On August 13, 2020, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), the de facto ruler of the UAE, along with Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, issued a joint statement, declaring their readiness for “the full normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE” (US Department of State 2020c). This “historic” and “huge breakthrough”, a millstone in Israel-Arab antagonistic relations, was expected to increase regional security and stability (Netanyahu 2020b; Trump 2020; US Department of State 2020c). The Abrahamic Accords between the UAE and Israel took a month to complete, and three Arab states, including Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, signed or declared the accords, a peace treaty, and full normalization in the four months leading up to the end of the year (US Department of State 2020a; 2020b). The public statement made the UAE third, following Egypt and Jordan, breaking pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic taboos and signaling that it is no longer central to Arab strategic calculations (Koduvayur and Daoud 2020; Traub, Cohen et al. 2023).

Scholars have examined the UAE-Israel reassurance from multiple perspectives, employing rational approaches to interpret the normalization declaration as a strategic sequential game. Particularly, some have rationalized UAE-Israel normalization through the lens of reassurance theory, which posits that states use strategies to persuade adversaries of their non-aggressive intentions (Lebow 1983; Stein 1991), or as “a peacetime balancing strategy” to discourage others from balancing and promote their image as a viable alliance partner (Midford 2002; Mazloomi, Yeoh et al. 2018).¹ Reassurance is assumed to be most effective with security-oriented opponents (Lebow and Stein 1990; Stein 1991), and addresses structural constraints, such as the security dilemma inherent in the realist paradigm (Glaser 1992; 1994; Kydd 2000; Montgomery 2006; Glaser 2010; Knopf 2012; Jervis 2017). UAE-Israel reconciliation follows a long process of reassurance between two security-minded adversaries, addressing Iran’s expanding regional influence and nuclear program. This shift to reassurance was to establish a status quo coalition to counter Iran-led revisionist camps, causing a “geopolitical earthquake,” a “paradigm shift,” and a “new Middle East”—a geopolitical gravity-strengthening anti-Iran alliance (Rabi and Mueller 2017; Falk 2020; Friedman 2020; Guzansky and Marshall 2020; Koduvayur and Daoud 2020; Norlen and Sinai 2020; Ulrichsen 2020; Guzansky and Feuer 2021; Yossef 2021; Singh 2022; Vakil and Neil 2023). The Gulf states’ perception of the security dilemma has escalated since the early 2000s, peaking during the Arab Spring (Cinzia 2020). The Arab-Israeli reassurance process has been ongoing since the early 1990s. However, the lack of effective reassurance over an extended period remains ambiguous.

The recent development of reassurance between the UAE and Israel has also been attributed to a combination of security and opportunity considerations (Lebow and Stein 1990; Stein 1991). Their tacit involvement in economic, technological, and cultural spheres, which gained momentum following the Arab Spring, supported this. The UAE’s foreign policy focus on neo-liberal soft power collaboration and its political doctrine, emphasizing peace as a core Islamic value and its national identity, have attracted Israel’s attention and fostered confidence (Winter and Guzansky 2020; Traub, Cohen et al. 2023). The rapprochement establishes a geopolitical, economic, and cultural center of gravity in the region based on shared security and economic interests, allowing economic integration to promote Middle Eastern peace (Achilles 2021; Vakil and Neil 2023). It’s unclear why the UAE risked breaking the Arab taboo—public recognition and diplomatic relations with Israel—before and/or without addressing the Palestinian cause, finding a just and comprehensive solution based on Palestinian core demands, or ending the Israeli occupation while enjoying covert business-like collaboration.

Signaling is crucial in identifying the aggressive and cooperative intentions of states, indicating their readiness to respond forcefully or demonstrate resolve and cooperation (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). Reassurance approaches, in particular, link strategy efficacy with transmitting an informative signal, which is costly enough to foster trust. However, psychological approaches, in particular, call into question the effectiveness of reassurance, owing to the complex trade-off between the cost of transmitting trustworthy signals and the potential benefits of dishonest or aggressive behavior (Stein 1991; Kydd 2000; Midford 2002; Glaser 2010; Kertzer, Rathbun et al. 2020). Pessimistically, the approach questioned establishing credible, costly signals, their self-expletory nature, and the fact that it’s hard to figure out intentions because of cognitive and emotional factors hindering effective information processing.² The cognitive hurdles, including distrust, suspicion, and concerns about other players’ motives, have hampered multiple reassurance attempts in the Middle East (Sevilla Jr. 2011). The Arab strategic approach towards Israel witnessed a notable transformation from “three no’s,” namely, “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it,” in Khartoum (LAS 1967), to three conditional “yeses” in flowing years (Podeh 2014; Rabi and Mueller 2017). Israel’s rejection of Arabs’ collective and proactive reassurance merits investigation. The unique characteristics of the UAE’s signal and the reasons behind Israel’s perception of its credibility remain vague.

This study examines the UAE’s act of reassurance to Israel through a bold move, despite the availability of less expensive and risky alternatives. Using the psychological-behavioral approach to credible commitment, it delves into a mechanism through which leaders can convey a credible signal to reassure adversaries, encouraging conflict mitigation and peaceful negotiation. The UAE’s public declaration of normalization with Israel, specifically by its prominent figure, MBZ, is analyzed to understand how psychological cognitive barriers such as mistrust, suspicion, and threat perception influence the reassurance initiative. It elucidates the significance of the August game, which had been overlooked by scholars who solely scrutinized the October normalization agreement, the Abraham Accord, attributing the reassurance to security concerns or strategic opportunities. The article highlights how the UAE reassured Israel by lowering cognitive barriers and signaling its reliability through an irrevocable commitment (IC). The argument improves upon an underappreciated aspect of IC through the development of a mechanism transforming it into an informative convey of reassurance, a method that has received little attention from scholars. It also renders IC a feasible strategy for particularly addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict, avoiding generalization.

This study utilizes qualitative analysis to look at how the credible commitments model affects the normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel (Fearon 1997; Simmons and Danner 2010; Stevens and Cooper 2010). It draws on archival sources, including official documents, government statements from Arab leaders (including those from the UAE) and Israel, public opinion surveys, and academic journal articles. It examines the development of Arab-Israeli reassurance from the UAE’s independence in 1971 to the late 2000s, when it participated in Arabs’ collective reassurance efforts through the League of Arab States and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. In the post-Arab Spring, with no reassurance initiatives, both parties opted for issue-based tacit collaboration. It concludes by explaining why and how the UAE and Israel achieved successful reassurance.

