The Cultural Identity of East Asia in the Age of Globalization: Westcentrism and Asian Values

Jung In Kang
(Sogang University, Korea)

〈 Content 〉

I. Introduction	IV. The "Asian Values" and the Cultural Identity of East Asia
II. Preliminary Examination	V. Conclusion
III. Cultural and Economic Effects of Globalization	

• Key Words: Westcentrism, Asian values, globalization, cultural identity, East Asia

【ABSTRACT】

In this paper the author explored the future of East Asian civilization, focusing on its cultural identity in the age of globalizatoin. To do this, first, a preliminary examination of core concepts and phenomena such as "globalization," "Westcentrism," and the "Rise of East Asia" was made, for these factors brought the issue of the cultural identity of East Asia to the fore since the early 1990s. Then, in order to understand the cultural identity of East Asia in light of globalization more concretely, the cultural and economic impact of globalization upon East Asia was investigated by discussing theories regarding the cultural effect of globalization and the tri-polar regionalization of the global capitalism with special focus upon ongoing sub-regionalzation in the Great South China and the Bohai Rim regions. Finally, on the basis of the preceding discussions the Asian values discourse which is more directly related to the cultural identity of East Asia was reviewed and some prospective suggestions for building viable cultural identity were made.

I. Introduction

The process of globalization has been accelerating since the early 1990s, notably with the end of the Cold War and the accelerated IT revolution which has reached its peak in the construction of the internet with the worldwide web. Consequently, concern about the future world order has been on the rise. With regard to the future of the various civilizations in the world, three contending views have attracted popular attention. Francis Fukuyama predicts that civilizations the world over will converge on the liberal capitalism of the West(Fukuyama 1992). In contrast, Samuel P. Huntington prophesies the clash of civilizations, especially between the West and an alliance of Islam-Confucian civilizations, thereby obtaining world-wide fame after the September 11 New York Terror in 2001 (Huntington 1996). In opposition to this view but without stressing convergence, Harald Müller, director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Hesse, forecasts the coexistence of civilizations with mutual accommodation and interdependence(Müller 1999).

Thus, many Western scholars predict confidently the convergence, coexistence or clash of civilizations in the age of globalization, placing Western civilization at the center —or as the central actor. In the midst of such glib talks about the future, non-Western civilizations remain in the background. They are frequently marginalized, forgotten, or absent. For Westerners, it appears very natural to maintain their identity, while promoting globalization and a global restructuring of capitalism. In contrast, for East Asians as well as other non-Western people the task of adapting themselves to global capitalism undergoing a major restructuring seems to entail the threat to their own identity, despite their strenuous effort hitherto put into the modernization of their own countries. In short, the task of successful adaptation to the global economic order and that of maintaining cultural identity appear mutually complementary to the former, but ostensibly conflictual to the latter.

I shall explore the future of East Asian civilization in this paper, focusing on its cultural identity in the age of globalizaton. To do this, first, a preliminary examination of core concepts and phenomenon such as "globalization," "Westcentrism"¹⁾ and the "rise of East Asia" will be made, for these factors have brought the issue of the cultural identity of East Asia to the fore since the early 1990s. Then, in order to understand the cultural identity of East Asia in light of globalization more concretely, the cultural and economic impact of globalization upon East Asia will be investigated by discussing theories regarding the cultural effect of globalization and the tri-polar regionalization of the global capitalism with special focus upon ongoing sub-regionalzation in the Great South China and the Bohai Rim regions. Finally, on the basis of the preceding discussions the Asian values discourse which is more directly related to the cultural identity of East Asia will

1) "Eurocentrism" is the word more commonly used than "Westcentrism". However I prefer to use the latter to the former, as I shall discuss later.

be reviewed and some prospective suggestions for building viable cultural identity will be made.

