The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 has reignited debates associated with Finlandization, a foreign policy based on neutrality. A policy that had once helped Finland maintain its independence during the Cold War. In 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Finlandization could be a possible model for defusing tension with Russia in the context of the current Ukrainian crisis (Engelbrecht 2022). Macron’s suggestion, however, was quickly dismissed, as Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of areas in and around four Ukrainian oblasts—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia in September 2022. As a result, and given Finland’s accession into NATO as of April 2023, Ukraine’s Zelenskyy has aborted Finlandization as an option and is now urgently seeking to join NATO.

By narrow definition, Finlandization refers explicitly to Finland’s past relations with the former Soviet Union. It describes a relationship in which Finland maintained its independence as a state while making some concessions to the Soviet Union in areas of foreign policy. Finlandization, under such light, has been extensively discussed in the past (Berdentson 1991; Cha 2020; Forsberg 2016; Juntunen 2017). However, less overarching definitions of the term ‘Finlandization’ have been provided as an alignment strategy in international relations research. In other words, where Finlandization fits along the spectrum of alignment strategies hasn’t been fully thought out. Under a broader definition, other states have also been identified as potential beneficiaries of Finlandization. Specifically, for example, Bruce Gilley has argued that Finlandization is an option for Taiwan to pacify China, one that will further benefit U.S. security interests without increasing tensions over the Taiwan Strait (Gilley 2010). Along this line, Timo Kivimaki has further scrutinized Finlandization as a strategy somewhere between bandwagoning and balancing (Kivimaki 2015).

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study aims to answer the following research questions: First, what is the theoretical place of Finlandization in international relations research? More specifically, it seeks to position Finlandization as a foreign policy option for smaller states against belligerent superpower neighbors, alongside the more classical concepts of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. To meet this end, this study has taken a three-step research approach: First, it reconfigured the spectrum of alignment strategies enunciated by David Kang (Kang 2007). Second, by using Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) against Finland and Estonia, differences were used to extrapolate four key variables that had made Finlandization conceptually viable. Third, and in relation to today’s bellicose Russia under Vladimir Putin, Finlandization is reconceptualized for smaller and middle states in East Asia against a Xi Jinping-led China. Xi’s political trajectory, as a leader of rising superpower, has theoretically entered into an era of a life-long dictatorship in China. Compared with previous research, this study renders itself unique as it blends together scholarship and arguments from both the Western and Eastern hemispheres for data collection and analyses. With Finlandization reconceptualized, the value proposition of this study presents a set of conditions for constructing a diplomatic off-ramp should tension between China and its neighbors escalate to military confrontation.

The Coining of ‘Finlandization’ and Ongoing Debates

Finlandization has generally been described as the tendency of weaker states to be subordinate to much stronger neighboring states in foreign policy while maintaining broad independence and sovereignty. The concept of ‘Finlandization’ was popularized by a former Austrian foreign minister, Karl Gruber. He had based on his derogatory references to ‘Finnische Politik’ in his 1953 book on Austria’s future, Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit (Gruber 1953). The book was a warning to his government not to follow the Finnish example (Maude 1982). The actual term was first likely used by Professor Richard Lowenthal in 1966 when he was discussing a proposed simultaneous dissolution of two military blocs in Warsaw Pact countries (Laqueur 1997). Hans Mouritzen used it to discuss Denmark’s foreign policy toward Germany from 1935 to 1940 (Mouritzen 1988). Other scholars, such as Timo Kivimaki and Moon-seok Cha, have discussed the potential for Finlandization in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN in the context of a rapidly rising China (Kivimaki 2015; Cha 2020). The concept of Finlandization was recognized in Finland as a pejorative foreign policy that negatively affected domestic politics through censorship and low autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. Despite its derogatory perception, some have argued that Finlandization was the most sensible choice that Finland could make to preserve its sovereignty and independence (Inboden 2014). Jared Diamond interpreted Finlandization as a flexible and realistic choice for Finland. He argued that Finlandization was a rational decision that helped maintain national identity, core values, flexibility, and was based on careful self-assessment (Diamond 2019).

