the nuclear power industry have a strong interest in underestimating the harmful effects of nuclear weapons and radiation emitted by nuclear power plants (Perrow 2013) is worth noting. Additionally, some studies focus on the sociocultural context of recognition, such as the A-bomb Survivor’s Health Handbook (Oh 2017; 2018) and others on civic solidarity and the relationship between the state and the individual (Takahashi 2008).

Third, there are national and international approaches. These studies concern the formation of new identities and solidarity among atomic bomb victims (Lee 2017) and analyze the discourse of “only bombed country” and the development of Japanese identity as national victim (Kwon 2009; 2023).

The tragedy of Hiroshima has been transformed into a universal desire for peace (Kwon 2009). The pursuit of accountability for the perpetrators led to a ‘no-apology reconciliation.’ This dilution of the perpetrator, coupled with considerations of U.S.-Japan relations, also helped break the “cycle of perpetration and victimization” (Kwon 2009). Blaming the United States invoked a causal theory of history, which in turn recalled Japan’s theory of responsibility. The use of the word “we” was intended to universalize the tragedy of Hiroshima as a peace ideology without specifying the perpetrator and victim.

Conversely, the Japanese government’s emphasis on Japan as the “only A-bombed country” represents a restoration of the victimized subject through national memory. It signifies that Japan is the only nation or people in the world that experienced atomic bombings. Although the phrase “only bombed country” has been in use since the 1950s, its frequent use emerged in the 1980s, when the existence of non-Japanese victims had already been recognized (Kwon 2009), highlighting the intentionality of Japan’s diplomatic identity in employing this phrase.

Therefore, the process of national restoration through the ambiguous recognition of the perpetrator and emphasis on the victims’ uniqueness was a strategic approach in constructing Japan’s diplomatic identity. This strategy enabled Japan to strengthen its position in the international community, bolster its defense capabilities under the guise of contributing to peace, and break free from the constraints of being a defeated nation. However, the more the perpetrator is obscured and the idea of univeral victimhood is reinforced, the more it becomes disconnected from the experiences of individual victims.

There are dilemmas in Japan’s nonnuclear identity. According to the work of Daisuke Akimoto, Japan’s nuclear-related identities can be categorized as a nuclear-bombed state, a nuclear disarmament state, a nuclear-threatened state, and a nuclear umbrella state (Akimoto 2020). The conflicts and dilemmas between these nuclear identities have been highlighted in cases such as the release of contaminated and treated water from Fukushima and the non-signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Based on the above discussion of the various dimensions of the struggle for victim recognition, this study examines the characteristics and dilemmas of the Japanese government’s perception of nuclear issues and Hiroshima in forming its diplomatic national identity. It identifies the conflicts and contradictions that arise from the disparity in social perceptions.

A country’s foreign policymakers redefine its identity and justify its foreign policy. When a country experiences denial or disrespect from the international community, it often engages in a struggle for recognition to overcome these challenges (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015; Gustafsson et al. 2019).

This study focuses on how Japanese foreign policymakers shape the country’s national identity and justify its foreign policy, using Hiroshima as a case study to analyze Japan’s postwar identity. It traces the evolution of discourse on nuclear issues and Hiroshima by analyzing relevant statements from the Japanese government, with particular attention to international recognition of Japan as the “only A-bombed country.”

The transition from a defeated and A-bombed country to global peace advocate is illustrated through Japan’s history of struggling for recognition. This complex process includes both individual victims’ struggles for recognition and the broader struggle at the national level. This study explores the theoretical aspects of the struggle for recognition concerning the identity of the victims and provides concrete examples to illustrate these dynamics.

Japan’s struggle for recognition is reflected in its international relations and the perception of its national identity. This process involves overcoming a deficient self-identity and the denial or nonrecognition experienced internationally. The study argues that Japan’s transformation from victim to peaceful nation encapsulates its postwar struggle for recognition. Japan experienced disregard or nonrecognition from the international community, prompting a struggle for recognition. National leaders redefined Japan’s identity to overcome these limitations, using foreign policy to gain recognition. This change in diplomatic identity is linked to self-identification in the context of foreign policy, aiming for a higher status in the international community.

The research centers on Japan’s self-perception as a peaceful nation and the foreign policy shaped by this identity. It focuses on three key cases to explore the relationship between Hiroshima, nuclear-related victim identity, and foreign policy.

1. United Nations Involvement: This case analyzes Japan’s efforts to gain recognition at the UN. Upon joining, Japan emphasized its identity as an A-bomb victim country and promoted denuclearization rhetoric. Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has been limited by military constraints. However, after perceiving a lack of recognition during the Gulf War, Japan began to actively promote changes in its peace activities.

