In the twenty-first century, new settings for civic activities have emerged in Russia, leading to a radical revitalization of civil society due to large-scale public and social actions (Public Chamber of the Russian Federation 2012: 144). As part of these changes, civil society networks are rapidly developing, alongside the extent and quality of participation in various civic activities. Civic activities are defined as the deliberate, coordinated, voluntary activities of citizens in a free democratic society, especially addressing social or community problems; they are generally conducted by associations rather than individuals. By participating in such activities, Russian people are increasingly acting to improve their daily conditions and social dynamics, particularly in terms of organizing social movements with shared values and perspectives. Despite a relatively short history of democracy and complex political conditions, Russian citizens are increasingly engaging in coordinated, voluntary activities to address social and community problems, often through associations rather than relying solely on traditional institutions of representation. This study aims to explore the nature and dynamics of contemporary civic activities in Russia, focusing on two central research questions: What has caused the vitalization of grassroots civic activities? And what are the limitations of these activities, particularly in their relationship with state institutions?

A key argument presented in this study is that while online networks and digital platforms have democratized access to civic engagement and lowered participation barriers, they have also introduced new forms of state oversight and control, complicating the landscape of Russian civil society. To answer our research questions, we analyze trends and directions in Russian civic activities using expert survey data collected from 2014 to 2021. Our findings indicate that the organization of ordinary people through online networks has significantly contributed to the growth of civic activities and the evolution of civil society, fostering a burgeoning “third sector.” The Internet has played a crucial role by facilitating online civic activities and enabling a connection between online and offline protests. However, the impact of these online activities remains ambiguous, and their dependence on state-initiated digital feedback platforms poses a significant vulnerability. An expert survey data reveals a complex landscape where civic activities thrive in some areas while facing considerable challenges in others. One of the key findings is the dual role of digital platforms. On the one hand, they provide a powerful tool for mobilization, communication, and organization among activists and civic groups. On the other hand, these platforms can be co-opted or controlled by state mechanisms, which can undermine their effectiveness and pose risks to activists. This duality highlights the precarious nature of online civic engagement in Russia.

This article aims to contribute to existing literature on Russian studies by providing a comprehensive analysis of contemporary civic activities in Russia. It highlights the significant role of digital technologies in shaping civil society and the constraints imposed by state institutions. By examining the intersection of online and offline civic activities, this study offers insight into the evolving dynamics of civil society in a complex political setting. It contributes to a deeper understanding of how grassroots movements can thrive despite challenges and the potential and limitations of the Internet in fostering civic engagement. Also, this article invites readers to discuss the matter of state-controlled digital feedback platforms in the future.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the next section reviews existing academic works on contemporary civic activities in Russia. Then, the third section briefly explains the theoretical background of civil society and social movement networks. The fourth section describes the research methodology and data collection procedures of the expert survey. In the following section, we discuss major findings such as the contrasting trends between online activities and offline protests, as well as the role of digital feedback platforms. Then, the sixth section discusses the revitalization of civic activities in contemporary Russia. The last section is devoted to concluding remarks.

In Russian politics, scholars and practitioners have paid relatively little attention to civil society (Hudson 2003). The study of Russian civil society has become one of the major research topics particularly since the pivotal work of Domrin (2003), which laid the groundwork for understanding the complex dynamics between society, civil society, and the Russian state. His analysis provided a historical perspective on the development of civil society in Russia over the past decade, highlighting persistent challenges such as state domination and societal fragmentation (Dormrin 2003). Following Domrin’s pioneering studies, many scholars studied state-society relations in the twenty-first century, noting government institutions’ increasing efforts to assert control over NGOs and civil society entities to consolidate power (Henderson 2011). More recently, Berls (2021) has expanded on these themes, exploring how the state attempts to systematically manipulate and co-opt civil society to serve its interests. Russian authorities often employ a variety of tactics, ranging from legal constraints to direct intervention, to ensure that civic activities align with state goals and do not pose a threat to political stability (Berls 2021). This continuous effort to control civil society is a hallmark of Russia’s approach to governance, where maintaining a facade of civic engagement is crucial for legitimizing the regime both domestically and internationally.

In contrast to the state’s effort to influence over civil society, civil society’s mass protest and campaign activities often characterize Russian civil society. Rosenfeld (2017) explores the social base of protest in Russia between 2011-2013. She noted that Russia’s middle class was mobilized for democracy, and he found that mobilization occurred at very different rates among public and private-sector employees with similar occupational and educational profiles (Rosenfield 2017). While the opposition movement drew support from the private-sector middle class, the public-sector middle class was more likely to stay home and less likely to identify as democrats (Rosenfield 2017).