Some scholars have been applying the concept of Finlandization to other regions. In 2014, for example, Henry Kissinger had argued in the Washington Post that Finlandization would be a satisfactory solution for Ukraine as the country would be free to choose its domestic political system and could associate itself with Western Europe economically and politically (Kissinger 2014). Robert Kaplan contends that the foreign policy of Finland has contributed to the stabilization of the European order, and that this policy choice can be replicated in other regions of the world such as China with its neighbors (Kaplan 2015). Finlandization has also been discussed as a choice for smaller states within China’s sphere of influence regarding foreign policy, especially in the age of US-China competition. Along this line, Gilley has argued that the Finlandization of Taiwan can benefit the US, China, and also Taiwan (Gilley 2010). Myeongse Kang has also researched Finlandization by emphasizing the positives of Finlandization as a self-rescue plan for smaller states (Kang 2007).

Various Theoretical Approaches to Finlandization

A) Finlandization as Adaptive Politics

In past literature, Hans Mouritzen conceptualized the term ‘Finlandization’ to refer to ‘adaptive acquiescence’ (Mouritzen 1988). According to Mouritzen’s concept, Finlandization occurs when a great power offers smaller states superficial concessions to preserve basic foreign policy principles or societal values. Mouritzen’s work emphasized the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client (or ‘puppet’) state. He explained that the former makes voluntary concessions to a stronger neighbor in order to safeguard key elements of its independence. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized regime calculates strategic concessions to a nearby stronger state that will best serve its long-term interests and possibly those of its neighbors. Geographic proximity, psychological threats from a superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides drive strategic concessions. Due to geographic proximity, the superpower only needs to issue vague threats rather than demonstrate actual military muscle to influence the policies of its weaker neighbor. Adaptive acquiescence, thus, differs from imposed domination, which occurs when a stronger neighbor installs a client regime in a weaker actor.

B) Finlandization as a Bandwagoning Neutralist Policy

Jin-ho Kim interpreted Finlandization as a bandwagoning neutralist policy (Kim 2009). According to Kim, Finland’s Finlandization was a neutralist policy to bandwagon with the Soviet Union. After two wars with the Soviet Union —the Winter and Continuation wars— Finland came to believe that it could defend its independence from Soviet aggression, but growing Soviet threat remained a geopolitical reality that it had to deal with. The foreign policy choice of Finland was neutralism, and this foreign policy objective of neutralism was pursued by bandwagoning with the Soviet Union. Kim argued that Finlandization was a unique neutralist foreign policy that was created by the geopolitical position of Finland and its historical relationship with the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union abandoned its intention to annex Finland’s territory, it put itself in a position of accepting Finland’s neutrality, and even independence, as long as Finland did not move toward colluding with its adversaries.

In history, Finland became allies with Nazi Germany for the invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II.¹ This resulted in Soviet interference with Finnish domestic affairs, culminating in the Note Crisis of 1961, during which the Soviets put Finland’s neutral foreign policy to the test (Kang M. 2007, 263). Kim claimed that the Nordic balance² —the balance between pro-Western and pro-Soviet propensity— reduced the potential for conflict between the two superpowers during the Cold War (Kim 2009). Although bandwagoning and neutrality policies appear seemingly incompatible since neutrality by definition implies not favoring one of two [or more] sides, Kim’s conceptualization of Finlandization as a bandwagoning neutrality policy illustrates that a state can concurrently choose both as an optimized foreign policy under specific geopolitical circumstances.

C) Finlandization within a Spectrum of Alignment Strategies

Balancing and bandwagoning frequently appears in international relations literature on state strategies. David Kang has elaborated upon bandwagoning, balancing, accommodating, and hedging by adding degrees of fear in a continuum (Kang 2009). In his spectrum model, state strategies exist along a continuum as opposed to dichotomous opposites. By defining state strategies in this manner, it was made possible to empirically derive variation and variables in a falsifiable manner. In similar fashion, engagement, accommodation, hiding, and hedging were utilized in regional security strategies along a continuum (Goh 2005). Among these strategies, an essential distinction was how they addressed the level of fear of a potential adversary. States may not balance but still be somewhat fearful of another state, in which case it might prefer to hedge. States that do not fear a larger state, on the other hand, do not hedge, even if they do not bandwagon. In accordance with Kang, this latter strategy is viewed as accommodation. He further qualifies his model by saying that these two extreme strategies of bandwagoning and balancing do not exhaust the possible responses to rising powers nor are they dichotomous opposites. This means that middle states may also simply accommodate with no fundamental change in military stance or alignment posture (Kang 2009, 8). In this light, David Kang’s distinctions are particularly pertinent in analyzing the foreign policy of middle powers. His spectrum of alignment [Figure 1] illustrates distinct types of state behavior and alignment strategies.