The irreversible commitment, a prevalent strategy in international politics (Reichers 1985; Sull and Spinosa 2005; Ågotnes, Goranko et al. 2007; Simmons and Danner 2010; Stevens and Cooper 2010; Wright, Charlie Weir et al. 2016), has been relatively overlooked in the literature on reassurance, likely due to its high costs compared to other conflict management strategies (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991). IC, in the psychological approach, is a reassurance strategy for mitigating mutual mistrust, misperception, and stereotypes in adversarial relationships, incentivizing the adversary to engage in negotiations (Stein 1991). It involves the self-imposed, unilateral, and “credible commitment” of an actor to carry out a specific action, irrespective of the reactions of other parties involved (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987). This aligns with the attributional behavioral approach, which views commitment as a process of intertwining an individual with certain behavioral manifestations (Reichers 1985; Sull and Spinosa 2005). The credible commitment theory suggests that states may, rationally and under certain conditions, bind themselves irrevocably to promote conflict resolution and peaceful negotiations (Elkins, Guzman et al. 2006). IC is hence a crucial trust-inducing strategy for leaders in adversarial relationships to overcome psychological barriers and is applicable to both defenders and challengers (Schelling 1958; Stein 1991; Quackenbush 2011).

Establishing “absolute” irreversible commitment is challenging (Schelling 1958), but certain accumulative attributes increase the credibility of commitments to varying degrees (Walton and McKersie 1991). The IC’s effectiveness as a reassurance measure stems from its ability to offer an alternative to conflicts or threats between adversaries. This effectiveness is primarily based on the irreversibility of the reassurance action, as once undertaken, it becomes arduous or unfeasible to reverse (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991; Stevens and Cooper 2010).³ Irreversibility makes a commitment philosophically “true” and “firm,” as it consistently dictates an actor’s actions in all possible scenarios, regardless of their personal level of commitment, inclination, or lack thereof.⁴ Credible commitment theories underscore the significance of binding actors to promises, making it risky and costly to back down in uncertain situations (Simmons and Danner 2010).

States may take irrevocable measures to signal their unwavering commitment to future actions, recognizing the challenges of retracting or reversing these actions (Stevens and Cooper 2010; Quackenbush 2011). This irrevocability serves as a reliable indicator, rather than a manipulative gesture, of the sender’s intentions to reassure the recipient (Jervis 1989; Stein 1991). Once a state surpasses the threshold of no return, it becomes inexorably dedicated to continuing along a path of reassurance or peace (Stevens and Cooper 2010). The inability to reverse its promise at low cost reinforces its genuine dedication to deescalating hostilities and pursuing a peaceful solution (Simmons and Danner 2010). Overall, the irreversibility of an initiative directly correlates with the credibility of the signal it transmits to key stakeholders (Stevens and Cooper 2010).

IC is a “self-binding” commitment where one voluntarily and deliberately renounces its freedom of choice, independent of others’ behavior, to convince adversaries that alternative recourse to force or war has been abandoned, generating incentives for behavior modification (Schelling 1958; Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Sull and Spinosa 2005; Elkins, Guzman et al. 2006; Stevens and Cooper 2010; Quackenbush 2011). Psychology indicates that voluntary commitment enhances personal responsibility, leading to stronger commitment, while external pressures, extrinsic constraints, and incentives can weaken an individual’s sense of agency, autonomy, and responsibility, resulting in weaker commitment (Sull and Spinosa 2005; Stevens and Cooper 2010).

The efficacious implementation of an IC involves a “substantial political cost” for the initiator, which is evident to the recipients (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991). This cost arises from “the public nature” of irreversible commitments and the difficulty associated with reversing public pledges (Stevens and Cooper 2010; Yarhi-Milo 2013; Kydd and McManus 2017). Public commitments are seen as more obligatory than private ones, as they create a moral obligation and risk the initiator’s reputation if not fulfilled (Sull and Spinosa 2005). Leaders who openly communicate their actions and statements demonstrate a stronger level of commitment, while those with weaker resolution may be hesitant to offer it publicly (Tarar and Leventoğlu 2009; Stevens and Cooper 2010).

Public commitment is closely associated with “audience costs,” which are reactions of domestic and foreign political audiences to foreign policy outcomes (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001; Tomz 2007; Snyder and Borghard 2011; Yarhi-Milo 2013; Kydd and McManus 2017). The costs are essential in bargaining for leaders to craft credible commitments and communicate their genuine intentions during crises (Fearon 1994; Smith 1998; Tarar and Leventoğlu 2009). Going public reassures the opponent that the initiator will not back out or exploit if it adopts the alternative strategy (Yarhi-Milo 2013).

The observable endogenous and exogenous public commitment costs establish reputational stakes, incentivize domestic bargaining, and convey leaders’ competency to both domestic and foreign adversaries (Fearon 1994; Snyder and Borghard 2011). The dynamic interplay between domestic constituencies and international politics allows leaders to signal their commitments or threats effectively (Smith 1998). Failure to fulfill commitments can damage their international reputation, credibility, and competence in foreign affairs, potentially leading to their removal from power (Walton and McKersie 1991; Fearon 1994; Smith 1998; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008; Snyder and Borghard 2011).

The IC is a groundbreaking initiative that challenges established domestic collective ideas, beliefs, and taboos (Yarhi-Milo 2013). Making irreversible decisions entails unavoidable political consequences for leaders (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991), and domestic politics and bureaucratic conflicts further complicate IC feasibility (Lockhart 1978). Therefore, to make irreversible decisions, leaders need high autonomy from domestic restrictions, which can be challenging in highly institutionalized and open democracies (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991; Weeks 2008; Downes and Sechser 2012). Non-democracies, on the other hand, excel in explicit commitments due to their closed ruling system, which allows officials to make decisions without external pressure, fosters accountability and responsibility, and provides a clear framework for assessing the effectiveness and credibility of the commitments (Sull and Spinosa 2005; Stevens and Cooper 2010). The public aspect of the commitment contributes to its irreversibility and legitimacy.