2. U.S.-Japan Relations and Hiroshima: This case focuses on President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima and its implications for U.S.-Japan relations. It examines whether the U.S., as a country that dropped the bomb, acknowledged the bombing and its victims. The analysis includes Obama’s remarks, Prime Minister Abe’s response, and Abe’s comments during his visit to Pearl Harbor, assessing how acknowledgment of the bombing and its victims manifests in diplomatic relations and changes in Japan’s security legislation under the Abe administration.

3. 2023 Hiroshima G7 Summip: This case explores the Kishida cabinet’s discourse on Hiroshima and peace. As the only G7 country in Asia, Japan invited major world leaders to Hiroshima to empathize with its experience of suffering and promote a transition to a world without nuclear weapons. Japan’s identity as a bombed country has been a cornerstone of its leadership in the nonnuclear discourse, influencing diplomatic discussions at the UN and with Western powers, including the United States.

This study primarily examines the Japanese government’s official positions and perceptions by analyzing speeches and diplomatic documents from key leaders. It focuses on the Diplomatic Bluebook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the foreign policies of the Abe and Kishida governments. These documents provide a comprehensive overview of Japan’s foreign policy directions and messages, serving as a self-contained source of official positions and data on relevant topics. The research traces the Japanese government’s perceptions related to Hiroshima and nuclear power as recorded in these diplomatic archives.

A textual analysis of these documents supports the discussion. This study also references existing analyses of speeches by Hiroshima mayors (van der Does 2023), highlighting how expressions related to Hiroshima, nuclear power, and peace have changed over time through comparative analysis. Additionally, public opinion surveys and media analyses are used to understand the discrepancies between the perceptions of national identity among foreign policymakers and the broader Japanese society.

Bridging with the Nuclear Powers: An A-Bombed Country in the UN

Japan is the first and only country in the world to have suffered atomic bombings, first in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and then in Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. In addition, in March 1954, the Daigo Fukuryū Maru (Lucky Dragon #5) was contaminated by nuclear fallout from the United States’ Castle Bravo thermonuclear test at Bikini Atoll. These events have fostered a strong desire among the Japanese people for a ban on atomic bombs and an end to nuclear tests. The Japanese government has actively pursued this goal, forwarding resolutions from both houses of the Diet to relevant countries and the United Nations, urging the cessation of nuclear tests (MOFA 1957).

On December 18, 1956, Japan achieved a significant milestone when it was admitted to the United Nations at the 11th session of the General Assembly, becoming the 80th member state. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan noted that this membership marked Japan’s genuine return to the international community as a peace-loving nation committed to international peace and prosperity (MOFA 2017).

On January 14, 1957, the First Committee of the United Nations began deliberations on disarmament issues, including nuclear weapons. During the general debate preceding these discussions, the representative of Norway proposed a system for preregistration of atomic bomb tests with the United Nations. The United States expressed willingness to consider this proposal. Japan, seeking to leverage its unique position as the only A-bombed country, consulted with the United Kingdom, France, and other nations, none of which objected to the proposal. However, it became clear that an immediate cessation of nuclear tests was not feasible. As an initial measure toward broader disarmament and the suspension of nuclear tests, it was suggested that preregistration of nuclear tests could help minimize their impact, allow for continuous monitoring of global radiation levels, and prevent radiation damage.

Despite Japan’s appeals to the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union to suspend nuclear tests, citing the Resolution on the Prohibition of Atomic Bomb Tests, these powers did not comply. Consequently, on February 25, Japan, in collaboration with Canada and Norway, submitted a joint proposal to the United Nations.

In its official stance, the Japanese government emphasizes its commitment to the principle of a nuclear test ban, urging cooperation among the United States, the United Kingdom, and China to establish a practical and effective prohibition of nuclear testing. Acknowledging the complexities of the current international environment, the government expresses ongoing concern about the detrimental impacts of nuclear testing. It has consistently advocated for the cessation of such tests on humanitarian grounds and has voiced regret in response to tests that have occurred.

We believe that our proposal, including the registration system, is the most steady, practical and effective measure to appeal to world public opinion on the issue and to push it in the direction of a ban, as the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom have been shifting the blame to each other (MOFA 1957).

Although our efforts to break the disarmament stalemate have not been rewarded with concrete results, our efforts to emphasize the United Nations’ responsibility for disarmament issues and to fulfill our responsibilities as members of the Disarmament Commission and the Security Council have been fully recognized by the relevant countries (MOFA 1959).

China(the People’s Republic of China) succeeded in its nuclear test in 1964. In 1967, Japan’s Prime Minister Sato Eisaku advocated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan’s Peace Constitution. Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his contributions to reconciliation in Southeast Asia and for signing the NPT on behalf of Japan. Based on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has developed nonnuclear principles and norms and has led global discourses on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

Japan has consistently sought to bridge the gap between nuclear-armed states (such as the United States, Russia, the UK, France, and China) and non-nuclear-weapon states. This effort includes organizing meetings like the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), submitting the Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the UN General Assembly, and collaborating with like-minded countries through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). Japan also engages in individual consultations to promote these goals. Furthermore, Japan is committed to maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime. It advocates for practical measures, such as encouraging states to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and initiating negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In addition, Japan promotes education on disarmament and nonproliferation and engages in discussions with nuclear-armed states to advance effective nuclear disarmament verification (MOFA 2024a, 228).

