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Democracy and Territorial Change
The Korean Journal of International Studies 20-1 (April 2022), 1-19
Published online April 30, 2022
© 2022 The Korean Association of International Studies.

Ajin Choi [Bio-Data]
Received September 29, 2021; Revised January 18, 2022; Accepted January 28, 2022.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
This study explores the types and sources of decisions made by winning states toward defeated states focusing on territorial change after international conflicts. That is, it examines the impact of democracy on the settlement process of international conflicts and argues that due to their norm of respect for public sovereignty and consent democratic states as winners are less likely than non-democratic states to impose punitive peace on the defeated states. To test this argument this study analyzes a total of 260 cases of territorial change during the period from 1870-1992 using the ordered probit model. The empirical analysis shows that democratic winners are less likely to conquer or annex territory obtained from defeated states and more likely to construct a new political entity within that territory. The finding can contribute to the literature on democratic foreign policy and territorial change by connecting these two areas and showing how democratic norms and ideas can externalize in the settlement of international conflict via procedures of territorial change.
Keywords : international conflict, democratic states, territorial change, norms and ideas, public sovereignty
INTRODUCTION

At the end of conflict, winners discuss or decide on how to treat the defeated states. This decision is extremely important since it can either advance or break the peace achieved through fighting. During the twentieth century, democratic states emerged as winners from three major wars including the Cold War. Scholars of international relations have also reported the empirical regularity that democratic states are more likely than non-democratic states to prevail in interstate war and conflict (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998; 2002; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001; Choi 2003). Based on these empirical findings, this study builds on the current literature to explore the impact of the democratic triumphs on the international system and order; in particular, it asks which distinctive ideas and norms democratic winners have brought into the international discussions for the settlement of conflict and how these norms and ideas have been reflected in the actual settlement.1 In other words, if democratic norms and ideas matter in international relations, this study explores which observable implications we can find with regards to the settlement of international conflict.

Democracies often accuse aggressive or dictatorial leaders, not the state or its people, of being responsible for war. Therefore, once they defeat adversaries in war, democratic states should be be less likely to punish defeated states severely because of their respect for public sovereignty and consent. This study tests this argument based on the procedures of territory change after international conflicts and shows that democratic winners may be less likely to conquer, annex or extend its sovereignty into the territory taken from the defeated states.

This study can contribute to the field of international relations and foreign policy. On the one hand, exploring the relationship between democratic norms and territorial change, it shows the impact of international norms on state behavior can vary with domestic regime type and democratic norms and ideas can be externalized into the settlement process of international conflict via territorial change. On the other hand, the findings of the study can have important implications for the future of international order by showing the patterns of territorial change and democratic foreign policy.

The analysis below proceeds in four steps. First, I presents the related literature and main hypothesis. Second, the sources of data and the measurement of variables will be presented. Third, I report on the data analysis. Finally, I will present a summary of the key findings and discuss their implications for international relations theory and practice.

Literature and Hypothesis: Territorial Change and Democratic Norms

The impact of democracy on international affairs is one of the most studied themes in the field of international relations and foreign policy. Major issues and debates can be categorized into three dimensions:2 First, it is whether democracy is relevant to international relations. Second, it concerns which international arena democracy impacts. Third, it asks through what mechanisms democracy determines international outcomes.

This study agrees with the position that democracy has played a significant role in international relations and aims to contribute to this debate by expanding the arena in which the impact of democracy can be exerted. Indeed, despite numerous studies on democracy and territory in international relations, the relation between democratic states and territorial change has rarely been systematically investigated.3 This study explores the determinants of territorial change by articulating the impact of democratic norms and ideas, in particular respect for public sovereignty and consent.

The discussion below elaborates how this democratic norm and idea can have an impact on territorial change through historical development and theoretical logic. Territory has been the main source of security, wealth, national pride as well as the prestige of states. The protection and acquisition of territory are, therefore, prime motivations and goals of states’ foreign policy (Altman 2017). In fact, few interstate wars are fought without any territorial issue being involved in one way or another (Huth 1996; Carter 2010; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Territory was a major source of more than a half of all the wars during the period from 1648 to 1989 (Holsti 1991, 307-311). Moreover, at the end of war, winners have claimed ownership or jurisdiction of territory which they acquired while they were fighting. Among the 132 territorial conflicts during the period from 1648 to 2000, 87 conflicts, 66 percent of the total territorial conflicts, resulted in the redistribution of territory (Zacher 2001, 218).