Upon close examination, Kang has defined accommodation strategy as an attempt to cooperate and craft stability with a greater power without alteration to military stance or alignment by falling short of an extreme-end bandwagoning strategy. In this context, an accommodation strategy entails mutual adaptation and acceptance by established and rising powers, as well as the elimination or significant reduction of hostility between them. It can be seen as a strategy mutually acceptable to unequal powers by which they can maintain peace without adjusting their status. At the international level, and with respect to accommodation among great power rivals, T.V. Paul has argued that accommodation “involves the accommodated state obtaining a larger share of global governance rights, and/or sphere of influence, and being content with it (Paul 2016, 5).”

A reconceptualization of Finlandization as an alignment strategy distinct from other such strategies can be done by adding another explanatory variable, viz., degrees of autonomy, to Kang’s spectrum of alignment strategies model. After the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), the Finno-Soviet relationship was devoid of wars. As re-depicted in [Figure 2], Finlandization can be interpreted as a form of accommodation strategy here as well.

The following modified continuum model can provide insights into finding Finlandization’s position on the spectrum with an additional attribute, autonomy. As presented, Kang’s model was modified by adding ‘degrees of autonomy’ on the vertical axis to identify strategies for smaller or middle power states. Although the Finnish perceived the Soviet Union as a threat and their reasoning for engaging in Finlandization was survival, it is possible to plot ‘Finlandization’ in the ‘Less Fear-Less Autonomy’ quadrant since Finland still did not lose their domestic sovereignty. If they had intensely feared the Soviet Union, they would have capitulated and become a satellite state. Subsequently, Finlandization can be ‘reconceptualized’ as an accommodation strategy characterized by ‘low fear’ of external threats and ‘low autonomy’ in terms of policy and governance.

In contrast and although not directly related to the main topic, the opposite pairing of ‘more fear’ and ‘more autonomy’ in this quadrant model theoretically postulates pursuing a ‘hard’ regional military alliance amongst like-minded nations such as NATO in order to externally attain and formalize balance of power.³

With this said, Timo Kivimaki’s research highlighted the shortcomings of Finlandization in terms of its inability to protect Finland’s autonomy from the security dilemma (Kivimaki 2015). In The Finnish Dilemma, George Maude further pointed out the need for Finland to actively promote communication between NATO and the Soviets, and the importance of economic relations with the West in order to avoid becoming a client state in the shadows of low autonomy and Soviet influence (Maude 1976). Selective examples of self-censorship serve as evidence that low autonomy had occurred in Finland during this era in order to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union.⁴ Firstly, Kai Ekholm provided an overview of the political censorship of the Finnish library during the postwar period (Ekholm 2001). Secondly, United Press International (UPI) also cited the case of Finland’s film censorship, which was intended to avoid offending the Soviet Union (UPI 1983). With low autonomy added to David Kang’s spectrum in this study, Finlandization is uniquely reconceptualized and represented as a distinct alignment strategy which differs from other existing models. Next, by comparing Finland and Estonia, this paper will examine key differences by isolating factors that once made Finlandization possible for one country, but not the other, in Europe.

Selection of Cases: Geographical, Historical, Political and Cultural Factors

Following World War II, the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union, and Eastern European states became Soviet satellite states. In contrast, Finland was able to preserve its sovereignty and independence during that period. This raises the question of what made Finland different from these other states. What factors allowed Finland to settle with Finlandization while other similarly situated countries were either annexed by or became satellite states of the Soviet Union? To address this question, the case analysis included herein adheres to Most Similar System Design (MSSD) principles by identifying variables that differ across similar systems with respect to observed outcomes. Kyong-jun Choi conducted a previous case study on this topic in which (a) geographical location, (b) historical experience, and (c) ethnic homogeneity were treated as explanatory variables that influenced ‘national identity’ of middle-ground states foreign policy decision-making toward Russia (Choi 2020).⁵ Based on these previously identified factors, this study takes into account each variable which has made Finlandization possible for Finland. Estonia, which had experienced a dissimilar outcome, was chosen to examine variations due to its commonalities in geographical and historical conditions with Finland.