Despite Japan’s diplomatic efforts, its contributions to Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) have sometimes been underappreciated. In March 1991, the Kuwaiti government publicly thanked nations that contributed to its liberation from Iraq, yet notably excluded Japan, despite Japan having provided approximately \$13 billion—around 20% of the total financial support from the coalition. This oversight highlighted the perception of Japan’s efforts as ‘checkbook diplomacy,’ since Japan did not send personnel to the conflict, leading to limited international recognition of its contributions.

In response to this lack of recognition, Japan’s foreign policy shifted towards more active participation in international peace and security efforts. Japan has since taken steps to assert its identity in the international arena by promoting arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament, including hosting the UN Kyoto Conference on Disarmament, advocating for stricter arms control measures, and enhancing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. These initiatives have helped to bolster Japan’s international standing and identity (MOFA 1991).

The Gulf War, often referred to as the “trauma of the Persian Gulf,” was a turning point for Japan, motivating it to dispatch Self-Defense Forces for logistical support during subsequent conflicts, such as the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Asahi Shimbun 2021). Japan has also improved the effectiveness of its Peacekeeping Operations. Since 2011, Japan has made personnel contributions, including deploying Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) officers to the United Nations Missions in South Sudan and supporting policy and training initiatives at the UN Secretariat (MOFA 2024).

Japan is a major financial contributor to UN Peacekeeping efforts, ranking as the third-largest donor after the United States and China. Its contributions extend to enhancing medical systems, countering new threats like improvised explosive devices, and combating disinformation. Japan also plays a leading role in the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), which aims to strengthen peacekeeping capabilities. Additionally, Japan has contributed intellectually, such as by co-hosting the Peacekeeping Ministerial and developing training courses for Peacekeeping Intelligence (MOFA 2023b).

In August 2023, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Japan and attended the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony. During his meeting with Prime Minister Kishida, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, a goal Japan continues to champion as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in wartime.

Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and began its two-year term in January 2023. This marks the 12th time Japan has held this position, more than any other UN member state. Japan aims to play a proactive role in global peace and security and is advocating for UN Security Council reforms, including the expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats and its admission as a permanent member (MOFA 2024a).

Reconciliation with the United States: President Obama’s Visit to Hiroshima

Japan, as the only country to have experienced atomic bombings during wartime, has been actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to promote a world free of nuclear weapons. Central to this initiative is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Japan supports by making concrete contributions through frameworks like the G7 and NPDI, a coalition of 12 non-nuclear-weapon states. These efforts focus on realistic and practical proposals to strengthen the NPT.

In 2016, under Japan’s G7 chairmanship, the Hiroshima Declaration was issued, emphasizing a strong commitment to nuclear disarmament. This declaration coincided with the historic visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to Hiroshima, marking the first time a sitting U.S. president visited the city since the atomic bombing. This visit, along with those of other world leaders, highlighted the reality of the bombings and served as a catalyst for renewed international efforts toward nuclear disarmament (MOFA 2017).

Prior to the G7 Summit in Ise-Shima on May 26-27, 2016, the Japanese government invited the leaders of participating countries to visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. This site, where the U.S. military dropped the atomic bomb at the end of World War II, stands as a poignant reminder of the devastation caused by nuclear weapons.

During the summit, nuclear disarmament was a key agenda item. Foreign Minister Kishida said, “To achieve concrete results, nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states must work together. Understanding the ‘inhumanity’ of nuclear weapons is the catalyst for this,” emphasizing the importance of visiting the bombed sites to see the “reality of the bombing.” Kishida expressed his personal connection, stating, “I was moved as a citizen of Hiroshima and as a foreign minister from the bombed city to see the U.S. president’s visit to Hiroshima come to fruition and appeal for a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ from the soil of Hiroshima” (Kishida 2016).

Upon arrival at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, President Obama was greeted by Prime Minister Abe and met with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida, Hiroshima Governor Hidehiko Yuzaki, and Hiroshima City Mayor Kazumi Matsui in front of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. At the museum, Foreign Minister Kishida gave an overview of the museum and its exhibits, including Sadako Sasaki’s paper cranes. President Obama handed two Hiroshima-area children paper cranes that he had folded.

Both Abe and Obama signed the guest book at the park. In the guest book, Abe wrote, “I express my sincere condolences to all the victims of the atomic bombings. I pray for lasting peace and will do my utmost to realize a world free of nuclear weapons.” President Obama wrote, “We have known the agony of war. Let us now find the courage, together, to spread peace, and pursue a world without nuclear weapons” (MOFA 2016).