II. Preliminary Examination

Globalization seems to have a universalizing and homogenizing impact upon the people in the globe, as we can find in the universalization of capitalism, democracy, automobile, TV's, internet, and so on. However, the intensification of cross-cultural experience globalization has made possible may frequently result in awakening and strengthening of the hitherto dormant cultural identity of peoples in many parts of the world. As it is also an uneven and asymmetrical process and its most important source is the Western civilization, led by the United States, globalization has appeared as cultural imperialism and/or another Westernization which threatens the cultural identity of most non-Western civilizations and in turn provoked the reactive rise of their cultural identities. In this sense globalization is Janus-faced: it is not only laden with putatively universal values but also with Westcentrism. So in order to understand the awakening of cultural identity of East Asia since the early 1990s, it seems necessary to briefly examine globalization, Westcentrism and the rise of East Asia.

1. Globalization

Globalization is a confusing and controversial concept. Jan Aart Scholte identifies at least five broad definitions of globalization which are interrelated and overlapping in some ways.²⁾ First, globalization is conceived in terms of "internationalization" and thus refers to the increase of cross-border relations between countries. Economically it stresses "large and growing flows of trade and capital investment between countries." More broadly, it points to "enlarged movements of people, messages and ideas" between countries. Second, globalization is defined as "liberalization." It means a "process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an 'open', 'borderless' world economy." Third, globalization is equated with "universalization," i.e., the "process of spreading various objects and experiences"—e.g., the Gregorian calendar, decolonization, TV's, McDonald's— to people all over the world. Fourth, globalization is seen as "westernization or modernization, especially in an 'Americanized' form." This refers to the process in which "the social structures of modernity—i.e., capitalism, rationalism,

2) I draw upon Jan Aart Scholte's work on globalization heavily in the following discussion.

industrialism, bureaucratism, etc.—are spread the world over," normally demolishing traditional cultures and local autonomy in the process. Globalization in this sense is sometimes described as an "imperialism of McDonald's, Hollywood and CNN." Fifth, globalization is understood as "deterritorialization" or a "reconfiguration of geography," by which "social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders."³⁾ Scholte prefers the fifth definition of globalization and defines globalization as a "transformation of social geography marked by the growth of supraterritorial space." He stresses, however, that "globalization does not entail the end of territorial geography," but that "territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelations"(Scholte 2000, 8).

For the causes of globalization Scholte suggests roughly four great driving forces behind globalization: the spread of rationalism as a dominant knowledge framework since the Enlightenment, a certain turn in capitalist development (for example, the globalization of production and consumption), extensive technological innovations in respect of transport, communications and data-processing, and, finally, the construction of enabling regulatory frameworks such as technical and procedural standardization, liberalization of cross-border finance, investment and trade, guarantees of property rights for global capital, and the legalization of transworld organizations and activities(Scholte 2000, 89-108).

What merits special attention in connection with the subject of this paper is the close link between informationalization and globalization, as I shall discuss later in sub-regionalization of East Asia. That is, without technological innovations, globalization patently could not have taken place. Thus, some authors suggest that technological change has been the single most important driving force behind globalization(Scholte 2000, 99). The notable impetus for it has been the IT revolution including the construction of the internet and the worldwide web. Of course, the end of the Cold War, and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO have played a significant role in accelerating globalization.

2. Westcentrism

The challenge of globalization has now been transforming non-Western societies including East Asia, just as the challenge of modernization had done a century before. Countries in East Asia have been exposed to globalization ostensibly as internationalization, that is, the free flow of information, goods, services, cultures and even social problems such as pollutions, AIDs and Mad Cow disease. Among these, it is

3) All the quotes in the above come from Scholte(2000, 15-17).

information that circulates around the world in the largest amount, most freely and most rapidly. The diffusion of values and cultures has also become easier, albeit in a less visible form. The diffusion of values also takes the form of human rights and democracy as well as free market.⁴⁾ Thus East Asian countries have been faced with the pressures of human rights, democratization, and market-opening from the West. Such will be seen as globalization as universalization and liberalization by the West, but as globalizaton as Westernization and imperialism by East Asian countries.