A) Tracing Finlandization

In October 1939, Joseph Stalin with his six-point exposition of terms demanded parts of Finland’s frontier, including Viipuri, to serve as a buffer zone against potential northern attacks. One of his objectives was to move Finland’s boarder away from Leningrad. His demand also included, but was not limited to, a thirty years lease over the Hanko peninsula, where a port could be potentially established as a naval base by the Soviet Navy (Edwards 2008, 76-77). In exchange, Stalin offered parts of Eastern Karelia to the Finns as compensation. Since Finland was unwilling to give up the port, talks broke down, and Stalin launched his winter invasion in November of that year. Eventually, a peace treaty was signed during March 1940 where Finland made certain concessions. Soviet fears, however, were realized when Finland decided to side with Germany’s Third Reich in the Continuation War and Operation Barbarosa in 1941.

After the Allied forces landed in Normandy during World War II, Stalin launched a major offensive against Finland in 1944 with a plan to occupy Helsinki (Jakobson 1980, 1037). Stalin, however, aborted this plan and signed the Moscow Armistice in September 1944. This gave the Soviets rights to use airfields inside Finland’s territory. It also stipulated German withdrawal from Finland (Kirby 2006, 231-232). Then, after the conclusion of World War II, Finland and the Soviets became co-signatories to the multilateral Paris 1947 Peace Treaty. During this period, Finland under Soviet influence did not participate in the Marshall Plan and failed to become a member of the United Nations by Soviet veto (Kuusisto 1959, 44). This treaty shaped future Finnish-Soviet relations and the so-called ‘Paasikivi Line’, which became a cornerstone in Paasikivi’s foreign policy.

The principle of neutrality, under Paasikivi’s leadership manifested in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) that Finland signed with the Soviet in 1948. Urho Kekkonen, who succeeded Paasikivi in 1956, continued with the doctrine of neutrality which is now commonly referred to as the ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen’ doctrine. Although the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 imposed a crisis on this doctrine of neutrality, Finland managed to safeguard its statehood and independence by way of a steadfast accommodation strategy against the Soviets. This doctrine, today, is widely known as Finlandization.

B) Estonia vs. Finland

The countries of Estonia and Finland are separated by the Gulf of Finland and have separate land borders with Russia in Northern Europe. The distance between the capitals of these two countries, Tallinn and Helsinki, is approximately 83 kilometers. Consequently, both countries are exposed to Russia’s security interests and military power. While the Soviet Union invaded both Estonia and Finland, the outcome for these two countries proved to be different after World War II until the Soviet Union was dissolved.

Estonia’s geographic value to the Soviet Union has differed from that of Finland’s. After having signed the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of non-aggression, Stalin invaded Poland in September 1939. Thereafter, Stalin pushed Estonia to sign a treaty that would allow the Soviets to set up military bases inside Estonia. One reason for this demand was because the Soviets, despite their non-aggression pact with Germany, were afraid that the Baltic states would be used by the Germans as a land corridor for invading Leningrad at a future date. This treaty between Estonia and the Soviets was signed in September 1939, which was the same month the Soviets had invaded Poland. After Estonia and the Baltic states knelt, the Soviets started their military invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939 to start the Winter War. In light of the geographical location of Leningrad, both Finland and the Baltic states, including Estonia, had immense geographical value from a security perspective to the Soviet Union.