The Japanese MOFA commented on President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima: “President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was the first visit by a sitting U.S. President and it was an extremely important historical event in terms of commemorating the war dead and revitalizing international momentum for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the visit symbolized the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, an ‘Alliance of Hope,’ which has been built up over the more than 70 years since the war” (MOFA 2016).

A textual analysis of President Obama’s speech in Hiroshima reveals its literary sensibilities, largely influenced by speechwriter Ben Rhodes. The speech appeals to emotion without assigning blame, using nuanced language that broadens the context of the war’s objects and subjects, thus making responsibility less clear. This ambiguity reflects the avoidance of a direct confrontation with the causes or responsibilities of the atomic bombing.

In his speech, Obama addressed the victims of Hiroshima as part of a larger group of innocent victims of war, stating, “We come to mourn the dead, including over 100,000 Japanese men, women, and children; thousands of Koreans; a dozen Americans held prisoner. Their souls speak to us. They ask us to look inward, to take stock of who we are and what we might become.” He further highlighted stories of hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) who had forgiven those responsible for the bombings, framing the narrative as a broader human challenge rather than a bilateral issue. “We see these stories in the hibakusha – the woman who forgave a pilot who flew the plane that dropped the atomic bomb because she recognized that what she really hated was war itself; the man who sought out families of Americans killed here because he believed their loss was equal to his own” (The White House 2016).

Obama used the word “we” the most, emphasizing a collective human responsibility to learn from the past and pursue a future without war. “We must reimagine our connection to one another as members of one human race. For this, too, is what makes our species unique. We’re not bound by genetic code to repeat the mistakes of the past. We can learn. We can choose. We can tell our children a different story – one that describes a common humanity, one that makes war less likely and cruelty less easily accepted” (The White House 2016).

Obama also linked technological progress with the need for moral advancement, warning that scientific advancements, like the splitting of the atom, must be matched by moral development to prevent future catastrophes.

Prime Minister Abe responded to Obama’s visit by highlighting the symbolism of reconciliation and the deepening U.S.-Japan alliance. Abe’s remarks and those of Obama focused on the shared commitment to a future without nuclear weapons and the importance of remembering history to prevent future suffering.

President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was met with mixed reactions, highlighting its symbolic importance in U.S.-Japan reconciliation and its focus on the inhumanity of war and nuclear weapons. This visit marked a significant shift in recognizing Japan’s transition from a bombed nation to a peace advocate. It provided an opportunity to acknowledge past wrongs by both the United States and Japan and to foster a shared identity against war and in favor of humanity. Some have suggested that Japanese leaders should make similar gestures of reconciliation, such as visiting memorials for those affected by Japan’s actions during the war, including the victims of the Nanjing Massacre and the comfort women in Korea (Sneider 2016).

The United States and Japan often emphasize a moralistic, pacifist image, yet there is tension between the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons and the realities of nuclear deterrence, which underpins the U.S.-Japan alliance. This duality sometimes leads to a perceived evasion of addressing the full responsibilities of war.

The Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 notes Obama’s Hiroshima visit and Abe’s Pearl Harbor speech. “On behalf of the people of Japan, I would like to once again express my sincere gratitude to the United States, the world, and Japan for the generosity shown to us. Seventy-five years after ‘Pearl Harbor,’ Japan and the United States, which fought a fierce war that will go down in history, have formed an alliance rarely seen in history, an alliance that is deep and strong, an alliance that faces together the myriad of challenges that envelop the world today more than ever before. It is an ‘alliance of hope’ for tomorrow. What binds us together is the power of reconciliation, the power of a tolerant heart” (MOFA 2017). Abe emphasized the U.S.-Japan alliance as a symbol of tolerance and reconciliation, underscoring the importance of remembering the past while advocating for peace. He reiterated the significance of memorializing the victims and highlighted the relationship between the United States and Japan as friends committed to reconciliation.

Despite the positive atmosphere, the ‘no-apology’ stance was a deliberate diplomatic strategy to promote reconciliation without a formal apology. In his memoirs, Abe stated that Obama’s decision not to apologize for Hiroshima meant that he did not need to apologize at Pearl Harbor. Instead, he chose to honor the soldiers who perished. In Abe’s speech, crafted in collaboration with Tomohiko Taniguchi, he deliberately avoided a direct apology, portraying the soldiers as having transcended the dichotomy of enemy and ally. He concluded that it was “the reconciliation brought about by a heart of tolerance” that ultimately unified the United States and Japan as allies (Abe 2023).

Abe’s perspective was reflected already in his Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the Second World War. In the meticulously crafted rhetoric of the , terms such as “aggression,” “apology,” “colonization,” and “sincere remorse” were incorporated, but Prime Minister Abe did not explicitly use the term “apology” (Oh 2023). The rationale was that previous apologies issued by the cabinet were adequate and that it would be inequitable for Japan alone to continue apologizing given the historical context. This stance indicates an acknowledgment that Japan’s previous apologies were driven by a misinterpretation of the international community’s stance at the time (Abe 2023).