The use of IC in negotiations increases the political risks for the initiator while also making it more difficult for the opponent to defect (Stein 1991).⁵ IC serves as a strategic move to influence the adversary’s choices in line with the initiator’s interests, considering multiple audiences and stakeholders (Walton and McKersie 1991; Weeks 2008). The political costs of IC for initiators develop psychological and political symbols that galvanize public opinion within the adversary’s country, thereby swaying their constrained leaders to consider an alternative action (Stein 1991). IC removes the adversary’s leaders’ restriction and creates a political incentive for them to act in reverse, establishing a political audience cost to defect (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987; Stein 1991).⁶

Effective IC also relies on the “ripeness” of a dispute or adversarial stalemate, where both parties are prepared for non-military resolution (Stein 1989; Kleiboer 1994; Babbitt and Hampson 2011). Ripeness is the “willingness” of the main participants in an antagonistic relationship to pursue “peaceful” alternatives to conflict or force (Kleiboer 1994), based on a shared perception among all participants of the optimal moment for settlement (Babbitt and Hampson 2011). Thus, a conflict is ripe when the adversaries are willing to negotiate or pursue alternative political “solutions” that are comparatively less risky and less costly than continuing the conflict.⁷

Effective IC is achievable under certain conditions, but it is politically costly and irreversible, making it risky for states to use to reassure their opponents and uncommon in conflict management. Establishing credibility through symbolic trust-building measures is a viable option, provided that the initiator possesses a comprehension of the requisites for instilling confidence (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987). Lack of knowledge and mutual mistrust among adversarial leaders hinder successful reassurance (Stein 1991). External trustees must be insured to alleviate states’ apprehension of violating commitments and to establish credibility among all stakeholders (Maoz and Felsenthal 1987). These variables improve the effectiveness of irreversible commitments.

The UAE achieved independence on December 2, 1971, 23 years after Israel (The Presidential Court 2022). Membership in the Arab League and the GCC greatly influences the UAE’s overall foreign policy and stance towards Israel (Zaga 2018). Upon joining the League, the UAE adopted a hawkish approach, refusing to acknowledge the existence of the Jewish state and joining in “the boycott of Israel” (1972). Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE’s ruler, emphasized that “no Arab country is safe from the perils of the battle with Zionism unless it plays its role and bears its responsibilities in confronting the Israeli enemy” (Alkim 1989). The UAE backed a Saudi-led oil embargo in 1973 to punish the US for supporting Israel during the Arab-Israeli October confrontation (Ulrichsen 2020).

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape underwent a gradual transformation with Sadat’s negotiations with Israel, the Camp David Accords, the Iranian Revolution, and Iraq’s military intervention in Iran (Rabi and Mueller 2017; Zaga 2018). The 1978 League summit in Baghdad rejected Sadat’s peace initiative and reaffirmed “the Arab nation’s commitment to a just peace based on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, the safeguarding of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian, and the establishment of their independent state” (LAS 1978). Egypt faced consequences following the Egypt-Israel peace accord, leading to reprisals from the League’s Council and Arab states’ boycotting Ciro, except for Oman, Somalia, and Sudan (2020).

The establishment of the GCC moderated the UAE and other Persian Gulf monarchies’ uncompromising stance, although they still refused to acknowledge Israel and sought “a fair” compromise for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, ending Israel’s occupation (Podeh 2014). Saudi Crown Prince Fahad (1981) ibn Abd al-Aziz (1981, Aug. 7)proposed the “Fahad Plan,” which entailed “to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967,” the dismantlement of “Israeli settlements,” “the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homes,” and the “establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.” The proposal vaguely secured recognition of Israel (Shipler 1982). The League summit in Fez, Morocco, unanimously approved the plan (LAS 1981), but it failed to maintain Arab consensus, dividing the Arab world into “moderates” and “rejectionists,” like Syria and Iraq, opposing any compromise with Israel (Satloff 2002). Israel rejected the Fez initiative as “a plot for Israel’s eventual destruction” and a “threat to Israel’s existence” (Shipler 1982). The lack of explicit recognition rendered the Fez plan much inferior to that of Prince Fahd, and Israel reverted to the Arab practice of acknowledging the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative, with whom Tel Aviv refused to negotiate (Shipler 1982).

The events of the early 1990s, including the decline of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, prompted a reevaluation of regional security threats, with Iraq emerging as the major concern for the national security of the Gulf monarchies (Ulrichsen 2020). The Gulf states still viewed Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) as a security threat due to its Shi’i expansionism, support for extremist Islamic organizations, and efforts to sabotage Palestinian-Israeli peace (Sevilla Jr. 2011). The dynamics also prompted a shift in Israel’s strategic focus from developing alliances with non-Arab nations to forging normalized ties with moderate Arab states “to outflank Iran” (Parsi 2005). Israel also sought normalization to strengthen its political and economic supremacy and geostrategic weight in the emerging order (Barak 1995). Israel expressed willingness to undertake “risks” to establish practical trust with Arab nations, including “demilitarization”, reviewing its military posture, and withdrawing forces from disputed areas, but as part of “a package” of peace and normalization (Rabin 1994; Barak 1995).

The 1991 Madrid peace summit marked the beginning of constructive the Persian Gulf Arabs-Israeli. Following the 1994 Oslo Accords, the states agreed to review the boycott of Israel as part of “dramatic changes in Arab attitudes” and a “concrete signal to the Israelis that peace comes with rewards” (Sciolino 1994). However, the primary embargo on direct commerce with Israel remained in place without addressing fundamental issues of recognition and normalization, Israel’s withdrawal, or refugees’ right of return. The rise of Likud and Netanyahu has disrupted the peace process (Inbar 1997),⁸ complicating Arab-Israeli reassurance, with Qatar and Oman struggling to maintain public relations with Israel while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE negotiate peace without normalization (Rabi and Mueller 2017). The peace process was further complicated in 2000 due to a stalemate, the second Camp David negotiations, the Palestinians’ second intifada (Pressman 2003), reviving pro-Palestinian sentiments in the region, and a “reactive” embargo by Arab League nations (Al-Jazeera 2004).

After September 11, the GCC—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—worked more actively to deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute. In February 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz outlined the Arab Peace Initiative (API), offering Arabs’ contingent collective “recognition, normalization,” and “full peace” as a reward for Israel’s “full withdrawal from all the occupied territories” plus “the establishment of a Palestinian state” (Friedman 2002). Arab revisionists opposed “normalization,” insisted on Israel withdrawing from Syrian Golan, and refused repatriation of Palestinian refugees, while moderates rejected the rejectionists’ measures that would make it ineffective and unacceptable (Teitelbaum 2009; Podeh 2014).

On March 27, 2002, the Arab League summit in Beirut overwhelmingly accepted the API’s land-for-peace plan, ambiguously addressing the issue of “normal relations” with Israel as well as acknowledging the problematic demands of Arab radicals. “The conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the crisis would not offer peace or security to the parties” was a crucial feature of the API (LAS 2002). Arab leaders hoped that the signal, with its groundbreaking offer of collective normalization between Arab nations and Israel, would serve as a catalyst for Israelis to place their “trust in peace” (bin-Abdulaziz 2002).