Considerable attention among researchers is occupied by the study of the mass protest campaign of 2011-2012 for “fair elections.” Most recently, Dollbaum (2022) studied the relationship between federal protest campaigns and the emergence of local activist organizations in Russia. Using the analysis of the protest campaign for “fair elections” of 2011-2012 as an example, he concluded that mass protest campaigns lead to the emergence of new local civil communities and organizations that continue their activities after the completion of the protest campaign itself (Dollbaum 2022). The experience accumulated during the protest campaign at the federal level, such as the repertoire of activities, methods of interaction with the authorities, etc., is then replicated and actively used in the local social movements. Thus, the structuring and complication of civil society take place.

On the other side, some researchers focus on the contribution of social network services but are favorable to the existing power structure. Spaiser et al. (2017) point to a significant role in the protests of the development and use of social networking sites, with the analysis of the role of Twitter in the 2011-2012 protest campaign. Their analysis of the political discourse suggested that the perceived pro-Putin support had a real effect on the opposition and general public on Twitter. This shows that regardless of the promises that new digital technologies hold in terms of empowerment of marginalized or weaker (political) actors, these technologies are still part of the overall system of power — in particular, uneven resource distributions — and may therefore still be utilized by governments in their favor.

Some other researchers also contest the Western-oriented theoretical and empirical studies but highlight Russia’s particular contexts. Rosenberg (2017) concluded that the events of the Russian protests in 2011–2013 cannot be explained by one theoretical framework alone. They are similar to the Color Revolutions in their usage of elections as focal points but dissimilar in terms of the essential role of democracy in diffusing activists (Rosenberg 2017). In contrast, Russia’s protests were similar to the Arab Spring, according to Lynch (2012), in that they were started by “loose coalitions of disparate groups and individuals” but were dissimilar in the strength of the cascading effects. There are more similarities, including protesters’ grievances and social portraits, certain government and opposition tactics, and especially the widespread use of the Internet by young opposition members, which resembles the Arab Spring. She demonstrated that democracy was not the main, if at all, the demand of the protesters, but rather grievances for social justice, human dignity, and a corruption-free country. As a result, many protests now “go local” (Lynch 2012, 70). In addition, Flikke (2021) delivers another striking example through the analysis of protests related to landfills and waste disposal. His research on the dynamics of this protest and its relationship with the peculiarities of the political regime in Russia argues that social protest forces and the Putin regime flesh out the specifics of interaction (Flikke 2021).

The Spring of 2017 in Russia spurred extensive research on social movements. Kravets and Toepfl (2021) examined protests triggered by a film critical of former President Dmitri Medvedev. They compared protest coverage on Yandex.ru, News.yandex.ru, Google.ru, and News.google.ru, finding that Google’s algorithms more frequently directed users to sites discrediting Vladimir Putin and discussing protests, unlike Yandex (Kravet and Toepfl 2021). Nechai and Goncharov (2017) also studied the 2017 protests, focusing on Twitter’s role in political protests. They discovered a high polarization among users, with anti-regime participants and regime loyalists using Twitter differently. Anti-government users primarily used retweets for communication and spreading information, while direct political statements, including anti-corruption claims, were fewer (Nechai and Goncharov 2017). Some activists continued to use Twitter to organize future protests, highlighting its role in developing political and social identities (Nechai and Goncharov 2017). Skiperskikh (2021) analyzed protest activities in early 2021, noting that protests have become more carnival-like, with political power mocked and discussed with irony. He observed that protest potential is growing, attracting more young activists, though long-term mass protests are absent, likely due to Russia’s diverse regional landscapes (Skiperskikh 2021).

The existing research regarding online political activism has been mostly based on online platforms people use. However, those researches often underestimate relationships between online activities and offline participation of civic activities, including protests, meetings, campaigns, etc. Also, previous works disregard mutual interactions, between state authorities and civil society members around those online platforms.

In this circumstance, this article contributes to the existing literature on Russian civil society by comprehensively analyzing contemporary civic activities and their interaction with state institutions. Specifically, this research illuminates the role of digital technologies. It underscores how the Internet and social media have facilitated the growth of grassroots civic activities and their organization, offering new insights into the intersection of digital and traditional forms of activism. Second, this study focuses on the formation and sustainability of voluntary initiative groups, contributing to a deeper understanding of how grassroots movements can thrive in complex political settings. On the other hand, this research sheds light on the constraints faced by civic activities in Russia, such as state-controlled digital feedback platforms that may diminish the impact of civil society. By addressing these aspects, the article contributes to the discourse on Russian civil society, offering valuable perspectives for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners interested in the development of civic activities in Russia and other similar contexts.