During Abe’s tenure, the cabinet enacted security-related legislation that permitted the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. In April 2015, the United States and Japan agreed to revise the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Subsequently, in May, the Cabinet approved amendments to the security bill, which passed the House of Representatives on July 16 and the House of Councillors on September 19. The passage of these bills was controversial because they paved the way for a modest expansion of the role and capacity of the country’s military. The bills were passed in the House of Representatives following a reinterpretation of the Constitution to ensure their constitutionality, accompanied by an extension of the Diet session.

The ruling party passed the bills in the House of Representatives without the participation of opposition parties, who staged a walkout in protest. Following the passage of the legislation, the Cabinet’s approval rating plummeted (NHK 2024), and approximately 40,000 citizens protested against the new laws. Some media outlets called for the ousting of Abe’s cabinet, and the Students Emergency Action for Liberty and Democracy (SEALDs) organized protests that garnered significant media attention. Neighboring countries, including South Korea, expressed concerns that Japan might be becoming capable of waging war.

Prime Minister Abe expressed confidence that the decline in his approval ratings would be temporary. He considered the protests minor in scale and impact compared to the Anpo protests of 1960, which opposed the renewal of the security treaty with the United States. Abe noted the irony that the Japanese public, averse to altering the status quo, opposed the enactment of security-related laws as if they disrupted peace, yet were also reluctant to repeal them once established (Abe 2023). This narrative underscores the complex interplay of historical memory, reconciliation, and transitioning national policies in shaping U.S.-Japan relations and Japan’s post-war identity.

The World Without Nuclear Weapons: The G7 Hiroshima Summit

In October 2022, Prime Minister Kishida published a book titled Toward a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: A Courageous Will of a Peaceful Nation. This book outlines Kishida’s vision and commitment to nuclear disarmament, deeply influenced by his heritage as a native of Hiroshima. Drawing from his political experiences, Kishida delves into the historical and moral imperatives for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. He discusses significant events, including President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, which Kishida facilitated as Foreign Minister, and broader diplomatic efforts aimed at reinforcing Japan’s identity as a peace-loving nation. Additionally, Kishida provides practical steps for nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and Japan’s unique position as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings (Kishida 2020).

Before hosting the G7 Hiroshima summit, Kishida appraised Japan’s status within the G7 as follows:

Within the G7, Japan is the sole member from Asia, but there is no “Europe” or “Asia” when it comes to rules for peace. The situation surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly tense, including frequent missile launches by North Korea. In addition, sharply rising energy and food prices are striking a blow to countries all around the world, including in Asia. I will work actively to persuade Asian nations to unite to protect the peaceful world order, and at the same time, with the leaders of the U.S. and Europe, I will engage in discussions that take Asian nations’ true intentions also into account.

Japan is the only country anywhere in the world to have suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war. Threats by Russia to use nuclear weapons must not be allowed to defile the past 77 years of history of nuclear weapons not being used. I express my grave concern over President Putin stating this week that Russian implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is suspended. The continuation of efforts towards nuclear disarmament is becoming increasingly critical, and Japan will lead such discussions within the G7 (emphasis by author, Kishida 2023a).

The G7 Summit was held in Hiroshima from May 19 to 21, 2023. As the host country, Japan conveyed the message that the major industrialized nations of the international community worshiped at the Hiroshima Peace Park and prayed for a world without nuclear weapons and for peace. Japan recognizes the historic significance of this summit, held in Hiroshima, the site of the bombing and a symbol of the pledge of peace, in affirming the G7 leaders’ commitment to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons (The Government of Japan 2023).

We, the G7 Leaders, meet at a historic moment in Hiroshima, a reminder of the unprecedented destruction and immense human suffering caused to the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the dropping of the atomic bomb in 1945. In this solemn and reflective moment, we reaffirm our commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons with enhanced security for all, in the first G7 Summit document to focus specifically on nuclear disarmament. A world without nuclear weapons cannot be achieved without nuclear non-proliferation, and we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment by the DPRK of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear program, as well as all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs, in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions (emphasis by author, The White House 2023).

Not only the G7 leaders but also the heads of state of invited countries and heads of international organizations, laid wreaths at the Peace Memorial Park, visited the archives, and listened to the voices of the survivors, all of whom shared a moment of direct contact with the reality of the atomic bombing and the hearts of those who long for peace. In particular, President Biden’s guest book was introduced directly in the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook.

Building on the Hiroshima Vision, Japan intends to take realistic and practical steps toward nuclear disarmament through the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the 2022 NPT Review Conference. This plan outlines a roadmap to transition from current security realities to the ideal of a nuclear-free world. It includes initiatives such as promoting the CTBT, initiating negotiations on the FMCT, and enhancing education on disarmament and nonproliferation.