Despite favoring Prince Abdullah’s idea, Israel remained skeptical of the Arabs’ commitment to reassurance, preferring a more comprehensive normalization proposal (MFA 2002). The Beirut API failed to signal Arab credibility in Israel due to the prevalence of Arab rejectionist-required clauses, its vague definition of normal relations, its failure to prevent “terrorism,” and its “take it or leave it” proposal (Peres 2002). Diplomatic efforts conducted under the API framework did not yield tangible results (Teitelbaum 2009; Podeh 2014), and its decline began with the implementation of the US “Road Map” Plan (Bush 2003). Despite signaling Arabs’ willingness to collectively recognize and normalize relations with Israel, the API appeared ineffective in gaining Israeli approval.

Geopolitics still kept Arab-Israeli relations crucial. The G.W. Bush administration’s “regime change” and the war on terror overthrew Afghanistan and Iraq’s regimes, challenging the regional balance of power (Valbjørn and Bank 2012; Cinzia 2020). Iran’s aspirations to extend the “Shia Crescent” from the Levant to the Persian Gulf have raised concerns about Iran becoming a regional hegemon, endangering its adversaries (NBC News 2004). The mid-2000s developments prompted Israeli and Arab moderates to reconsider their respective policies. The capture of Israeli soldiers by Hizballah in the summer of 2006 significantly influenced Israel’s strategic calculations, culminating in the abandonment of self-restraint and engagement in the second Lebanon conflict. (Teitelbaum 2009). Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan have publicly criticized Hizballah for its “unexpected, inappropriate, and imprudent actions,” threatening all Arab countries and their achievements (SPA 2006). This convergence of Arab and Israeli interests prompted both parties to reconsider the API as the only game in town.

The 2007 summit in Riyadh reaffirmed the API land for peace proposal and included an “Arab Quartet” working group of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Arab leaders committed that “no normalization with Israel can take place before achieving a comprehensive and just peace” based on the API (bin-Zayed 2007b). They urged Israel to accept the “strategic choice” as the sole solution to the conflict (WAM 2007b), warning that failure to do so would eliminate any prospects for peace or diplomatic overtures, placing “everything back in the hands of fate” and “the lords of war” (Al-Jazeera 2007). Israel rejected the relaunched API due to its problematic components and emphasized the need for peace agreements based on fundamental principles, including “two nation-states”, each addressing their own people’s national aspirations, in a terrorism-free environment (MFA 2007b).

The Riyadh summit failed to dispel negative psychological cognitions in Israel, as the Arab-Israeli reassurance issue was not another declaration but an emotional breakthrough to signal Arabs’ trustworthiness to Israel (Friedman 2007). The Arab Quartet did not yield a breakthrough, with only Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers visiting Israel in July. A Saudi or UAE delegation’s visit may have been more effective in influencing public opinion (Rabi and Mueller 2017). The effective reassurance appeared to call for a novel Sadat, an opportunity missed by Saudi King Abdullah and Emirati Khalifa bin Zayed.

The Bush administration announced a peace conference in Annapolis with the aim of alleviating Arab-Israeli tensions and facilitating a regional alliance to contain Iran’s threat (Bush 2007). Arab moderates sought the benefits of normalization only following a peace agreement, aligning with the API (bin-Zayed 2007a; WAM 2007c), avoiding “gestures” of “normalization before peace” (Tehran Times 2007), and warning potential negative consequences of a failed peace summit for all sides (WAM 2007a). Israel, on the other hand, sought “normalization of relations with Arab states,” regardless of the Palestine issue, including recognition, halting the boycott, and ending isolation, as Jordan and Egypt have signaled (Livni 2007; Olmert 2008). Israelis aimed for a “direct, ongoing” negotiation with Palestinians to tackle the outstanding issues, focusing on “the road map,” aligning with the principle of “two states for two peoples” (Livni 2007; Olmert 2008).

The Annapolis agreement between Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate a final settlement based on “obligations under the Road Map and US monitoring” (MFA 2007a), was deemed a “total Arab failure,” “an unprecedented blow to the Palestinian cause and the broader Arab community” and the API’s demise, due to the absence of the initiative and “the Arabs’ persistent demands” (Al-omrani and Morrow 2007). Arab leaders were criticized for “inexcusable misuse of the normalization card,” the only way to compel Israel to negotiate without compromises (Al-omrani and Morrow 2007). The optimism of Arab moderates regarding the implementation of the API with US support faded soon, as Barack Obama gradually distanced himself from the peace initiative of Israel and “the Muslim world spanning from Indonesia to Morocco” (Mahnaimi and Baxter 2008). Less irrelevantly, Arabs concluded that the API had become obsolete due to the lack of serious consideration by Israel and the US and the failure of Arab states to effectively communicate the initiative’s objectives to the Israeli public (Muasher 2008). Arab leaders were urged to halt peace initiatives and any form of relationship with Israel until the end of its occupation, leaving “the verdict with the Arab people” (WAM 2009).

The UAE-Israel Secrete Diplomacy After the Arab Spring

The 2010-11 regional geopolitical dynamics impacted Arab-Israel reassurance, overshadowing the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The Persian Gulf Arab states viewed the wave of democratization in the Middle East as part of Iranian expansionism and sectarianism, with the Shia crescent expanding to “a full month” (The Economist 2016). The Arab Spring has fueled extremist groups like Muslim Brotherhood, causing rifts within the Arab community, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan fearing Qatar’s relations with IRI, Syria, Hamas, and MB could “smear and undermine” Arab leadership (Al-Jazeera 2009). The Syrian Civil War deepened Gulf region divisions, with the Gulf states supporting different Syrian opposition organizations fighting against Assad’s regime (Zaga 2018). Therefore, the Middle East prioritizes maintaining the status quo over Palestinian-Israeli peace, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE counter-revolutionary operations in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and Israel anti-terrorist campaigns in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights (Podeh 2014; Ulrichsen 2020). Rare diplomatic efforts, such as Qatar’s proposal of a modified API in 2013, did not gain traction among Israelis who were skeptical of Qatar’s support for Hamas (Kampeas 2013). Moreover, under Netanyahu, Israeli strategic thinking centered on the containment of perceived threats from the IRI and its proxies rather than peace with the Palestinians (Reuters 2009).