Unlike Finland, the Soviets were forced to annex Estonia due to its strategic importance in keeping threatening states at bay. Historians have pointed out, the territory of Estonia was so important to the Soviet Union that it had to be seized. Three brief examples illustrate this point. First, Silvio Pons wrote in the context of the British-French-Soviet negotiations in spring 1939 that ‘for a long time the possibility of a German attack via the Baltic region had preoccupied Soviet strategists’ (Pons 2002, 58). Second, Victor Rothwell discussed ‘Soviet anxieties about a fascist coups d’etat in the border states and observes that ‘in the summer of 1939 Stalin seems to have been in a highly nervous state about the security of Leningrad (Rothwell 2001, 122). Third, Geoffrey Roberts consistently emphasized the importance of the Baltics, noting that the Baltic question had represented the heart of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, for it was largely a territorial spheres-of-influence arrangement which was inclusive of the Baltic region (Roberts 1995, 672-700).

During this period, the fate of Estonia was decided by the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This pact divided Eastern Europe into two spheres of influence between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Subsequently, under this non-aggression pact, Estonia fell under Soviet’s sphere of influence. After the Soviets imposed a mutual assistance treaty upon the Estonians in September 1939, a puppet government under Johannes Vares ensued. The Estonia Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was established in July 1940. Then, on August 6, 1940, the Soviet Union folded in Estonia as one of its constituent republics (Mckenna 2013, 22-23).

Estonian leaders including Konstantin Päts and Johan Laidoner were, in the meantime, being arrested and deported to the Soviet Union. In the first twelve months of Soviet occupation, more than 60,000 people were killed or deported, and more than 10,000 were removed en masse. On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa. Large areas of Estonia were freed from Soviet forces by improvised Estonian units before the German army had reached Estonia. Estonia was, thereafter, under German occupation for three years, becoming one part of Reichskommissariat Ostland (RKO). By February 1944, the Russians Red Army were back on the Narva front. About 30,000 Estonians escaped by boat to Sweden and 33,000 to Germany; many thousands perished at sea. On September 22, 1944, Soviet troops re-took Tallinn. Shortly, thereafter Sovietization ensued in Estonia.

Finland, on the other hand, experienced a series of different war memories compared to Estonia despite their proximity. It repelled and militarily fought back the Soviets for more than two months. Although the Soviets were able to establish another short-lived puppet state in Finland, this state was dissolved and merged into the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (a.k.a. Soviet Karelia) after the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 1940. The Winter War, which waged on over the course of 105 days, was started with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland in 1939. During this war, Finland had succeeded in imposing staggering costs on their aggressor. Their respective kill and casualty rate ratios are noteworthy. Helsinki lost about 25,000 soldiers, but Soviet casualties are estimated to be close to 200,000. Hundreds of thousands more Soviets were paralyzed by frostbite. This was a war of extremes with battles fought during one of the coldest winters on record. The war was fought in snowbound woods where daylight only lasted a few hours and temperatures regularly plummeted far below freezing (Rehman 2016). Despite their fierce resistance, Finland eventually buckled under Stalin’s aggression and found itself obliged to part with large tracts of its territory. Finland’s citizen army had fought so hard against the Soviet Union that the Nordic country was able to keep its independence and avoid the fate that its Baltic neighbor had met. In this context, the war against Finland technically ended in victory for the Soviets. However, it is argued that the costs of war spoiled this success (Citino 2014; Spring 1986; Reese 2008). Apart from the large number of casualties, the Russian military lost any prestige it had gained during the interwar period (Kahn 2012).

The difference between Estonia and Finland was that Finland was able to repel the Soviets without full capitulation. On the other hand, Soviet occupation in Estonia commenced in July 1940 after a rigged election. While these events were happening in the Nordic and Baltic arena, Nazi Germany and the Soviets jointly launched their attack on Poland in September 1939, or one month after the signing of the non-aggression pact. Notwithstanding this Soviet-Germany non-aggression pact, Germany invaded Soviet occupied Estonia, and occupied its land starting from September 1941 until the Soviet reclaimed Estonia in October 1994 (Tarand 2004, 136).

In brief, the historical relationship and war memories between Finland with the Soviet Union were different from that of Estonia’s. The Soviet Union had won both the Winter War and the Continuation War, but these two wars left the Soviets with the impression that Finland, despite its smaller size, was a force to be reckoned with. These two wars, in retrospect, raised the Soviet Union’s assessment of Finland’s war capabilities in comparison to that of Estonia.