Kishida reiterated Japan’s commitment to leading efforts for a world without nuclear weapons, highlighting Hiroshima’s symbolic role. He emphasized the importance of taking concrete actions, particularly targeting nuclear disarmament discussions towards countries like China, Russia, and North Korea. This focus reflects Japan’s ongoing efforts to build consensus among nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states to achieve global disarmament.

This summit and subsequent actions underline Japan’s proactive stance in advocating for nuclear disarmament and its role in shaping international norms and policies towards a safer, more peaceful world, as represented by its foreign policy, including FOIP.

It is our belief and responsibility to ensure that future generations will be able to enjoy peace and prosperity without fear of nuclear weapons. That is why our generations must continue to appeal from the A-bombed city of Hiroshima that the use of nuclear weapons has caused indescribable devastation and that nuclear war could destroy the entire humanity. As we strive to avoid these dire consequences at all costs, we need to steadily move forward on the path toward a future “world without nuclear weapons.”

Believing in the survival of the humanity and seeking peace, the leaders of countries, the media from around the world, the youth and children leading tomorrow and all those with firsthand memory of World War II who have gathered in Hiroshima today are all “citizens of Hiroshima.” I believe that when all eight billion people of the world become “citizens of Hiroshima,” nuclear weapons will disappear from the earth. With this in mind, I invited the leaders of some of the world’s leading countries to gather here in Hiroshima. Pursuing an ideal is different from dreaming. An ideal is something we can strive to attain. To ensure an ideal future when our children, grandchildren and descendants will be able to live in a world without nuclear weapons, let us take realistic steps, one by one, as citizens of Hiroshima, starting today here in Hiroshima. Since this Summit was held in Japan, the only G7 member from Asia, for the first time in seven years, we had earnest discussions on the Indo-Pacific as well. I explained our new plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), and we, the G7, agreed to continue to work together to realize the FOIP (emphasis by author, Kishida 2023c).

Kishida stated that Japan will collaborate with the G7 on issues related to China and North Korea. Japan has emphasized its opposition to any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion, particularly concerning China, while also advocating for continuous dialogue with China. Additionally, North Korea is viewed as a primary nuclear threat, and Japan plans to cooperate with the G7 to address the abduction issue.

Regarding China, we, the G7, agreed on the importance of candid dialogue to directly convey our concerns and the need to work together on global issues, among others, and shared the view that China should act as a responsible member of the international community and that we are ready to build constructive and stable relations with China through dialogue. Regarding the situations in the East and South China Seas, we expressed our grave concern and agreed to oppose any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion. We also reconfirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and urged a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. Regarding North Korea, we confirmed that we will continue to work together on the issue of its nuclear and missile programs and the abduction issue, and, as the G7, strongly urged an immediate resolution of the abduction issue (emphasis by author, Kishida 2023c).

The reinterpretation of nuclear disarmament and the stance towards nuclear-weapon states are intensifying with his vision and foreign policy. At the 213th Plenary Session of the House of Councillors, Kishida highlighted Japan’s identity shaped by its experience with atomic bombings and its vision of a world without nuclear weapons. He also emphasized Japan’s foreign policy shaped by the Hiroshima Vision for Nuclear Disarmament, while distancing Japan from nuclear threats posed by countries like Russia and North Korea.

The situation surrounding nuclear disarmament has become even more severe due to Russia’s nuclear threats and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. However, this is precisely why we need to turn the momentum toward nuclear disarmament around and steadily advance realistic and practical initiatives, step by step. To this end, based on the G7 Summit Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision for Nuclear Disarmament, which was compiled as the first independent document on nuclear disarmament at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, we, as the only nation to have experienced atomic bombings, will continue and strengthen realistic and practical efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons by involving the nuclear-weapon states (emphasis by author, Kishida 2024).

The primary focus on nuclear-weapon states includes Russia, North Korea, and China, while the citizens of Hiroshima, representing broader Japanese sentiment, aim to influence the G7 and like-minded countries, even though many of these countries possess nuclear arsenals. The G7 Hiroshima Summit reinterpreted the significance of Hiroshima and peace, connecting it to Japan’s diplomacy through the FOIP. Japan’s nonnuclear identity is used to justify its foreign policy, aligning Hiroshima’s legacy with Japan’s broader diplomatic goals.

Japan’s application for UNESCO World Heritage status for ‘Visual Materials of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima - Photographs and Videos from 1945’ (1,532 photographs and two videos) raises concerns about selective memory regarding Hiroshima and nuclear weapons. As the population of survivors continues to age, there is an increasing need for primary sources that convey the devastation caused by war and the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the efforts of governments and citizens to avoid repeating these mistakes.