Small and weak nations including countries like Taiwan, Korea and Thailand are in a position difficult to become the center in the global flow of goods, services and values. The most important source of globalization comes from Western civilization led by the United States. The U.S. controls the internet, satellites communication, and other most advanced information technologies, and more than half of the world news comes from American media including the CNN. Thus, the U.S. is the most powerful source of globalization. In the process of globalization, the values and cultures of Western civilization have diffused throughout the world. Underlying this diffusion is Westcentrism, the meta-ideology.

If we look up the words "Eurocentric" and "Eurocentrism" in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, the adjective "Europocentric" is defined as "Having or regarding Europe as its centre; presupposing the supremacy of Europe and Europeans in world culture, etc." and the noun "Europocentrism" as "the idea or practice of placing Europe at the center of one's world-view"(*The Oxford English Dictionary* 1989, Vol. 5, 442).⁵⁾ In this paper, however, I shall use the term "Westcentrism" instead of "Eurocentrism," as I am more interested in the current state of affairs than historical origin and evolution of what is called Eurocentrism and the former more explicitly includes the United States, Canada, Australia and the like which have inherited and developed European civilization in non-European territories.⁶⁾

Thus, Westcentrism refers to the attitude which takes the world-views, values, institutions and practices of the Western civilization as universal and supreme. If we examine various definitions given by many theorists, it is found to consist of the following three general propositions. First, modern Western civilization has reached the highest stage

4) In reverse, yoga, meditation, Zen Buddhism and the like are examples of the diffusion from Asia into the West.

5) In *The Oxford English Dictionary* "Eurocentric" and "Eurocentrism" are found under the entries of "Europocentric" and "Europocentrism." However, the former are more frequently used than the latter.

6) And, of course, the United States as the world hegemon has set the terms and agenda of global politics more powerfully than Europe.

of development in the history of humankind (Western superiority). Second, the developmental stages in Western history are universally applicable to all human histories, applying not only to the West, but also to the "Rest" (Western universalism and historicism). Third, non-Western societies placed in lower stages of development in history can improve themselves only by emulating and accepting Western civilization (Westernization/modernization thesis). In short, Westcentrism boils down to the three thesis: Western superiority, Western universalism and Westernization/modernization.⁷⁾

Westcentrism has evolved in the following three phases in terms of the hegemony shifts. The first hegemon of Western civilization was the Netherlands which achieved mercantilist modernity, then she was succeeded by Great Britain which achieved industrial modernity, and, finally, Great Britain had to give way to the United States formally in the aftermath of World War II which actually began to surpass the former at least at the end of World War I with the achievement of consumer modernity(Taylor 2000, 52). As the power and cultural hegemony of the hegemons in the Western civilization over neighboring Western nations have not been as powerful as that of Chinese empires over her neighboring countries had been in the past, and the principle of equal sovereignty among European states has been honored on the whole since the Westphalian Treaty, the widespread equality among Western nations has existed, and the domination of the world by Western civilization in the age of colonialism and imperialism had been achieved not by a single powerful nation or an empire, but by the concert of Western powers.

The now bygone twentieth century deserves the name of the "American Century," marked by three major U.S. political victories--World War I, World War II and the Cold War. In the American Century, the United States has dominated the world as the leader of the Western civilization and the hegemon of the world. The hegemon represents the future for other countries and wields cultural power to restructure the world in its own image. Thus, according to Peter J. Taylor, the U.S. has presented the world with the project of Americanization in the post-war world. It was to offer the Western European countries with the benefit of consumer capitalism through the Marshall plan and to provide the decolonized countries with the support for modernization. As a result, major nations in Western Europe went through the rapid reconstruction of their industry, strong Americanization in 1950s, so that they caught up with opulent consumer capitalism of America(Taylor 2000, 58-63). In contrast, the modernization in the Third World which was initiated by Truman's Four Point Plan, aimed at the realization of the nineteenth-century industrial modernity--a stage reached by the industrial revolution in Great Britain. However, the project failed dismally without any visible evidence for general 'catching up'

7) See Kang(2004, chap. 2) for more details about the concept of Westcentrism.

in the developing world. Most developing countries except for some in East Asia and Latin America have failed to materialize industrial capitalism, not to mention consumer capitalism.