Civil society and political opportunity structure

An increase in civic activities has been cited as the most prevalent evidence of the development of modern Russian civil society (Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2012: 44). In other words, despite numerous political challenges, there have been significant collective responses to the obstacles faced by Russian citizens, especially from active grassroots movements. The ability of “active citizenship” to contest the given circumstances is one of the major features of an emerging civil society. The presence of NGOs and other civil society groups provides an opportunity for citizens to participate in collective action to protect their interests (Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen 2004, 37). Civic activity is a form of community activity aimed at the realization of the social interests of individuals and various citizen groups. It manifests in different forms, e.g., independent citizen initiatives, citizen groups, and networks, which have their motives and aspirations and are united by the fact that they are not aimed at generating profit. These groups raise funds, mobilize activists, organize communication, and form coalitions to achieve their goals (Tarrow 1994, 137).

Political opportunity theory explains the emergence of social movements by highlighting the interplay between internal and external dynamics. Political and social changes can destabilize dominant power structures, creating opportunities for movement groups to engage when there are weaknesses or divisions within the ruling mechanisms. Thus, social movements result from interactions between movement groups and the broader sociopolitical environment, rather than merely reflecting external conditions or the capabilities of oppressed groups (McAdam 1999, 40). Pioneers of political opportunity theory emphasized that social movements are exceptional events triggered by changes in social structures, thus any event or social process can become an opportunity if it undermines the assumptions on which the political establishment is based (Piven and Cloward, 1977; McAdam, 1999). The openness of the political system provides avenues for social movements to emerge and grow, including access to political institutions, legal channels for protest, and democratic responsiveness to public demands (McCarthy and Zald 1996).

However, the state’s capacity and willingness to repress dissent are crucial in determining the dynamics of social movements. For example, in case the political system is not fully open or access to political elites is limited, political opportunities are, often, constrained by the state-monopolized political resources, such as media, social infrastructures or technologies. Therefore, the state’s repressive capacity shapes the strategic choices of movement actors, influencing their actions’ form, timing, and response (McCarthy and Zald 1996).

Civil society networks and the Internet

Under repressive conditions, civil society not only remains quiet, but it often tries to find other opportunities from informative or social networks outside the political regime (Keck and Sikkink 1999). The popularity and availability of information and communication technologies (ICT), particularly the Internet, have contributed to the emergence of new political opportunities and means of communication (Castells 2015). Accordingly, the development of the Internet has helped organize civic activities. Within the framework of theories of collective action and the mobilization of resources, the Internet is regarded as a set of technologies and tools that facilitates the interaction of actors, allowing them to form a network. It is an environment that enables the emergence of new forms of participation to mobilize collective action and a new medium that facilitates the mass participation of citizens in the decision-making process, thus enabling them to express their preferences and needs (Rodriguez 2013, 1058). The Internet has become an essential tool for mobilizing social movements in the twenty-first century. It is a new weapon of the powerless, enabling them to either directly contest repression or create spaces for everyday forms of resistance, including humiliation, mockery, and parody (Scott 1985, 41). Online tools such as social networking services (SNS), blogs, and forums create environments for citizens to self-organize and form various communities. One of the basic features of these communities is a network structure characterized by informal and horizontal relations. This structure has been central to the mobilization process.

Naidoo and Tandon (1999) identify civil society as an autonomous association in the form of a network that interconnects rights-bearing and responsibility-laden citizens. Accordingly, scholars emphasize the role of networks in civil society, especially their ability to promote rights and public interests by preventing failures of state and market institutions. The social structure of such networks facilitates the achievement of collective goals and forms a space for public activities. The subjects of civic activities in public spaces can be government officials, NGOs, businesses, and, even, ordinary citizens. In a community, networking between individuals through social relationships and various media (offline and online) allows people to exchange different resources (Miroshnichenko 2012b, 79). Online social networks can include various online communities or actors that are interested in and have the resources to participate in crowdsourcing activities aimed at responding to a need or solving socially important problems ((Miroshnichenko 2012a, 221). Furthermore, both online and in-person social networks can encourage their members to participate in collective action that will affect the public sphere (Morozova and Gnedash 2012, 9). In other words, the actions of network organizations can affect the socio-political reality of a particular society, especially in solving urgent social problems that require resources and imply costs.