From A-bombed Country to a World Without Nuclear Weapons

As discussed above, Japan has solidified its identity as an A-bombed country within the international community through its engagement with the United Nations, its relations with the United States, and its role in the G7. It has been recognized by nuclear powers, the United States, and the broader international community as a key actor leading the nuclear disarmament agenda. The relationship with the United States, once the perpetrator of the bombing, has transformed places like Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor into symbols of reconciliation and alliance, despite the lack of direct confrontation over accountability.

In Hiroshima, international leaders gathered at Hiroshima Peace Park to share a vision of peace and a world free of nuclear weapons, which they communicated globally. As a nonnuclear state, Japan has gained international recognition by advocating for the disarmament of nuclear states and positioning itself as a bridge between nuclear and nonnuclear states.

Japan is strengthening its position and contributions in the international community. On September 19, 2023, Prime Minister Kishida, in a speech at the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, announced a new ¥3 billion grant aimed at supporting overseas research institutes and think tanks. This grant is intended to foster research on the “mainstreaming of nuclear disarmament,” highlighting the importance of comprehensive efforts beyond government actions to sustain this trend. By establishing specialized posts in major research institutes, Japan aims to increase awareness of its commitment to “realistic and practical nuclear disarmament” and to bridge divides within the international community.

Although Prime Minister Kishida advocates for a “world without nuclear weapons,” there is also recognition for the need to develop technologies for safe nuclear power and maintain nuclear deterrence to prevent attacks. This dual stance reflects the ambivalence inherent in balancing peaceful and secure utilization of nuclear technology. It also highlights a limitation in the United States’ national identity, which projects a pacifist image while relying on a “nuclear umbrella” for security and prosperity.

Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort experienced when one holds contradictory beliefs, values, or attitudes or when behavior conflicts with beliefs or values. Individuals strive to resolve the dissonance by changing their opinions, behavior, or perception and interpretation of information (Festinger 1962). Japan faces cognitive dissonance between its vision of a world without nuclear weapons and the reality of nuclear-armed members of the UN Security Council. North Korea’s nuclear tests further challenge this vision, especially given Japan’s reliance on the United States for nuclear protection.

Japan’s diplomatic identity change aims to reconcile this dissonance. Moving beyond its identity as an A-bombed nation, Japan redefines Hiroshima from a symbol of victimhood to a symbol of global peace, aligning this narrative with its foreign policy goals. Under the Abe administration, Japan adopted a strategy of ‘proactive pacifism,’ and the Japanese government has also emphasized the FOIP. This involves promoting value-oriented diplomacy, collaborating with like-minded countries, and distinguishing Japan from perceived threats. Despite this focus on peace, Japan has increased its military spending and sought greater influence in international organizations, striving for recognition as a key player in the G7, the UN, and the global community.

Dilemmas Over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Kishida has been advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, but he faces the contradiction and irony of being under the nuclear umbrella and not signing the TPNW in a global context where wars have broken out and nuclear threats persist.

Although President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima did not result in an unequivocal apology or recognition of accountability by the United States, Japan’s deliberate avoidance of addressing the origins of the war, its responsibility during the war, and for dropping the atomic bomb is evident. The ‘political recognition’ of victims, based on the relationship between countries, is also at play. Anger toward the United States is often confined to the private sphere and is rapidly disappearing from public discourse (Kwon 2023). A significant portion of the Japanese public, 62%, expressed that Obama did not need to apologize for the bombing (the Japan Times 2016), indicating a broader societal reluctance to revisit these historical grievances (Kwon 2023).

The recent convergence of discourse on the nuclear threat from North Korea, the shared victim identities in South Korea and Japan, and the formation of a U.S.-Japan-Korea ‘we’ are examples of the reconfiguration of social identities. However, some South Korean victims have argued that ‘Koreans were threefold victims of the atomic bombings’—suffering from the U.S. bombings, Japanese colonization, and the South Korean government’s indifference and neglect (UNODA 2023). The demands of the Korean victims can be summarized as follows: acknowledgment of their suffering, a thorough investigation into their experiences, and for the Korean, U.S., and Japanese governments to accept responsibility, issue formal apologies, and provide appropriate compensation (UNODA 2023).

In addition, civil society organizations opposing the G7 Hiroshima event pointed out the irony of calling for a “world without nuclear weapons” while the United States, the United Kingdom, and France remain nuclear powers and the contradiction of not committing to the UN’s TPNW. They highlighted the perception gap wherein these countries claim the utility of nuclear weapons by referring to their ‘deterrent power.’ Japan tries to justify this position as follows:

The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon State has joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon States. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic and practical measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S. (emphasis by author, MOFA 2024a, 228).