Along the lines of communism, and before World War II, the influence of the Bolsheviks after their 1917 February and October Revolutions in Russia led to the creation of an Autonomous Governorate of Estonia in 1918. It was during this period that Jaan Anvelt rose to become the first premier of the Soviet Executive Committee of Estonia and chairman of the Commune of the Working People of Estonia. Johan Laidoner was, on the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces that fought against the Bolsheviks during the Estonian War of Independence which concluded with the February 1920 Treaty of Tartu. This treaty, signed by Jaan Poska and Adolph Joffe, had granted Estonia its independence from Russia. Prior to this treaty, Estonia was a province of Imperial Russia since 1721 up until 1918.

With the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia’s participation in World War I ended, and Russian control over Estonia was ceded to Germany’s Second Reich until its downfall. Specifically, this treaty between the Bolsheviks and Germany’s constitutional monarchy was annulled on November 11, 1918 by an Armistice that was signed by the Council of the People’s Deputies. This council represented Germany during its November Revolution, after Kaiser Wilhelm II’s had announced his abdication and right before the Weimer Republic was officially born. During May 1919, the provisional assembly of Estonia was dissolved and the first democratically elected Government of the Republic of Estonia came into formation with Otto Strandman as its first prime minister. This government reconfirmed the February 1918 Estonian Declaration of Independence.

In October 1920, the Bolsheviks as representatives of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR) signed with Finland another Treaty of Tartu with the same name where the border between Finland and Russia was decided. This was after Finland’s parliament on November 15, 1917 declared itself as the supreme authority inside Finland. One of the founders of the Communist Party in Finland was Yrjö Sirola. During the 1918 Finnish Civil War, Sirola led the Finnish Revolutionary Government (or Red Finland) as its Foreign Minister under the leadership of Otto Wille Kuusinen against White Finland. Juho Paasikivi stood firmly on the side of the White government in support of the German Prince and experimental King of Finland. However, with a White win in Finland’s Civil War and the fall of the German Empire, Finland became a presidential republic in 1919 with Kaarlo Ståhlberg as its first president. The Republic of Finland adopted liberal democracy as its official form of government from this point onward. Juho Paasikivi would, of course, later return to high-level politics and serve as Finland’s seventh President in March 1946.

Finland was different from Estonia in two key aspects. First, the division of Finland and creation of East Karelia, after the 1920 Treaty of Tartu, gave rise to the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) in 1923. This opened the door and gave room for some Finnish communists, such as Yrjö Sirola, to continue with their political careers in this new territory. Estonia, on the other hand, went through no such division toward creating a buffer zone after reclaiming independence. Second, in 1924, Comintern had attempted a failed coup d’etat in Estonia. In Finland, it was the Fascists (pro-German, anti-Communists) that had, under the Lapua Movement, attempted a failed coup d’etat in 1932. Thus, from the end of World War I until the start of the Soviet invasions of World War II, the overall political landscape and internal affairs in Estonia and Finland were entirely different. This variance, despite having a most similar system, later tilted Estonia toward Sovietization after World War II, rather than moving it in the opposite direction toward Finlandization.

Both Estonia and Finland were once possessions of the Swedish Empire back in the early 17th up until the early 18th centuries. Back then, and with the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Russia gained supremacy over Sweden, as Peter the Great was establishing the Russian Empire. After the Finnish War (1808-1809), a policy of Russification over the Grand Duchy of Finland (1809-1917) was attempted until the early 20th century. This attempt, however, was met with Finnish opposition. Finland had a more egalitarian culture than Russia. This different culture led Finland to become the world’s first country to grant women the right to vote in July 1906. It was at this point in history that Nicolas II, the Russian Tsar and Grand Duke of Finland, endorsed a new parliamentary decree that abolished Finland’s class-based system to establish a unicameral parliament. This event, and the prior establishment of the Senate of Finland, put down the groundwork for Finland’s considerable autonomy during Russia’s rule. Later, the Jäger Movement in 1915 was another historic example of Finnish resistance toward Russia (Payne 2011, 28-29).

In terms of overall Russification success, the Russians had left a more sizable imprint in Estonia than in Finland. Unlike in Finland, where less than 2% of the total population speaks Russian, this figure in Estonia exceeds 20% (Forsberg and Pesu 2016). As a result, and comparatively speaking, Estonians are more likely to feel cultural affinity with Russians compared with the Finnish population. Although both Finland was annexed and influenced by Russia in the past, Finland has throughout the years managed to successfully maintain its own unique cultural identity.