Network organizations generally reveal some common characteristics, especially in the Russian socio-political context (Lipenack and Stamps 1994, 164; Sheresheva 2012). First, successful network organizations often have common long-term goals that individuals cannot fully achieve. Second, their structure is based on voluntary links between more than two actors, providing flexibility and openness. Third, they incorporate some other independent partners who, while pursuing their own goals, maintain motivation and sense of responsibility for achieving the goals of the network to a certain extent. Fourth, leadership is divided and plural; thus, networks show elasticity, rather than being firmly structured. Finally, there are multiple levels of interaction, as each network member can communicate directly with any other member (Makoveeva 2012).

The characteristics of the Internet have significantly contributed to the growth of civic activity networks. In essence, when access to formal political institutions is limited, online civic activities provide alternative political opportunities for mobilizing voluntary participation to drive political and social change. This research explores how information and communication technology (ICT) in Russia has sparked the rise of online and offline local social movements. Furthermore, the study aims to elucidate the state’s counteractions, particularly those orchestrated by those who control technological resources.

Based on the preceding literature review, the analysis in the present study considered the following indicators when evaluating the network structure of civic activities in the Russian context: first, the prevalence of horizontal over vertical relationships; second, equality of actors, coordination without hierarchical control, and formation of joint action on issues of interest; third, resource interdependence, such as networks formed to develop agreements concerning the exchange of resources available to actors; fourth, trust as the basis of cooperation (contractual framework of actors, based on agreed formal and informal rules); fifth, common interest and commitment to the cause of civic activity; sixth, openness to the development of a system of external relations. Finally, the seventh indicator is the voluntary nature of participation.

In order to analyze the networks of civic activities in Russia, this research applies the survey method to gain the opinion of experts. To reveal the nature of civic activity networks in Russia, including the dynamics of their development and forms of their implementation, surveys of experts were conducted from 2014 to 2021.

To study protest activity, experts in Russian regions were interviewed. This method was justified for several reasons. Firstly, the sample included knowledgeable individuals who could characterize the socio-political and socio-economic situation in their region and could draw conclusions and make forecasts. Secondly, ordinary citizens are not always willing to discuss their real willingness to participate in protest campaigns. In some cases, they tend to underestimate their willingness to protest, while others may overestimate it. Therefore, the paper does not use the results of mass surveys conducted by sociological organizations such as VTsIOM or FOM. Additionally, similar research methods and tools have enabled the collection of comparable data annually, facilitating the analysis of protest activity in Russia over an extended period. This also includes related phenomena that are examined in this paper.

The author’s research allowed for the measurement of dynamics using consistent indicators throughout the study period. Furthermore, adding new questions to the questionnaire identified certain features whose significance emerged in specific years and periods. For example, the questionnaires in 2020 and 2021 were supplemented with questions about the development of digital feedback platforms by public authorities, focusing on the characteristics of civic activity manifestations.

The experts were recruited from different fields and institutions, including government authorities, NGOs, political parties, academic institutions, businesses, and media organizations, to represent a variety of social groups. Experts from government authorities amounted to 36.5% of the total, the social and political elite (members of NGOs and political parties) amounted to 29%, and other communities (business, media, and academia) amounted to 34.5%. These experts were recruited from 34 regions in Russia, with 10-17 experts from each region, as can be seen in Table 1. These regions were selected to ensure heterogeneity in terms of geographical location, economic development, political system, social and demographic characteristics, ethnicity, religion, and political and administrative orientations.

Competence and awareness of the problem under study were the primary criteria for selecting experts. Each of the target group was represented relatively evenly within each sample, both in each subject of the Federation and in the sample as a whole. The breakdown was as follows: representatives of government authorities comprised about 35% of the sample, representatives of NGOs and political parties made up about 30%, and representatives of the expert community accounted for the remaining 35%. The central criterion for selecting experts was their competence, which entailed several specific qualifications. These included an awareness of protest activity in the region, knowledge of the main mechanisms of the regional political system, affiliation with a regional political elite group, work experience in public policy or within public authorities and local self-government, familiarity with the main actors in the regional political process, and an understanding of the political situation in the region.

Experts were invited to participate through a snowball methodology. They were recommended by reputable individuals in the region and previously interviewed experts. Thus, the recommendation’s significance was twofold: it came from the experts themselves and was accompanied by a request from a person important to the expert to take part in the survey.

All collected questionnaires were anonymous. The data from these questionnaires were entered anonymously into the SPSS database for subsequent processing in a generalized form. This ensured that the individuals processing the data could not identify specific experts, and the report did not mention the names and positions of the experts. Experts were informed at the initial stage about the subsequent anonymity of data processing, which created conditions conducive to maximum frankness in their responses.