Attitudes and practices of states regarding the acquisition of territory have changed over time (Barkin and Cronin 1994; Korman 1996; Zacher 2001, Fazal 2007; Altman 2020). The transformation of the medieval order to the modern international system generated the delimited territorial state with exclusive authority over its domain. In the early period of this modern system, the legitimacy of interstate borders was defined in dynastic terms. State territory was the exclusive property of ruling families, and they had an absolute right to rule their territories. In this case, monarchs used force to expand their power and prestige, and once they had won, the victorious often conquered and extended their sovereignty into the new territory obtained from the defeated states.

One of the earlier challenges to this practice and legitimacy was attempted during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. During the war from 1792 to 1815, France denied the absolutism of the king which is the foundation of the principle of state sovereignty throughout Europe in this era. It pronounced that “the source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation,” and “the people has become… an absolute sovereign” in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Hayes 1968, 69). Based on this principle it was believed that the territorial border should be determined by nations and people. The belief in national self-determination, therefore, questioned the legitimacy of territorial change when it proceeded without the consent of the people.

Faced with this challenge, the rest of the European powers formed a coalition to fight against the expansion of this idea and belief. After defeating France, the winners drew the borders based on the monarchy system again and the idea that state sovereignty was derived from the people are not reflected in their decisions at all.

However, the democratic idea and belief in public sovereignty reemerged in the early twenty century. At the end of World War I, the United States, emerging as a member of the winning coalition, proposed peace terms and a new international order based on the promotion of democracy. In the address to a joint session of Congress on January 22, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that no peace could last “which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just power from the consent of the governed…Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset.”4 Declaring war on Germany on April 2, 1917 he clarified that the United States was going to fight against the German military autocratic regime and had no quarrel with the German people. It would fight “for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, and the German peoples included.”5

At the same time, Wilson emphasized that the terms of peace should not be severely punitive once the German militaristic autocracy, which, it claims, was responsible for the war, was removed from power. Based on this idea, on January 8, 1918, the United States proposed the Fourteen Points as the guideline for the peace agreement and informed the German people that they could enjoy the benefits of this peace program by accepting it and repudiating their militaristic leaders (Schwabe 1985, 11-20). Since Wilson opposed imposing punitive peace on Germany under the condition of a proper change of its political structure, the concept of compensation in his proposal was based on the principle “no annexation, no contributions, no punitive damage.”6

The propensity of democratic states to limit territorial gains is reflected in their evolving practices of territorial annexations at the end of World War I. At the end of World War I, although Wilson’s original ideas about postwar settlement was compromised during the peace negotiations, the Entente Powers and their democratic allies finally obtained only small territorial concessions in the European continent.7 In fact, Britain and the United States did not establish sovereignty over any new territories, and France only reestablished sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine which had belonged to France since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 but was taken by Germany after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871.

In the case of the settlement at the end of World War II, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill jointly proclaimed the principles for which they were fighting in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Keeping the Wilsonian tradition, the first and second points of the Atlantic Charter stipulates that “countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other” and “desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned” (Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994, xvii). In fact, no Western power achieved significant territorial gains after this war.8

In contrast, authoritarian Soviet Union, however, continued to believe that victors in wars could claim territorial spoils and absorbed the Baltic states, parts of Poland, Germany, Finland, Romania and Japan’s northern islands (Zacher 2001, 220).

More recently, in the conduct of war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States and the members of “the coalition of the willing” emphasized that their war aim is to remove illegitimate regimes. After toppling these regimes, they have been committed to the reconstruction of states rather than the acquisition of territorial gains or the demand of huge reparations (Fukuyama ed. 2006). On the other hand, Russia took over and has threatened to seize a part of the territory of neighboring countries and China has claimed sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea occupying a part of them as well (Altman, 2021).

International relations scholars have provided fruitful explanations regarding the behavior of democratic states in the initiation and settlement of international conflict.