Concerns Over Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Treated Water Discharge

The Japanese government defines water treated by the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) as water that has been effectively purified of radioactive substances to levels below regulatory safety thresholds (MOFA 2024a). This ALPS-treated water is then diluted to further reduce the concentration of radioactive substances, including tritium, before being released into the ocean. Authorities assert that concentration of radioactive material in the discharged water is significantly below safety regulatory limits. They maintain a transparent stance by working closely with the IAEA to communicate on the safety of these discharges both domestically and internationally, based on scientific evidence (MOFA 2024b).

The IAEA, established in 1957 as a related organization of the United Nations, promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensures it is not diverted for military purposes. Under Article III of the NPT, which took effect in 1970, nonnuclear-weapon states must accept IAEA safeguards to prevent the military use of nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes.

Japan, an original member of the IAEA, has consistently contributed to the organization’s discussions and activities, particularly with respect to nuclear nonproliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Recently, Japan has collaborated with the IAEA on various initiatives, including the release of ALPS-treated water from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, nuclear safety in Ukraine, and addressing global interest in nuclear energy for healthcare, food, and environmental applications.

Japan’s assertion of safety, based on the IAEA’s scientific findings, has been bolstered by solidarity with allies and like-minded partners in its relations with other countries. In dealing with China, which has been the most vocal in its opposition to the issue, Japan has reiterated its call for a measured response to the release of ALPS-treated water into the ocean, emphasizing that the decision in grounded in scientific evidence. Additionally, Japan has once again urged the immediate removal of import restrictions on Japanese food products. In Taiwan, Japan seeks to lift these restrictions based on scientific evidence. Prime Minister Kishida has pledged to maintain high transparency and scientific rigor in explaining the safety of ALPS-treated water. An inspection team of Korean experts was sent to TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi plant to evaluate the safety measures. During a meeting at the Japan-Australia summit, the Australian Prime Minister commended Japan’s responsible approach in cooperation with the IAEA (MOFA 2023a).

Despite these efforts, there is an irony in Japan’s emphasis on the ‘invisible radiation’ risks to its neighbors and the international community, which contrasts with its self-identification as a nuclear victim country. This contrast is particularly evident given Japan’s focus on the various harmful effects of radiation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This situation highlights the complexities in Japan’s ongoing self-identification and foreign policy.

Postwar Japan’s journey has focused on overcoming its identity as a defeated nation and perpetrator, striving to establish itself as a peaceful nation recognized by the international community. As the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, Japan has reinforced its self-identity and positioned itself as a bridge between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, leading initiatives in international organizations such as the UN, G7, and IAEA. Japan has consistently advocated against nuclear testing, submitting resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly, thereby securing a diplomatic role and space for its activities. Due to its experiences with atomic bombings, nuclear issues have become a significant focus in Japan’s international engagements.

Japan’s nonnuclear identity supports its foreign policy, integrating Hiroshima’s legacy into broader diplomatic objectives. This identity aligns with the G7 and other like-minded countries, despite the nuclear status of many of these nations. The focus on nuclear-armed states, particularly Russia, North Korea, and China, highlights a strategic ‘othering’ in Japan’s foreign policy narrative.

However, there exists cognitive dissonance in Japan’s struggle for recognition as a peace-loving nation. This dissonance is evident in several ironies: nuclear powers advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, Japan’s non-signatory status to the TPNW while promoting nuclear disarmament, and Japan’s acceptance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the release of ALPS-treated water from Fukushima, despite emphasizing the dangers of radiation. These contradictions underscore the discrepancies between Japan’s values as a peaceful nation and its struggle for recognition by the state and victims.

Guided by the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles,’ Japan has established a framework of nonnuclear policies and standards, positioning itself at the forefront of global discussions on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Japan has steadily built a foundation as a global peace advocate by enhancing its peacekeeping activities within the United Nations. Leveraging its unique position as the only A-bombed nation, Japan has strategically led global discourses on nuclear disarmament, including the prohibition of nuclear weapons. A significant turning point came with Obama’s visit to Hiroshima in 2016, marking the beginning of greater recognition of Japan’s changing identity. This recognition was further solidified at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in 2023, where Japan emphasized its global influence and reinforced its identity as a peace advocate on the international stage.

By embracing proactive pacifism rather than a narrative of defeat, Japan continues to navigate postwar constraints, and interpretations of its identity as the only A-bombed nation, its Peace Constitution, and its commitment to peace have been changing. In its struggle for recognition, Japan has actively utilized its A-bombed identity as a former aggressor nation to become a peace advocate. This diplomatic strategy reflects Japan’s efforts to transition from a position of normative disadvantage and victimhood to one of leadership and advocacy for global peace.

As Japan continues to change its diplomatic identity, it is crucial to trace the development of its national identity and foreign policy by examining the Japanese government’s responses to issues raised by Japanese society and neighboring countries. This ongoing transition, driven by the struggle for recognition, will highlight Japan’s historical legacy and contemporary geopolitical challenges. Ultimately, how Japan navigates these complexities will define its national identity and shape its foreign policy for the future.