Netanyahu’s ascension signaled a resurgence of the idea of dividing the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts (Mosaic 2020). He advocated for an interim solution (Mustafa and Ghanem 2013), and sought a “genuine” and “durable” “version of peace”, based on two main principles: “recognition of the Jewishness of the state” and “security of Israel” (Netanyahu 2009; CFR 2010; Netanyahu 2010; 2011b; 2011a). Netanyahu believed that the lack of recognition of Israel by Palestinians was “the root”, “core”, “underlying source”, and “the real engine of the conflict,” not occupation, and hence the greatest obstacle to peace. “A fundamental prerequisite for ending the conflict is a public, binding, and unequivocal Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people,” Netanyahu (2009) said. narrative of Jewish rights while de-legitimizing Palestinians’ narrative of occupation, rights, and demands (Mustafa and Ghanem 2013). Netanyahu expected the Palestinians to end conflicts, claims, and demands once and for all, like Sadat’s vow of “no more war, no more bloodshed” (CFR 2010). He also advocated for the “demilitarization” of a Palestinian state “without an army, control of its airspace, …and [the ability] to forge military pacts”, while rejecting Israel’s unilateral withdrawal and maximally maintaining settlements and sovereignty over the Jordan Valley (Netanyahu 2009).

Netanyahu’s ascension reinforced reconciliation with moderate Persian Gulf Arabs, shifting Israel’s strategic focus from the traditional “inside-out” approach of a settlement with Palestinians to “outside-in”, “a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world,” to resolve the local conflict with Palestinians (2020d). Netanyahu (2014) emphasized at the UN, “We must look not only to Jerusalem and Ramallah but also to Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh. With the active involvement of Arab countries willing to provide political, material, and other indispensable support, peace may be achieved”. The post-Arab Spring geopolitical reality motivated Netanyahu to consolidate Israelis’ conviction on an acceptable reassurance, signaling the Arabs’ commitment to “historic compromise” with no actual concession from Israel, an unconditional normalization with Israel independent of the Palestine cause.

The UAE and Israel have developed a tacit multifaceted collaboration that transcends socioeconomic areas, focusing on “strategic objectives” (Ravid 2013; Podeh 2014; Zaga 2018; Achilles 2021; Traub, Cohen et al. 2023; Vakil and Neil 2023). In 2009, the US State Department confirmed the clandestine diplomatic efforts between the UAE and Israel, as well as the amicable personal rapport between Emirati-Israeli Foreign Ministers Abdullah and Livni (Ravid 2013). In September 2012, Netanyahu met with FM Abdullah, accompanied by security and military officials from both sides (Ravid 2017). Pre-2014 Gaza War secret meetings between Israeli, Saudi, and UAE political and security leaders with US assistance indicated a coordinated effort against the IRI and its proxies (Hearst 2014). The relationship has grown over time, with an increase in Israeli delegations visiting the UAE between 2016 and 2019 (Entous 2018; Landau 2020).

Israel has reportedly become a significant supplier of military and security intelligence equipment, technologies, and services to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain (Rabi and Mueller 2017). Between 2008 and 2012, Israel submitted hundreds of applications to acquire military and intelligence equipment from Britain for resale to Arab countries, with the UAE as the main client (Benn 2013). UAE-Israel military and security cooperation has continued in the following years, with officials visits, exchange (i²⁴NEWS 2018), and multilateral exercises, as in 2016, 2017, and 2019, including the Iniohos exercises in Greece (Cohen 2017; The Tower 2019).

Nonetheless, the Palestine issue remained a determining factor in the UAE’s strategic approach to Israel, emphasizing that it would not “normalize ties with the Jewish entity until the Palestinian issue is completely and justly resolved”, Mohamad bin Rashid said in 2005 when rejecting Israel’s request to open an office (Al-Abed, Hellyer et al. 2006). Over the years, the UAE’s leaders have reiterated the rigid stance that recognition, normalization, or special relations with Israel may not be possible until the Jewish state shows a genuine desire to advance peace with the Palestinians based on the API and its core components, as Netanyahu and Livni were warned by FM Abdullah in the 2012 and 2016 meetings (Ravid 2017). The UAE condemned the relocation of the US embassy, the acknowledgment of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and the state’s control of the Golan Heights (WAM 2017). Despite supporting “Trump’s vision for peace” (2020), major Arab states, including the UAE, emphasize the importance of a fair and comprehensive resolution for the Palestinian cause, their rights, and the end of occupation (WAM 2020).

The UAE remains steadfast in its support for the Palestinian cause, despite changing regional dynamics and foreign policy priorities post-Arab Spring, emphasizing the importance of peaceful resolution, ending Israel’s occupation, and recognizing an independent Palestinian state for regional and global security (bin-Zayed 2013; 2014; 2015). FM Abdullah warned at the UN in 2019 that “stability cannot be established in our region without reaching a just, lasting, and comprehensive solution that enables the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital” (bin-Zayed 2019). Once accomplished, Israel will enjoy normalized ties and “mutual peace and security” with its Arab neighbors.

On August 13th, 2020, MBZ announced the normalization of relations with Israel in a joint statement with Netanyahu and Trump, culminating in the peace agreement on September 15. This section analyzes the unique characteristics of the UAE’s actions and evaluates how these attributes contributed to the accomplishment of an efficacious signal securing Israel’s acceptance.

The normalization declaration is an outcome of the UAE and Israel’s strategic shift towards reassurance. The UAE signaled reassurance by adopting an irreversible commitment, a strategy typically employed by leaders who realize the potential for misperceptions and misconceptions to influence their own and their adversaries’ judgments. Examining Emirati leaders’ statements and rhetoric revealed that this commitment was “to break old perceptions on both sides,” driven by the recognition of the leaders, mainly MBZ, that establishing relationships leads to influence, confidence, and the formation of networks, as well as increasing receptiveness and credibility, thereby fostering a willingness among others “to listen and trust” (Aldroubi 2020; CFR 2020). “Mohamed bin Zayed’s bold and courageous step” to engage in a “risky endeavor” was “one of the strategic decisions that have to be made” (Aldroubi 2020), to achieve a “breakthrough” and overcome “centuries of misunderstandings and decades of mistrust [that] animate aggression” (Al-Otaiba 2020). From this standpoint, “better awareness and enhanced capabilities to address risks and dangers provide reassurance and weight,” facilitating “more intensive statecraft and regional dialogue… a more hopeful mindset, and de-escalation of tensions” (Al-Otaiba 2020). “We broke the psychological barrier, and that was the most important thing,” as Garghash said (Friedman 2020).