This study explores the impact of democratic ideas and norms on the treatment of defeated states at the end of international conflicts focusing on the process of territorial change and argues that due to the democratic idea and norm of respect for public sovereignty and consent, democratic states are systematically, beyond the historical examples presented earlier, less likely to take over the territory of the defeated states. Based on historical developments and theoretical expectations about democratic ideas and norms, this study derives the following hypothesis:

* Hypothesis: Democratic states as winners are less likely than non-democratic states to impose punitive peace on the defeated states. That is, democratic states are less likely to conquer or annex the territories obtained from the defeated states.

To test the hypothesis above, this study uses an ordered probit model with robust standard errors while controlling for other variables which are expected to impact territorial change.

CONTROL VARIABLES

This study includes as control variables the type of the territory changed, the location of the territory changed, the type of the international conflict, the domestic political regime type of the defeated states, the size of area and population of the territory changed, the trade volume of the winner states, and the year.

The first variable is the type of territory changed. Homeland territory, “because it raises the value of a specific territory and provides an imperative to establish sovereignty over it, plays a distinctive role in driving international conflict” (Shelef 2016, 33). Therefore, compared to non-homeland territory the loss of homeland territory can not only increase the probability of repeated international conflict and the conquest or annexation of homeland territory but also incur high costs in governing it. Based on this argument, it is expected that if the territory changed is the homeland of the defeated state, the winner state is less likely to conquer or annex it.

The second variable is the contiguity of territory changes. The location of territory matters in the outbreak, intensity, and settlement of international conflicts (Vasquez 1995; Carter 2010). For example, “when territory is strategically located, target states are more likely to consolidate their position, while challenger states are less likely to escalate militarily” (Carter 2010, 969). As for the process of settlement of international conflicts, the location of territory can matter in a way that if the changed territory is contiguous to the winner state, the winner state is more likely to conquer or annex it because the costs to merge or govern the contiguous territory may be relatively low.

The third variable is the type of conflict. The use of military force, or its lack, can affect the decision of the winner, since it reveals the actual costs to both winner and loser. Investing in such a costly military operation shows how strongly both parties are committed to the territory under dispute (Fearon 1994; 1995). Therefore, it is expected if military force is involved in the dispute, the winner state is more likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained.

The fourth variable is the domestic political regime type of the defeated state. When a conflict of interest arises between democracies, democratic peace theorists argue that democratic norms externalize in the international arena, and thus democratic states are better able to trust and respect one another (Maoz and Russett 1993; Doyle 1997; Owen 1997). Based on this reasoning, it is expected that if both winner and loser have a democratic political system, the winner is less likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained during the dispute.

The fifth variable is the size of territory changed. As the size of area to be changed increases, it is expected that a winner is more likely to conquer or annex the territory.9

The sixth variable is the size of population. The larger the size of the population, the less likely a winner is to conquer or annex the territory to be changed.

The seventh variable is trade volume. Richard Rosecrance (1986) divides states into trading and territorial ones and argues that trading states are less interested in conquering territory since they accumulate most of their wealth and power through trade.10 Based on his argument, it is expected that the larger a winner’s trade volume, the less likely the winner is to conquer or annex the territory obtained.

The eighth and last variable is year of occurrence. International norms and laws limiting the right of conquest have developed over time (Korman 1996; Zacher 2001; Fazal 2007). Therefore, it is expected that as time passes a winner is less likely to conquer and annex the territory to be obtained through international conflict.

DATA AND VARIABLES

This study analyzes a total of 260 cases of territorial change during the period from 1870-1992 based on the territorial change dataset constructed by Tir Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul Diehl, and Gary Goertz in 1998. This dataset covers the period from 1815 to 1999, but the national trade volume variable collected by Katherine Barbieri (1998) starts from 1870 and ends in 1992. The scope of the cases in this study is, therefore, limited to the period from 1870 to 1992.

The dependent variable is operationalized based on the process of territorial change. The territorial change dataset by Jaroslav, Achafer, Diehl, and Goertz (1998) divides the process of territory exchanged into 6 categories. These six categories are conquest, annexation, cession, secession, unification, mandated territory. If a winner conquers or annexes the entire territory obtained (conquest or annexation), it is coded as 0; if a winner takes only a part of the territory obtained through disputes or negotiation (cession), it is coded as 1; and if a winner leaves the territory in order to establish new independent entities (secession) or to form a new political entity out of two or more pre-existing entities (unification) or to place it under the control of another political entity such as the United Nations or League of Nations (mandated territory), it is coded as 2. The distribution of 0, 1 and 2 is 31.8, 61.0 and 7.2 percent each.