C) Conditions for Finlandization

Case analyses performed herein suggest that there are certain conditions that work in favor of Finlandization. First, the strategic value of Estonia for the Soviets, in terms of geographical importance, far outweighed that of Finland. Second, the historical memories of Finland against Imperial Russia and the Soviets differed from the Estonians in that the Winter and Continuation wars were fought against the Soviets. Third, after both countries’ declaration of independence, Finland conceded portions of its land, specifically Karelia, and managed to escape full Sovietization. Moreover, in Finland, a civil war was fought after World War I where White Finlanders prevailed over the Reds, in terms of war performance, which led to the establishment of the liberal democratic Republic of Finland. This victory of the Reds helped avoid Soviet-led communist occupation, whereas in Estonia the Soviet Communist Party operated illegally inside Estonia in the 1920s and 40s, which eventually led to Soviet occupation prior to 1945. Upon analyses, these factors were identified as critical differences between Finland and Estonia.

The above table represents the most important variables used for identifying the critical difference between Finland and Estonia prior to 1945. After 1945, fighting Fascism in Finland, as opposed to fighting the seeds of Communism became an imperative to protect Finnish egalitarianism. Although the Estonians had also attempted anti-Soviet movements after the Soviets annexed Estonia, their partisan Forest Brothers were unable to ward off the Soviet Red Army. Finland’s dissimilarities with Russian cultural diaspora further gave room for its leaders to pursue a path toward Finlandization.

Reconceptualizing Finlandization has, thus far, mostly looked at factors of fear and autonomy along the spectrum of alignment strategies. Kekkonen’s idea that conciliation with the enemy was Finland’s only hope for lasting peace as early as 1943 was given as an example of how Finland had low fear of Sovietization. It was also highlighted how lower autonomy in Finland worked for establishing a trustworthy and careful foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. The example given was how Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan which was sponsored by the United States. The second component of this study sought to isolate variables that hypothetically explained the difference between Finland and Estonia. In this exercise, (i) geographical worth, (ii) historical war memories, and (iii) anti-Communism were identified along with (iv) cultural affinity as independent variables.

The third and final component of Reconceptualizing Finlandization is more recent. Specifically, a significant shift inside Russia occurred in 2000. This was the year when Vladimir Putin rose to grab power as Boris Yeltsin stepped down at the Kremlin. In retrospect, and in accordance with the 1991 Belovezha Accords, the Soviet Union was dissolved and a new Russia appeared. This new Russia, under Putin’s authoritarian dictatorship, has now instilled high fear (rather than low) and is pursuing outright annexation (rather than less autonomy) against its nearest European neighbors. Having had Putin at the center of power for more than twenty-years, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are now two prime examples of how the world has changed in Europe with a new Russia.

What this means is that Finlandization is now no longer a viable ‘alignment strategy’ for Ukraine in light of the ‘modified spectrum model’ since ‘high (or more) fear’ and becoming the target of annexation has resulted in military confrontation and alliance arrangements against Putin’s invasion thus rendering bandwagoning and/or balancing obsolete. Along this line, and although John Mearsheimer has criticized NATO for provoking Russia into invading Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2015), others view the recent rise of dictatorship and consolidation of power by Putin, and the subsequent end of democracy in Russia, as the real and long-term threat that is to fear (Ostrow et al. 2007).

Given what has transpired with Putin in power, it is therefore, no surprise that in March 2004, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania finally moved to join NATO after years of efforts where these countries, and others, were invited to begin accession talks at the Prague Summit held in November 2002. Moreover, with a militant dictatorship in Russia, Finland’s recent choice to also join NATO in April 2023 comes as no surprise. Hence, another variable for Finlandization is hypothesized as the characteristics of Russia’s dictatorship. In the context of constructivism, degree of altercasting will either make or break application (Wendt 1992). The social construction of Russia as an autocratic militant state under Putin has now made Finlandization impossible. Finland, as a testament, sought a new strategy for preserving its sovereignty by way of joining NATO rather than holding on to its neutrality policy. Finland, in this light, is now constructing a new fence along its borders with Russia.