The United States has, thus, begun to project globalization unto the world to replace modernization and to complement Americanization since the early 1970s. With the advent of the unipolar world at the end of the Cold War, globalization has become more compelling. While both modernization and globalization are interrelated processes to complement Americanization, the latter apparently smacks of pressure and threat, whereas the former had the strong flavor of promise and persuasion(Taylor 2000, 67).

3. The Rise of East Asia

Kyung-il Kim points to the context in which the word "East Asia" introduced itself and gained wide currency in the West:

Although the name East Asia itself was introduced due to the demise of Eurocentrism, the establishment of American hegemony, the emergence of the Third World, and the spread of cultural relativism, it is, above all, the dynamic economic growth shown in this area since the 1970s that the name began to gain concrete substance common to this area(Kyung-il Kim 1998, 32-33).

As we may recognize in Kim's statement, East Asia had been little more than a geographic concept during a few decades after World War II. However, the dynamic economic growth achieved in this region including Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore since 1970s began to attract serious attention from the West. Besides, the phenomenal economic growth observed in East and Southeast Asia and the decline of ideological confrontation in the aftermath of the Cold War have also led Asians to restore Asian consciousness or identity, so that Asia has been "rediscovered" or "re-Asianized"(Funabashi 1993, 75-77). Moreover, the Asianization of Asia is "paradoxically the result of the globalization of its economy and media." As Asian nations grow out of the special relationships with their former colonial powers and integrate with the global economy, they begin to recognize neighboring countries as "trading partners, providers of investment opportunities, and competitors"(Funabashi 1993, 79).

The dynamic growth of the East Asian economy and Asia's subsequent self-discovery forecast a new change in the world politics of the twenty-first century. Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean politician, stresses that there will be three centers of world power (Europe,

North America and East Asia) in the twenty first century, in contrast to two (Europe and North America) in the twentieth century(Mahbubani 1995, 100; Gamble and Payne 1996, 247-48). Seen from this perspective, Mahbubani asserts, the so-called two World Wars and the subsequent Cold war may well be interpreted primarily as European struggles or Civil Wars in Europe(Mahbubani 1995, 100). In the last few centuries, the Western civilization has shaped the world history and the influence of East Asia has been rather negligible. Now many observers have noted that East Asia has arrived on the world stage. Its sheer economic weight will enable it to raise its own voice and strengthen its own cultural identity. Mahbubani illustrates this point by comparing East Asia's GNP with that of North America over time:

As recently as 1960, Japan and East Asia together accounted for 4 percent of world GNP, while the United States, Canada, and Mexico represented 37 percent. Today both groups have about the same share of the world's GNP (some 24 percent each), but, with more than half the world's economic growth taking place in Asia in the 1990s, the economies of North America and Europe will progressively become relatively smaller(Mahbubani 1995, 100-101).

III. Cultural and Economic Effects of Globalization

In order to have a prospect for the cultural identity of East Asia and examine its link with the so-called Asian values in the age of globalization, we need to examine various theories regarding the cultural effect of globalization and explore an overarching reason for the coincidental rise or resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, Asian values discourse, and Christian fundamentalism in the United State against the background of globalization. If the rise of cultural identity could be interpreted as the cultural outcome of globalization—or of the so-called "glocalization"—then, the tripartite regionalization of global economy, as its economic consequence. Thus, the regionalization of the global economy will be addressed with special focus upon the ongoing sub-regionalization in the Great South China and Bohai Rim regions, for the formation of which the Asian values coagulate with globalization and informationalization.