The eight independent variables are operationalized and measured as follows: First, to measure the democracy score of each state involved in conflict, I use the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005) and construct a score for each war participant by following the formula: domestic regime type = democracy score - autocracy score + 10. This domestic regime-type score ranges from 0 to 20, and the higher the score ascribed to a country, the more fully democratic that country is assumed to be. In my analysis, I use a dummy democracy variable by coding it as 1 if its score is 17 and higher, and 0 otherwise (Rousseau, Gelpi, Reither and Huth 1996). The democratic winners are 45.5 percent while the democratic losers are 46.8 percent.

Second, for the type of territory changed variable if the territory changed is the homeland of the defeated state this variable is coded as 1, and if it is the dependent territory of the defeated state, it is coded as 0. The homeland is 37 percent of this territory type variable.

Third, following the “contiguity” variable in the territorial change dataset (Jaroslav, Achafer, Diehl, and Goertz 1998), the contiguity variable in this study refers to that a winner has either a common land boundary or is separated by a body of water not exceeding 150 statute miles in width. This variable is coded as 1 if the territory changed is contiguous to the winner, and 0 otherwise. The contiguous territory is 54 percent of the territory changed.

Fourth, for the type of conflict variable, it is coded as 1 if military force is involved in territory change, and 0 otherwise. The military conflict is 27.5 percent. Fifth, the size of territory change variable indicates the size of territory changed and is logarithmically transformed. Sixth, the size of population variable refers to the size of population in the area of territorial change and is logarithmically transformed. Seventh, the trade volume variable measures the total trade volume of a winner and is logarithmically transformed. Data are taken from Katherine Barbieri’s International Trade Dataset (1998). Eighth and lastly, the year variable is based on the year when the territorial change occurred.

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1 below systematically presents the relationship between the domestic political regime type of winners and the process of territorial change, controlling for the domestic political regime type of losers, interaction term between the regime type of winners and losers, type of territory, type of conflict, contiguity to winners, size of area and population, trade volume, and year variables.

As can be observed in Table 1, five of the ten variables in the model turn out to be statistically significant while the remaining five variables are not: First, democratic winners are less likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained from the defeated as it was expected. This result from the data analysis is consistent with more recent cases of U.S. behavior in fights against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as several historical cases after World War I and II, as discussed in the theoretical section. More broadly, this finding contributes to the debate on the impact of norms on state behavior. International relations and law scholars have claimed that territorial norms have spread and affected state behavior thus leading to the decline of the number of conquests (Zacher 2001; Fazal 2006; Huth, Croco and Appel 2011). Altman (2020; 2021), however, challenges this position arguing that it is difficult to accept that the number of conquests has indeed declined. By adding the democracy variable in the model this study systematically shows that the spread and effect of international norms can vary with domestic regime type.

Second, the interaction term variable between the domestic political regime type of winners and that of losers is positively associated with the level of conquest or annexation. That is, when democratic winners face democratic losers, the former is more likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained through conflict. This statistical finding is not consistent with what we expected in the previous section. A possible explanation may be that democratic states are involved in territorial change with each other only when the territory concerned decisively belongs to one or another side (Fearon 1994). Or democratic losers are less likely to be threatened by or more likely to make concessions to democratic winners than non-democratic winners (Miller and Gibler 2011).

Third, if military force is involved in conflict, winners are more likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained. This finding shows that when states are strongly committed to capturing certain territory, they are more likely to use military force, therefore, once one of them wins through fighting, the winner is more likely to conquer or annex the territory. This finding is consistent with what many international relations scholars have argued about the relationship between territorial issues and the use of force as discussed earlier in the theoretical section. More importantly, this study can further identify that the impact of the use of force can vary with the type of territorial change.

Fourth, if the territory to be changed is contiguous to winners, they are less likely to conquer or annex it. In the one hand, this finding may reflect the period of imperialist expansion through which great powers acquired their colonies far away from their home countries. On the other hand, winners may be more cautious or rely on negotiation in changing national borders since how the border is drawn has unexpected consequences for national or regional security and stability such as the recurrence of conflict (Carter and Goemans 2011; Miller and Gibler 2011). Fifth and finally, if the territory to be changed is the homeland of defeated states, winners are more likely to conquer and annex it. These two findings show that in contrast with the expectations described in the previous theoretical section, the conquest or annexation of territory may not be driven by the costs of governing it.