The MBZ’s public declaration of normalization between the UAE and Israel is seen as an indicator of the UAE’s irrevocable commitment.⁹ With this high-profile public announcement, MBZ indeed effectively engaged a global audience as external trustees, creating a sense of accountability and ensuring that any breach of the agreement would result in significant diplomatic repercussions, thereby making the commitment irreversible. Indeed, once MBZ publicly announced the UAE’s recognition of and normalization of ties with the Jewish state, there was “no way back from the act,” even in the face of the following grave events, as an Emirate delegation stressed later at the Knesset (AFP 2022).¹⁰ This irreversibility made the gesture a genuine indication of the UAE’s intentions, giving it significant weight in Israel’s political landscape (Times of Israel 2020). President Rivlin Reuven (2020) lauded the “wise leaders” of UAE, notably MBZ, for “their notable and courageous action” that have helped “build and strengthen the trust”, promoting understanding and cooperation among all involved parties.

The UAE’s move was remarkable for its unparalleled, voluntary, and unconditional nature. MBZ made a public announcement of normalization of relations with Israel without mentioning UN resolutions, the API, or demanding Israel’s withdrawal, an independent Palestine state with East Jerusalem as its capital, or Palestinian refugees’ right of return (US Department of State 2020c). Likewise, the September 15th Abraham Accord does not mention the API or the core issues, nor does it commit explicitly to a two-state solution (US Department of State 2020a). It also overlooked the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, where the management of the Muslim sacred sites was handed over to the Jordanian- appointed Waqf Council, legitimizing Israel’s sovereignty over holy sites, which caused concern among Arabs and Muslims , but pleased Israelis (Fraioli and Stevenson 2020; Magid 2020). The provisions were also taken out of FM Abdullah’s address at the signing ceremony (bin-Zayed 2020). The Emiratis under MBZ followed Sadat’s reassurances to Israel by declaring no more disputes and no more demands.

The non-reciprocal nature of the UAE’s commitment, a dramatic departure from the historical rhetoric and practices of Arab states, contributing to regional acceptance of Israel, “marginalizing the Palestinian issue”, and reinforcing “the ‘one-state reality’ of occupation and unequal rights”, caused a “huge breakthrough” for Israel (Ahren 2020a; Fraioli and Stevenson 2020; Magid 2020). Unlike previous ones with Egypt and Jordan, “in the current agreement, not only has Israel not withdrawn from so much as one square meter,” but instead includes “the application of Israeli sovereignty over extensive territories in Judea and Samaria” (Netanyahu 2020d). The public declaration of this strategic reversal served as a potent catalyst that effectively overcame psychological barriers and restored trustworthiness in Israel (The National 2020a). This signal and intention behind the “breakthrough for peace” were well received by Israelis as “the great turnaround” from “three no’s in Khartoum in 1967” to three obsolete yeses in 2020: “yes to peace with Israel, yes to recognition of Israel, and yes to normalization with Israel” (Netanyahu 2020c).

Outside the ruling closed circle, the UAE’s elites and general public remained steadfast in their support of the Palestinian cause and opposed normalization with Israel. Political dissidents founded the UAE Resistance Union to oppose normalization in all its forms (The Jerusalem Post 2020). Prior to the declaration, a survey revealed that 80% of Emiratis rejected all connections with Israel (The Washington Institute 2020a). Despite official attempts to sway public opinion, the majority of Emiratis continued to oppose normalization with Israel, according to a survey conducted in November (The Washington Institute 2020b). A March 2022 study found that two-thirds of Bahraini, Saudi, and UAE inhabitants dislike the Abraham Accords, compared to 19-25% who favor them (The Washington Institute 2022). Criminalizing and penalizing dissidents (Shehada 2020), threatening citizen surveillance and the expulsion of skeptics (Al-Hosani 2020), and justifying the act via religious polemics and narratives may explain the lack of public backlash to the normalization act in the UAE (Winter and Guzansky 2020).

In the Arab world, A November 2019–September 2020 poll in thirteen Arab countries, including the Gulf states, indicated that 90% of respondents opposed normalization with Israel, while those who supported it did so only if the Palestinian conflict was resolved (OWP 2021). A November 2020 poll found that three-quarters of Arabs believe the Palestine problem still affects all Arabs, with 88% against recognizing Israel and 6% in favor (Tamara Kharroub 2020). Hence, if Arab public attitudes were considered, there would be no “genuine normalization”, and no Arab leader would dare to “normalize” with Israel (OWP 2021). Hypotheses suggest initiator leaders require more autonomy from domestic political and bureaucratic constraints, and those who are perusing antagonistic policies against the opponent may incur greater costs (Stein 1991). Following Khalifa’s heart attack in 2014, specifically, MBZ has acquired significant decision-making power (Henderson 2022), allowing him to achieve a remarkable strategic advancement through the implementation of a bold and courageous measure, which is considered a pivotal strategic choice (Aldroubi 2020; bin-Zayed 2020, CFR 2020).

The UAE’s “unforgivable,” “hypocritical,” and “shameful” action and its “strategic folly” and “mistake” face a greater backlash from Arab and Muslim states and extremist Islamic movements (Kershner and Rasgon 2020; Reuters 2020a). The Arab League and OIC stressed that normalization would not occur unless Israel ceases its occupation and adopts a fair, comprehensive, API-based peace (Al-Jazeera 2020; Nabulsi 2020). Regional media lambasted the UAE’s act and its leaders, particularly MBZ, as well as Netanyahu and Trump, for undermining Palestinian rights and the two-state solution (e.g., Al-Ahram 2020; ÖCAL 2020; Shepp 2020). Arab intellectuals boycott cultural activities in solidarity with Palestinians, and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement urges global efforts to boycott, divest from, and sanction Israel (WAFA 2020). Various demonstrations have been organized in response to the UAE’s actions across the region (e.g., Daily Sabah 2020; i24News 2020; Mehr News 2020), with 90% of Arab individuals’ social media campaigns being “hypercritical” (Ahren 2020c).

The backlash against the UAE’s action appeared less severe than the reactions to Sadat’s Egypt, which threatened the political survival of its leaders. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that violating the taboo in the Arab and Muslim worlds still carries substantial risks and repercussions. The irreversibility of the UAE’s commitment and the political cost of violating the taboo affected the collective “psyche of the Israeli public”, causing a re-evaluation of their general perception that Arabs are hostile to Israel (Halbfinger 2020). Netanyahu emphasizes that “peace is not made with enemies but with those who have stopped being enemies and who desire peace” and the UAE’s act demonstrated that “Israel, which for decades was perceived as an enemy, is today seen as an essential ally” (Ahren 2020d).