During the organization of the study, the research team sought to cover a significant number of Russian regions. Their number annually depended on vailable funding for conducting a field study by interviewing experts. Therefore, the number of regions ranged from 14 to 25. At the same time, each time the task was set to cover different regions of Russia, both according to geographical, economic, and ethnic principles, as well as the peculiarities of the political system. This ensured the reliability of the data collected throughout the country. The need to collect at least ten questionnaires in each region was also taken into account. This made it possible to obtain representative data on the situation in the region. Unfortunately, not all regions were able to do this in each specific year of the study. The reasons for this were: low response rate from experts, the inability to establish contact for a survey with experts.

Experts provided written responses to questions on the following topics: 1) the dynamics of civic activity development in Russia from 2012-2021, 2) new forms of manifestation of civic activity, 3) the degree of civic activity on the Internet, 4) the level of development of network principles in civic activity, 5) the size of coalitions comprising NGOs and civil society activists (number of partners); 6) the reasons (motivations) why NGOs and civil society activists interact; and 7) barriers to the formation of networks and coalitions of NGOs and civil society activists. These questions aimed to reveal the degree of development of civic activity networks in Russia, the environment in which such networks developed, and the indirect signs of their development (dynamics of civic activity, the Internet, size of NGOs, number of civil society activists coalitions, etc.).

The experts were offered two methods to assess the formulated questions in the questionnaire. The first method involved a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicated the minimum level of manifestation of the evaluated phenomenon, and 10 indicated the maximum. The second method used a scale from -5 to +5 for cases where it was important and possible to identify the direction of a process. On this scale, -5 indicated a strong decrease in activity, and +5 indicated a strong increase, such as the increase or decrease in citizens’ protest activity. Each question included a brief explanation of the extreme values on the rating scale to help the expert understand the content and nature of the question. This approach enabled a thorough evaluation of the various phenomena included in the study.

To confirm the representativeness of the sample of this study, a calculation was carried out using statistical tests (criteria) Wilcoxon and Student (for a clear example, the questionnaire question was taken: “How do you think offline (traditional activity) and online (online activity) activity on socio-political issues in your region is developed?”. Two key hypotheses (basic and null) were formulated for further analysis. Calculations of the p-value for each of the tests (p<0.001) make it possible to exclude the null hypothesis as reliable and establish that differences in variables are present, and therefore the data obtained from the respondents can be extrapolated to the entire general population.

Additional data were collected from the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation’s (2012) Report on the State of Civil Society in the Russian Federation (Public Chamber of the Russian Federation 2012), “brand analytics” research (about the specifics of the development of the Internet in Russia), and studies by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center and the Foundation of Public Opinion (data from Russian sociological research on civic activity and citizens’ access to the Internet in Russia).

It is important to recognize the direction of change in Russian civic movements, especially the quantitative increase in online civic movements and the political expression of youth groups. The rapid development of digital technologies, the changing political environment in Russia, and conflictual agenda have led to a request for an analysis of changes in civic engagement. It was also associated with the observed change in the participants of civil and protest actions, as well as the formats of their actions. In this regard, in 2020 and 2021, a question about the forms of civic engagement was added to the questionnaire in order to identify its transformation.

Table 2 indicates the latest changes in civic activities in Russia from 2020 to 2021 by the percentage of experts who responded positively to the given statements. According to the survey results, experts noted that manifestations of civic activity have blossomed, especially regarding the politicization of economic and social agendas and the active participation of the young generation. However, it is also noteworthy that the appearance of new issues has decreased, while the volume of civil protests has increased. In this context, this section explains the latest trends in online and offline civic activities, along with the fundamental limitations of Russian civil society.

Increasing online civic activities and the involvement of young people

In the last few years, there has been a pronounced imbalance in the development of offline (or traditional) and online civic activities in the public sphere, especially relating to politics, with a preponderance of digital activism. For instance, there was a progressive development of platforms and an increase in the number of supporters expressing their civic position on the Internet from 2014 to 2019. Table 3 shows the average response of experts to a question about the extent of online civic activities in their region (scored from 0 = no civic activity at all to 10 = large-scale civic activities). Between 2014 and 2019, experts’ ratings of the extent of online civic activities increased from an average of 5.30 to 6.30, as reported in Table 3, while experts found the significance of offline activities as having stagnated, as will be explained in the next section. However, the expert’s assessment rate of the extent of online civic activities reached its highest point in 2019 with an average of 6.30, then declined to 6.12 in 2020, and rose slightly to 6.16 in 2021, while the rate for offline activities increased from 4.50 in 2020 to 5.11 in 2021, as seen in Table 4. The assessment, therefore, indicates that the gap between traditional and online civic activities in Russia has narrowed since 2020.