The results of the remaining five variables which are not statistically significant also provide interesting insights. First, the domestic political regime type of defeated states in general does not matter in the decision of conquest or annexation made by winner states whereas the interaction term variable between the regime type of winners and losers matter. Next, contrary to the trading state argument made by Rosecrance (1986) and others, the national trade volume of the winners variable does not affect the decision of winner states with respect to territory obtained from the defeated. The impact of the size of area and population variables on the winner states’ decision over territory changed are not clear. This finding can confirm that the costs of governing over the territory changed may not be a significant factor in the decision of the winner states.

Finally, the year variable which measures the development of norms against the right of conquest does not affect the procedures of territorial change, either. This finding is indeed interesting since many international relations and law scholars, in particular, liberal institutionalists and constructivist scholars have claimed that new international norms can develop and strengthen over time and could eventually change states’ behavior. For example, with respect to the norm of territorial integrity Mark Zacher (2001) argues it has been increasingly accepted among both western and developing countries since 1945. In contrast with this position, this study finds that although there is a substantial negative correlation between time and conquest or annexation (-0.36), this relationship is no longer statistically significant in the multivariate statistical model. This finding shows that norms and ideas do not necessarily spread linearly over time and supports Dan Altman’s position about the pattern of the conquest of territory. According to him, “there have been more than 70 attempts to conquer territory since 1945. Indeed, attempts to conquer territory succeed about as often as they did a century ago” (2021, 2).

Table 2 below presents the marginal impact analysis of the relationship between the five statistically significant independent variables and the procedures of territorial change dependent variable. The coefficients presented in Table 1 do not present how much each independent variable substantively affects the dependent variable. Instead, this marginal impact analysis shows the hypothetically calculated changes that the probability of the dependent variable is associated with changes of each explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum, while the values of all the other variables are held at their mean or modal or median values.11

According to this analysis, first, democratic winners are about 11.5 percent less likely to choose to conquer or annex the territory obtained from the defeated than non-democratic winners. Democratic winners are about 14 percent more likely to choose to build a new political entity in the area or to place the territory under the control of another political entity via major international organizations. Second, when democratic winners face democratic losers, they are 16.5 percent more likely than non-democratic winners to conquer or annex the territory obtained from the losers. If the territory to be exchanged is contiguous to the victorious state, this state is about 21 percent less likely to choose to conquer or annex, and 18 percent more likely to choose to build a new type of political entity in the area or to place the territory under the control of international entities. If the territory is the homeland of the defeated state, the victorious state is about 11 percent more likely to conquer the territory, 26 percent more likely to choose cession, and 37 percent less likely to build a new political entity in the area or to place the territory under the control of international political entities. Finally, when military force is involved in the conflict, the winner is 30 percent more likely to conquer or annex the territory, and 22 percent less likely to choose to build a new political entity or to place the territory under the control of international entities.

In sum, the results from the empirical tests based on the ordered probit model and its marginal impact analysis confirm the main hypothesis in this study that democracies as winners are less likely than non-democratic counterparts to conquer or annex the territory obtained from the defeated.12 Furthermore, this finding can contribute to the debate on the impact of norms on state behavior about territorial change by showing that the spread and effect of international norms can vary with domestic regime type and proposing an alternative understanding about the impact of norms on state behavior and decisions regarding territorial change. The rest of the empirical findings also provide interesting insights over the determinants of territorial change. In the following this study further discusses the implications of these findings for international relations theory and practice.

CONCLUSION

This study begins with the questions of under which condition winner states are less likely to impose punitive peace on the defeated states and in particular whether democratic winners are less likely to conquer or annex the territory they obtained during the conflict. The key empirical findings that emerged from the analysis are that if the use of military force is involved in conflict, winners are more likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained. If the territory to be changed is contiguous to winners, they are less likely to conquer or annex it. If the territory to be changed is the homeland of defeated states, winners are more likely to conquer and annex it. Most importantly, democratic winners are less likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained from losers as we anticipated, but the interaction term variable between the regime type of winners and losers shows that democratic winners are more likely to conquer or annex the territory obtained from the democratic losers.