Looking beyond the European horizon, Finlandization, as previously mentioned, has also been discussed in the context of East Asia and a rising China. As a recap, it has previously been discussed in relation to Taiwan (Gilley 2010) and South Korea (Kivimaki 2015). The central question in China is whether its neighbors will fear Xi Jinping’s current third or even a possible fourth term as President of China. After exceeding his ten years in office, Xi has presented himself as dictator figure to the free world. His autocratic leadership has been described by some as “Dictatorship with Chinese Characteristics,” a word-play on “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” (Jeakins 2018). In the public sphere, US President Joe Biden has also called out Xi Jinping for being a dictator. In light of this change toward a dictatorship inside China’s Zhongnanhai, the question over whether Finalization remains an open option in East Asia hasn’t been fully answered. Only time will tell how and to what extent Finlandization, in terms of low fear and less autonomy, will be reconceptualized as an accommodation strategy in East Asia. How the conditional factors of geographic worth, historical relations and war memories, resistance to military aggression, and cultural affinity will eventually play out in the future further remains brittle. Herbert Bix had once pointed-out that the lack of democratic institutions subsequently accelerated militarism in Japan prior to 1945 (Bix 2001). If this becomes the case for China under Xi Jinping, Finlandization as a neutrality option in East Asia may fade away, just as it has in Europe under Putin’s Russia.

After World War II, Finland held less fear toward the Soviets on relative terms even though it feared them more than other non-adjacent nations. Finland’s goal to annex Eastern Karelia diminished at the conclusion of the Continuation War in September 1944, and this land was conceded to the Soviets. Unlike Estonia, Finland’s strong military resistance during the Winter and Continuation wars had allowed it to pursue a policy of neutrality and less autonomy during the Cold War. Finland’s alignment with Nazi Germany in its Continuation War had nurtured small internal pockets of anti-communist fascists, as evident by the Lapua Movement, which made it difficult for the Soviets to deeply penetrate inside Finland’s political arena. Moreover, Finland’s history of autonomy with Russia and lack of cultural affinity with the Soviets had allowed it to exercise an accommodation strategy with low fear with respected to Finlandization. With Finland now having joined NATO as opposed to pursuing its once traditional policy of neutrality and accommodation, the term Finlandization has entered into a new stage of either termination or dormancy in Europe.

Even though Finlandization was once viewed as an open option for Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military invasion of Ukraine under Vladimir Putin has now thrown this option completely off the table in Europe. One reason for why Ukraine’s Zelenskyy actively sought to join NATO at the July 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius was because of how Putin is working as a dictator by exercising brute military force to annex at least four Ukrainian regions. More specifically, Putin’s immediately targets had included the four regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia Oblasts. Furthermore, Russia’s recent air strikes aimed at Lviv Oblast and Kyiv have now further complicated the equation of Ukraine’s push to quickly become a NATO member.

As we look toward the opposite end of the Eurasian continent, the reconceptualized application of Finlandization is conversely still surviving but at a brittle state. However, the rise of China, compounded by Xi Jinping’s constitutional revisions for unlimited terms, has invited alarm to its closest neighbors by signaling the rise of yet another dictatorship which is Finlandization’s greatest enemy. Should Xi Jinping serve another fourth term or should he attempt a military maneuver over Chinese Taipei while in office, the likelihood of Finlandization staying alive, as a viable foreign policy option, will likely diminish.

It is important to note that the position of the stronger state, as was the case with the Soviet Union, was also a large factor in driving the success of Finlandization. For instance, the Soviets were content with having Finland as an independent but compliant state, whereas the Soviet’s strategy for Estonia was to annex it as a part of the Soviet Union.

The presented case study of Finland and Estonia further suggests that given the historical memories of the war between the Kuomintang and China’s Communist Party and strong anti-Communist sentiments held in Taiwan as exhibited by its Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Finlandization may not be an easily exercised option for the Taiwanese. Given today’s crucial importance of the Taiwan Strait in world affairs, the applicability of Finlandization in Taiwan, and in other countries that border on China, deserves greater scholarly attention through ongoing studies.