Online activity dominates the realm of civic activity in most regions. The only exception is Khabarovsk Krai, where the offline activity of citizens was significantly higher than online activism, primarily due to mass gatherings in support of the arrested ex-governor Sergei Furgal between July and October 2020.

The increased online mobilization of protest activities not only signals the widespread use of ICT but also the increased political participation of young people through the Internet. For instance, 44.9% of experts agreed that there was increasing involvement in civic activity by young people in 2020, which grew to 58.7% in 2021 (Table 2). The survey results indicated a high degree of youth involvement in civic activity in almost all regions, suggesting a so-called “rejuvenation.”

Similar to other countries, social networking and Internet applications provide significant opportunities for communication, information transmission, and resource mobilization in contemporary Russian society. They are instruments of horizontal relationships and connections in the community. Social networks help organize short-term actions, gathering many people for a particular cause, and civilian online applications are platforms that allow users to share information. Some of the civic activities that are fully implemented on the Internet are fire maps, fundraising for a specific purpose, and election monitoring on web cameras. Among them, some noteworthy movements are the ones related to combatting forest fires and helping victims of fire in the summer of 2010, and the protection of Lake Baikal from the risks of the Baikal Pulp and Paper Mill (BPPM) activities in 2010-2011. During the series of wildfires in 2010, which consequently damaged 300,000 hectares across Russia, many volunteers informally responded, with both in-hand or material assistance. In this process, individual live stream media, such as pozar-ru.livejournal.com, crowd-sourcing platforms, such as Ushahidi, and websites, such as Russian-fires.ru, become major sources of information and mobilizing tools for volunteer support. Furthermore, in the case of the protest against the BPPM between 2010-2011, environmentalists and supporting people not only organized protests at Irkutsk, but more people participated in online petition to express their strong will against the government’s relaunch of the BPPM, which was built in the 1960s and expected to damage ecological system of the Baikal Lake, the world’s largest source of fresh water in February 2010. The online petition and protests continued, and finally became one of the global environmental concerns soon after (UNESCO 2010). Following voices from local communities to global environmental actors, the BPPM was finally closed by the Russian government in December 2013 (TASS 2013).

Implementation features of traditional forms of protest

In contrast to the rapidly growing interest in online civic activities, which has been partly provoked by the government’s efforts to create online feedback services, conventional offline civic activities did not acquire new bright formats. More specifically, experts have noted a decrease in the importance of traditional manifestations of civic activity for two years in a row since 2018 (Table 4). They scored the extent of traditional civic activity as 4.91 in 2019 and 4.50 in 2020. This suggests that the decreasing trend began even before 2020’s spread of COVID-19, which significantly curtailed offline activities due to social distancing policies and travel restrictions. In 2021, experts’ evaluation of offline civic activities increased to 5.11 points, reversing two years of decline; however, as these trends paralleled their assessment of online civic activities as having an increasingly more significant impact and they rated the extent of such activities at over 6 points every year since 2018 (Table 3), more scrutiny is required in the future.

According to experts, such a slight decrease in protest activity can also be attributed to contrast: in 2017 and 2018, several large protest companies were organized throughout the country, while 2019 was not marked by such significant protests (offline protests were mainly in Moscow and Yekaterinburg). It is also important to note the actions of the authorities to consolidate citizens, including a political campaign in support of amendments to the country’s Constitution.

Limitations and challenges

The results of the study demonstrate that the level of offline protest activity is approximately at the same level, while online protest activity showed a noticeable increase from 2014 to 2021 (Table 5).

Such expert responses can be interpreted as a slight decrease in the activity of offline protests in 2019 and 2020, or the dominance of online protests in the public space. These figures indicate that there has been a rapid development of online protests, the involvement of citizens in protest actions in the digital space.

At the same time, online protests were gradually becoming more familiar (58.1% of experts believe that civil activity on the Internet “has not changed significantly” in 2021, which is 6.4% more than in 2020). At the same time, there was an awareness of the importance of offline action in achieving the goals of protest campaigns. This was demonstrated by the changes in expert estimates in 2020 and 2021.

The slight decrease in offline protest activity in experts’ estimates in 2019 and 2020 can also be attributed to contrast: in 2017 and 2018, several large protest companies were organized throughout the country, while 2019 was not marked by such significant protests (offline protests were mainly in Moscow, Yekaterinburg).