The UAE’s move set off a psychologically and politically potent signal that inspired trust among Israeli citizens and rallied them behind their more cautious and reserved leaders, providing them with reason to act despite any constraints they might encounter. A Channel 12 poll revealed that 80% “of Israelis preferred Israel’s normalization deal with the UAE over West Bank annexation” (Times of Israel 2020). The normalization also won popularity among Israeli political elites, with just 13 Arab coalition legislators condemning it as a plot to undermine the Palestinians (Ahren 2020d). Despite their dissatisfaction with Netanyahu, opposition leaders, like Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, hailed the normalization as an “excellent” achievement (Ahren 2020e).

Israel accepted the UAE’s reassurance signal because it aligned with Israelis lasting strategic calculations, notably Netanyahu’s “doctrine” on real peace.

This doctrine contradicts the concept, held up until a few days ago, that no Arab country would agree to make an official and open peace with Israel before a conclusion in the conflict with the Palestinians...and capitulating to the Palestinians’ demands... This mistake gave the Palestinians a veto over peace between Israel and Arab countries, holding the parties as hostages to the Palestinians’ most extreme demands, which put Israel in genuine existential danger (Netanyahu 2020d).

Israel has now received a significant signal from an Arab state, fulfilling its desire for “a genuine,” non-contingent peace based on Israel’s recognition and security, not “withdrawal and weakness” or “dangerous concessions” but “constant Israeli deterrence and Israel’s growing strength and power” (Netanyahu 2020d). “A psychological revolution in the attitude of the Arab states towards Israel’s right to exist” made the signal credible (Netanyahu 2020e).

The UAE has made a significant psychological milestone by changing its strategic orientation towards Israel, perceived as “a clear break with the failed strategies of the past” (Netanyahu 2020a), and “willingness to advance peace without a Palestinian veto” (MFA 2020). “The whole thing that we based our strategy on as Arabs is that the 2002 API specified that once Israel withdraws, there will be peace between Arabs and Israelis”, Palestinian official Saeb Saied lamented, but “Netanyahu came determined... to change the formula, saying that they want Arab recognition of Israel while they continue with the occupation, and the UAE stamped the green light for this” (Reuters 2020a). Netanyahu has recently proved “that not only [the 53-year-old occupation] is sustainable, but Israel can improve its ties with the Arab world while it is still going” (AP 2020). Hence, it seems irrational for Israel, as a rational actor, to decline the UAE’s assurance commitment given the expensive and hazardous signal conveyed by an Arab state, irrespective of the Palestinian cause and their demands.

The UAE’s decision was driven by the conviction that “the people of the UAE, Israel, and the wider Middle East are fatigued by prolonged conflict,” and that “every alternative to peace would result in devastation, impoverishment, and human hardship” (bin-Zayed 2020; CFR 2020). Notwithstanding the prevailing notion of Israel’s military superiority, moderate Arab states were unwilling to jeopardize what they had already gained through the 2002 API. Otherwise, they were dissatisfied with the status quo in the Middle East, where they perceived other adversaries as more threatening than Israel, especially in the Israel-Palestine issue (The National 2020b). Realizing there was no viable alternative, the UAE “broke the psychological barrier” and accepted the high relative cost to make the conflict “more manageable” (The National 2020a). Indeed, MBZ broke the “molds” when he realized that “these molds don’t work” (CFR 2020).

The UAE’s leadership demonstrated a paradigm shift by adopting a more “realistic” attitude and advocating normalization as a “fresh approach”, a prerequisite to facilitate a return to the negotiation table to tackle regional concerns, particularly the Palestine-Israel conflict, to stabilize the region. “This intractable conflict and the many others in our neighborhood will not be solved in a moment,” Al-Otaiba (2020) emphasized; nonetheless, “It can’t be resolved by more violence or by continuing down the same fruitless avenues. The region’s potential and the hopes of its people are being lost.”

Equally important is the Israelis’ willingness to consider alternatives to ongoing conflicts with Arabs or Palestinians to avoid “the cost of war”, which have been detrimental to Israel’s strategic interests (Netanyahu 2023). Since the early 1990s, Israel has signaled its willingness to make peace with Palestinians, hoping to restore relations with entire Arab world. Over time, there was a shift in approach towards Netanyahu’s outside-in doctrine, which aimed to expedite the normalization process with Arab moderates in the Persian Gulf by marginalizing the Palestine issue. Netanyahu (2023), emphasized that “when the Palestinians see that most of the Arab world has reconciled itself to the Jewish state, they too will be more likely to abandon the fantasy of destroying Israel and finally embrace a path of genuine peace with it.” While previous approaches failed to yield a single peace treaty in twenty-five years, Netanyahu celebrated the success of a different approach in 2020, which resulted in four peace treaties with four Arab states in just four months (Netanyahu 2023). Israel viewed Abu Dhabi’s signal as a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli adversarial relations (Netanyahu 2020d), hoping that it would have a similar impact to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, ultimately leading to the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mosaic 2020). Israel was also unwilling to preserve the status quo in the greater Middle East (Netanyahu 2020d). Normalization with moderate Arabs serves not only the Palestinian-Israeli peace but also to contain “the master enemy,” Iran and its proxies (Halbfinger 2020).

Israel’s annexation policy was a major setback to UAE-Israel reassurance, as it would increase costs for both states (Al-Otaiba 2020). Netanyahu thus opted for a non-binding and symbolic “temporary suspension” (US Department of State 2020c), in response to Trump’s request to implement the agreement (CFR 2020; Reuters 2020b). While this demonstrated the US’s role as an external trustee in fostering trustworthiness between the UAE and Israel.¹¹ Through this interim, non-binding pledge, Netanyahu has attained “normalization, peace, and sovereignty” while helping the UAE restore its image and reduce the cost of normalization within the Muslim community (Times of Israel 2020). It provides a “token bargaining chip” for both parties, with Israel gaining an image of compromise on an issue that was obviously not in its best security interests, and the UAE presenting the move as a victory for the Palestinians and the region (Norlen and Sinai 2020). Moreover, the relatively lower cost and risk associated with this action, compared to those associated with the UAE, may plausibly explain Israel’s decision (Ahren 2020b; AP 2020). It “simply gives Israel more leverage over the Palestinians for free; thereby, it enables and emboldens the occupation and normalizes the unlivable status quo as acceptable” (Shehada 2020). Three-quarters of Palestinians believe normalization merely forces Israel to postpone annexation, contradicting the UAE’s claim that cessation of annexation is a condition for normalization (PSR 2020).