This study sought to account for the behavior of democratic winners in the treatment of the defeated states with respect to the externalization of democratic ideas and norms. In other words, respect for public sovereignty and consent of democratic states makes them believe that although democratic states prevail in international conflict their right to conquer or annex territory should be limited without the consent of affected people and that the creation of new appropriate governance would prevent the repetition of interstate conflict and eventually promote international peace and security. This finding regarding democratic winners, therefore, can contribute to the literature on democratic foreign policy by showing how democratic norms and ideas can be externalized in the settlement of international conflict and in particular the treatment of defeated states via the procedures of territorial change.

This study may also have important implications for international relations and foreign policy practice. First, for a couple of last decades international scholars have agreed that territorial change, in particular conquest has substantially declined. However, Dan Altman recently points out that it is only partly accurate and claims that “Conquest remains a central issue in international politics―it has merely become smaller…the seizure of small territories will be “the most common spark for wars” among states (2021, 2-12). Therefore, it is important to continue to pay attention to how ongoing dispute generates territorial change to prevent conflict and promote peace.

On the other hand, insofar as democratic states are less likely to conquer or annex the territory after conflict and more likely to choose to construct a new political entity in that territory, this effort may prevent recurrent conflicts and advance peace between the two parties that fought. However, at the same time, it may demand additional commitments and investments on the part of democratic winners to create and support the construction of a new entity or state. Both international relations scholars and practitioners should pay greater attention to the exploration and development of a successful and sustainable model for this construction process.

Since this study only covers the period from the late nineteenth century to the twentieth century, its findings need to be interpreted cautiously for the understanding of current international relations and foreign policy of democratic states. After the Cold War ended, it seems that democracy was advancing, but this optimism did not last long. In the twenty first century authoritarian states are back backed by both “economic performance and military might” and this “authoritarian turn of recent years reflects the flaws and failings of democratic systems” (Mounk 2021, 163). This trend may affect international relations and foreign policy in the coming years and therefore future studies should continue to address the functions of democratic ideas and norms in the context of the contest between democratic and nondemocratic states and discuss their implications for international relations and state foreign policy.

Footnote

1 With respect to the impact of democratic winners on the international system, Ikenberry focuses on international institutional building and strategic restraint by the United States (2001).

2 Levy provides a comprehensive literature review on this debate and mentions that the democratic peace proposition acquired “a nearly law-like status” (2002, 467-472). Also see Rosato (2003) for a critique and review on democratic peace, Desch (2002; 2008) on democratic victory, and Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) on democratic commitment.

3 For a study on the relationship between democratic peace and territorial disputes, see Gibler (2007), Park and James (2015) and Owsiak (2016).

4 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917, PWW, XL, 533-539 quoted in Knock (1992), 112-113.

5 Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 2, 1917 in Link ed. (1966), Vol. 41, 525.

6 Speech by Woodrow Wilson, February 11, 1918 in Dockrill and Goold (1981), 32.

7 They, however, gained some significant territories by dividing up the colonies of the defeated powers. See Korman (1996), 132-142.

8 After World War II the United States maintained its control over some of the Pacific Islands that formerly belonged to Japan. Further for US territorial expansion or conquest see Maass (2020).

9 Conquests of entire states became rare after 1945 (Fazal 2007), however, conquests of small pieces of territory have persisted (Altman 2020).

10 For a more recent study about this argument, see Liberman (1998) and Markowitz, Mulesky, Graham, and Fariss (2020).

11 The interpretation of the marginal impact of the explanatory variables on the predicted probability of the procedures of territorial change is based on King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000).

12 The strength of this empirical finding is still limited. It is because this study tests the impact of democracy instead of the impact of the democratic norms and ideas in the statistical model therefore the causal mechanisms of the argument should be only inferred from historical development and theoretical discussion.

Tables
Table. 1. ORDERED PROBIT MODEL OF THE PROCEDURE OF TERRITORIAL CHANGE
Table. 2. THE MARGINAL IMPACT OF SIGNIFICANT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE PROCEDURES OF TERRITORIAL CHANGE
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20-1 (April 2022)