The results of the study demonstrate that protest actions are more important for stabilizing the socio-political situation in the regions. This trend appeared in 2018 and remains relevant for the next four years. In 2018, the impact of various forms of protest activity on regional life was estimated by experts at an average of 0.72 points (on a scale from -5 = significant destabilizing effect to +5 = significant stabilizing effect); in 2021, this indicator decreased to 0.36. Thus, we can say that protests perform the function of demonstrating existing problems and deficits, the solution of which requires the attention of the authorities. At the same time, online protests are less perceived as destabilizing compared to offline protests.

In many ways, this may be due to the fact that the organizers of the protests act based on public interests (Table 6). Only in 2014, according to experts, were the organizers of the protests dominated by their personal selfish interests (but to a minimum extent).

The study also demonstrates that the authorities, in order to demonstrate control over the socio-political space and the public agenda, focus more often on countering protest activity than on cooperation with its organizers. Only in 2018 and 2019, were the authorities more inclined to cooperate (Table 7).

For this reason, Russian authorities remain apathetic about preventing or dissolving public protests; authorities refuse to communicate or cooperate with protesters regardless of the form of protest, either offline or online. In addition to ignoring protest activities that have previously destabilized political and social reality, government authorities try to appease ordinary people’s dissatisfaction in various ways. The implementation of digital feedback platforms is one example, and the next section evaluates their development.

Civic activity in Russia is actively developing in accordance with public challenges and current trends. With the development of information and communication technologies, the Internet has become an important space for communication and interaction, in which the real and virtual worlds are increasingly intertwined. The mechanisms provided for online activities are increasing the number of opportunities and tools for civic engagement in the digital space every year.

The conducted research by the method of a survey of experts confirms the key role of Internet technologies in the civic activity of Russians. Experts note a high degree of development of online forms of civic engagement. At the same time, they note that youth and the media play an important role in the increasing use of digital tools in the process of organizing civic engagement.

The involvement of citizens in civic activity is accompanied by changes in the attitude of authorities towards activists, both in offline and online spaces. The authorities are becoming more open than before. One of the reactions of the authorities was the creation of feedback platforms. There are several effective digital feedback platforms supported by the country’s leadership. However, the low awareness of citizens about them and the lack of funding can make their further development difficult. Not all authorities and citizens are ready to use such platforms effectively due to distrust and lack of dialogue. To improve the situation, it is necessary to carry out information and educational work, stimulate feedback, and increase control. This will increase the transparency of government activities and establish a direct dialogue with citizens.

State response: Digital feedback platforms

On the eve of the elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the questionnaire included the question of organizing feedback from authorities and citizens through rapidly developing digital services. This issue was important because in the run-up to the elections, the lack of feedback through user-friendly digital services for citizens could create additional conditions for protests, as the misunderstanding of the position of the authorities on the part of the population could increase. During the elections, this misunderstanding could have provoked significant protests.

On behalf of the central government (with particular input from President Putin), Russian regional authorities are vigorously building and expanding digital platforms that enable citizens to provide feedback. There are many incentives for governments to create digital citizen feedback platforms; it is useful to understand recent perceptions of government officials regarding the merits of these platforms. The results of the latest survey indicate the intentions behind the implementation of these government-sponsored platforms. As Table 8 indicates, the most popular answer about the purpose of digital feedback platforms was government authorities’ need to collect appropriate information and public opinions (56.9%). However, other frequently chosen reasons suggest that many regional government authorities adopt online platforms passively, due to the directives of higher authorities (49.8%), increased accessibility of the Internet (44.2%), or unwillingness to lag behind others (43.4%). The less popular reasons are all about open and honest interactions with citizens, suggesting that government authorities tend to neglect sincere communication with civil society. For instance, the need for comprehensive communication was selected by 25.8%, increasing the requirement to respond to civic activity by 17.6%, and the desire to adopt civil society’s request by only 8.6%, all of which declined from 2020 to 2021.

In 2021, experts assessed citizens use of digital feedback platforms at 5.26 points (scored from 1 to 10), representing a slight increase from 5.10 points in the previous year. The lowest degree of public participation was often found in regions where officials’ reasons for creating such platforms were passive, e.g., responding to the directives of higher management. With regards to reasons why citizens did not participate in government-operated feedback platforms, the most common answers were ignorance about the existence of such platforms (56.3%), a high level of distrust for government authorities (50.0%), unwillingness to receive formal answers (37.7%), followed by complicated access procedures (32.8%).