This article examines the rationales and mechanisms behind the UAE’s effective reassurance. The argument presented emphasizes the UAE’s achievements in overcoming psychological and cognitive obstacles and building trustworthiness. This was accomplished through the August joint declaration of normalization, which included a significant gesture towards Israel through a voluntary, unconditional, and irrevocable commitment. This action had significant political consequences, as it violated a deeply held belief in the Muslim and Arab worlds against establishing normal relations with Israel without first achieving a fair and comprehensive resolution to the Palestinian issue. Concurrently, the commitment was unilateral and not contingent on Israel’s capitulation. The UAE’s action had various audiences and constituencies to consider. MBZ made a firm commitment in front of a worldwide audience, emphasizing that any failure to honor this pledge would have significant diplomatic repercussions. It prompted Israelis to reevaluate their ideas, expectations, and practices and rallied them to challenge their restrained leaders, reducing constraints on the leadership’s ability to act as well as raising the audience costs of defection for both Emiratis and Israelis. The UAE and Israeli leaderships pursued an alternative strategy of reassurance that required major political concessions when the Arab-Israel conflict was ripe for resolution.

The UAE’s recent declaration of normalization, akin to that of Sadat’s Egypt, highlighted the importance of a strong signal and the effectiveness of a reassurance strategy. Specific characteristics, mainly the irreversibility and high relative cost and risk, distinguished the UAE’s act from previous Arab attempts and signaled its genuine intent to reassure Israel. The perceived value of the signal appears sufficient to overcome cognitive obstacles inherent in the adversarial relationship and foster trust, facilitating the psychological breakthrough needed for reliable reassurance. The API proposal may indicate a deviation from Khartoum’s Nos of 1967 within the moderate Arabs’ strategic calculations, but it may not constitute a substantial impetus capable of providing Israelis with a sense of reassurance. Sharon, Netanyahu, and various right-wing elites, as well as more moderate figures such as Olmert, sought unconditional recognition and normalization regardless of the Palestinian issue and their demands. The API’s conditional nature raised questions about the cost of the signal and the sincerity of the Arab states in Israeli strategic calculations.

In conclusion, it is more appropriate to view the UAE’s decision to declare normalization of relations with Israel as a firm and irreversible commitment within a framework of concurrent alternatives rather than the first step in a logical sequence of actions in rational approaches.¹² The rational approach views the game dynamics between the UAE and Israel in August 2020 as distinct from previous periods, prompting a strategic decision by the MBZ. However, there is no clear evidence of significant shifts in preferences for either party, even during the allegedly tacit collaboration in the post-Arab Spring era. This suggests the UAE’s August initiative may have been a calculated maneuver in an ongoing game rather than a first action if the game had not been fundamentally altered. Also, the UAE’s decision to publicly declare normalization with Israel lacked rational planning, as it would have been more logical to wait for reciprocal concessions from Israel before committing, suggesting that a more prudent approach to conditional engagement could have been more beneficial in achieving similar outcomes while mitigating associated risks. The rational approach’s logical sequence of actions lacks explanatory power regarding MBZ’s shift in strategy from a covert bargaining approach to a more overt one. The UAE transitioned to public diplomacy as a strategic response, realizing that communication was insufficient and that a public, irrevocable commitment was the only viable option. The analysis provides a concise yet persuasive approach for the UAE’s initiative, despite its intricate nature, nuanced elements, and potential conflict with rational behavior principles.

¹ Psychological approaches, in particular, suggest various reassurance strategies to overcome cognitive barriers in conflict management (e.g., Osgood 1962; Lebow 1983; Stein 1991; Montgomery 2006; Knopf 2012). Some have suggested peacetime strategies derived from social identity theory to promote an actor’s image as a viable alliance partner (Mazloomi, Yeoh et al. 2018).

² Scholars argue that the effectiveness of “costless” signals or “cheap talks” like secret diplomacy or private commitment should not be overestimated, as they lack consequences for not following through (Schelling 1958; Jervis 1989; Tarar and Leventoğlu 2009; Yarhi-Milo 2013; Jervis 2017; Kertzer, Rathbun et al. 2020).

³ “Few actions are truly irreversible in theory; many actions are more irrevocable in actuality,” for example, governments’ commitment to liberalizing trade and investment or a political party’s commitment to a special course of action (Stevens and Cooper 2010, 506). The behavioral approach also suggests symbolic and non-capability-based actions, such as joining or withdrawing from international institutions, foreign interventions in weaker states, and behavioral signals that involve signing agreements that can signal a state’s intentions (Yarhi-Milo 2013). “A sustained pattern of behaviors leading to stronger and more enduring commitments, which are explicit, public, irrevocable, and volitional, particularly when reinforced by the cultural and institutional context of the country, can indicate the country’s bond to continuing those acts” (Stevens and Cooper 2010, 506; Maoz and Felsenthal 1987).

⁴ Revocable commitment, conversely, allows actors to change or revoke their pledges at any point, eliminating restrictions on their chosen strategy (Schelling 1958; Ågotnes, Goranko et al. 2007).

⁵ IC transforms the bargaining process into a dynamic resembling a “two-move game” in rational approaches, in which the initiator commits and the adversary makes final decisions (Schelling 1958).

⁶ IC, in this regard, is comparable, not identical, to the “first move” in the game by constraining the adversary’s options by altering its public expectations, symbolizing the power to fully dedicate oneself to the task at hand (Schelling 1958).

⁷ Notably, ripeness is “dynamic and cyclical,” not a “linear” process, with instances arising and swiftly passing if not promptly recognized and capitalized upon (Kleiboer 1994).

⁸ Netanyahu aimed to isolate the Palestinian-Israeli issue, prioritizing Israel’s strength and deterrence for “a safe peace” without compromising Israeli security.

⁹ The behavioral approach suggests a shift in perceptions when agreements are signed; with the act of signing, signaling commitment (through undertaking specific costly actions) is seen as a crucial factor for policymakers to consider (Yarhi-Milo 2013).

¹⁰ “No momentum was lost in normalization between countries as fighting raged with the Palestinian enclave” as UAE “authorities showed ‘understanding’ of the situation,” Israeli officials affirmed after the 2021 Gaza War (AP 2021). Despite Arab public pressure to boycott Israel for its military operation in Gaza following the October 2023 Hamas assault, the UAE leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to strategic partnership with Israel, prioritizing de-escalation, partnerships, and diplomacy (WAM 2023).

¹¹ The examination of the US’s position as an external trustee player requires more investigation; it is beyond the scope of this article.

¹² Derived from Maoz and Felsenthal (1987).