This study identifies the difference between offline and online civic activity in Russia. The circumstance indicates that online civil movements have a wider reach, but their impact is limited compared to offline activities. This is quite natural because communication in online space is easier, but there are also many hurdles to bring people from the virtual world to the street protest. In the meantime, the relationship between online and offline civic activities is not only contentious but rather complementary. Online initiatives allow people to participate in the process partly or fully by allowing remote access to various forms of activism. Civic activism is manifested on the Internet including portals, social networks, crowdfunding, and crowdsourcing platforms. In addition, widespread online civic activities allow more people to engage with political agendas going beyond economic or social issues. Furthermore, online activities cannot completely replace offline activities. They may have a mutually complementary relationship: Russians were able to move from offline to online activities to find more political opportunities; however, the proliferation of online activities also stimulated participation in offline action, such as by mobilizing youth protests. Transformations in social and political life and the development of ICT predetermine the need for and ways of introducing new forms of organizing civic engagement. An increasing number of citizens is beginning to take an active part in various movements and organizations that are trying to help satisfy their legal rights and interests in various ways. The forms of this participation also differ; they can be both peaceful in the form of flash mobs, volunteering, pickets, signing petitions, and aggressive in the form of road closures, civil disobedience, etc.

However, it has also been found that the influence of protests on the socio-political situation has been decreasing across most Russian regions. This trend is associated with the transition of protests to online spaces. The authorities are less afraid of such forms of disagreement, which means they may be less responsive to the demands of citizens. Therefore, despite the quantitative blossoming of online and offline civic activities, their comprehensive political and social impact (i.e., their qualitative aspect) is shrinking.

A striking point to evaluate contemporary Russian civic activity is the influence of various digital feedback portals established by the state. The development and increase in the intensity of online civic engagement is associated with not only the general benefits that ICT can provide but also with the specific development of online services and various mechanisms that provide an opportunity for citizens to express their position in a new environment. Initially, the Russian state did not notice or react to online civic activity; now, it seeks to regulate it, is to some extent afraid of it, and rarely supports it. Its attempts to control online civic activities have led to the increasing contribution of digital feedback platforms.

In sum, it can be said that in modern Russia, the level of civic and protest activity shows periodic bursts of vitalization, while many questions regarding its practical impact and autonomy remain. As discussed above, the network is the most effective platform for implementing civic campaigns. The Internet enables the mobilization of citizens in social movements according to the network principle. Thanks to the peculiarities of Internet communication, such as interactivity, efficiency, and extraterritoriality, whole (online?) communities of like-minded people are being built. Through Internet tools (social networks, blogs, forums, etc.), an information field is created to mobilize and self-organize citizens. The consolidation of civic organizations increases their political influence. The massive inclusion of citizens in civil and protest actions is observed when restrictions or infringements of rights directly affect their lives or interests. An analysis of protest movements in modern Russia suggests that the mobilization of people in online networks, as well as conventional forms of offline protests, have proliferated. The trend is toward facilitating the growth of civic activities and the evolution of civil society, as the seed of the burgeoning “third sector”. In the meantime, the critical impact of the increases in civic activities, especially those involving online participation built on the principles of cooperation and coalitions of various subjects of social and political activity, remains, for the time being, limited, especially due to its reliance on and vulnerability to government-initiated platforms.

This article aims to examine the development of civic activity in Russia. Recent changes in technological breakthroughs have contributed to the rapid expansion of civic activities. More specifically, the growth of the volume of civic activities and the development of ICT brought about the revitalization of online social movements, eventually stimulating offline civic activities. However, unlike its quantitative growth in the virtual arena, its real-world impact has been limited. Specifically, online feedback platforms provide more opportunities for ordinary people to participate in online civic activities, such as discussions, information sharing, parody, and more. On the other hand, government authorities, as the creators of these platforms, easily manipulate them to try to appease public dissatisfaction, thus alleviating the political and social tensions that may lead to the mobilization of social movements.

This study discusses only the case of Russia, but it can bring significant insight into understanding the opportunities and challenges of the social movements centered on online mobilization elsewhere. In the twenty-first century, social movements have often employed online mobilization since the Arab Spring, but reality shows that not many of them have successfully changed the reality, such as Hong Kong and Thailand. In this circumstance, this study can expand its niche to compare different geographical, political, and socio-economic factors determining the fate of those online social movements.

Finally, some of the limitations of this research must be acknowledged, especially regarding the consistency of the survey data. Due to limited accessibility to local experts, the number of experts changes from year to year, which can potentially affect the scores. Also, data collection across a wider period is still needed. These limitations will be addressed in further research in the near future.