1. The Cultural Effect of Globalization: the Rise of Religious Fundamentalism?

As words such as Westernization/Americanization, McDonaldization, Coca-Colonization, and American cultural imperialism suggest, globalization has frequently been perceived as

the inevitable and irreversible process shaping the world in the image of Western civilization led by the United States. In particular, the globalization described in the literature of economics and business refers to the inexorable and immutable globalization of capital, culture, and communications alike, which was accompanied by the political logic that there is simply no other alternative. However, recent literature begins to display growing skepticism about the logic of inevitability and irreversibility so often associated with the notion of globalization, and now conceives globalization as a field of struggle in which trends for globalization and countertrends against it struggle and conflict with each other(Hay and Marsh 2000, 4-7, 12-13).

For the understanding of the cultural effect of globalization, Robert J. Holton's succinct summary of diverse theoretical positions seems quite useful. He divides and summarizes them roughly into the following three theses: "homogenization," "polarization" and "hybridization" theses.⁸⁾ Their summary is in brief order.

The homogenization thesis is based on the understanding of globalization as the Americanization of the global society in which the world is reshaped in accordance with the neo-liberal Washington consensus. This position is commonly found in the literature on cultural imperialism which views the world culture as Americanized. This position builds on a number of key arguments. One is related to the theme of predominant American ownership of key resources for the manufacture and transmission of culture, including satellite systems, information technology manufacture, news agencies, the advertising industry, television program production and export, and the film industry. A second argument focuses on the U.S.'s role in constructing a regulatory framework within culture and information industries that favors U.S. interests. A third argument stresses the U.S. cultural hegemony that goes beyond the U.S. control of culture and information industries and includes the very characteristics of modern social organization. For example, the McDonaldization of society refers not merely to the spectacular worldwide expansion of the American fast food industry,⁹⁾ but more generally to certain broader cultural traits in the economy, organization, and personal life of which McDonald's is merely a manifestation. According to a study, McDonald's corporate strategy represents the values of global rationalization such as efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control over

8) These three theses have some parallel elements with my four cultural discourse strategies to overcome Westcentrism I have examined in another paper: assimilative, reverse, syncretic and deconstructive strategies. Of course some equivalent to the fourth strategy, that is, the deconstructive strategy is missing in Holton's discussion. See Kang(2003) for more details.

9) For example, by 1994 McDonald's had 5,000 restaurants abroad, including Moscow and Beijing. By 1995, around 20 million customers were served daily around the world, and 45 per cent of company profits derived from international operations(Holton 1998, 167-68).

products and the labor force. It also represents informality and lack of status hierarchy associated with self-service. Thus, those who stress this aspect of globalization warn that the cultures of countries the world over were being converged or homogenized to the American culture(Holton 1998, 166-72).

The polarization thesis is notably represented by Benjamin Barber and Samuel P. Huntington. This position stresses that the dynamics of the contemporary world are far from dominated by a single logic. For Barber, "the polarization ... is between McWorld and Jihad, between the forces of global consumer capitalism and those of retribalization, ... between commercial artifice, technology, and pop culture on the one hand, and narrow self-righteous faiths that generate war and bloodshed on the other"(Barber 1996: Holton 1998, 172). As is mentioned in the beginning of the paper, for Huntington, the polarization is between civilizations in general, and between the West and an emergent Islamic-Confucian axis in particular. The clash of civilizations is due to economic interests and power struggles as well as cultural differences. The scenario that the clash generates is one of global civilizational war(Huntington 1996: Holton 1998, 172-73).

Finally, the hybridization thesis emphasizes "cultural hybridity," "creolization," or "syncretism" within global culture. In a variety of ways, this approach emphasizes cross-cultural borrowings and intercultural fusion and blending to create hybridized or mixed cultural forms. Much of the contemporary evidence in favor of creolization or hybridization is drawn from the sphere of music(Holton 1998, 178-84). The thesis also stresses the fluidity, indeterminacy and openness of cross-cultural interactions, having the advantage of avoiding the burden of Westcentrism in discussing the cultural effect of globalization. Advocates of this thesis also understand the diffusion of world religions and the formation of modern European civilization as the outcome of hybridization(Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 306-307).

As the cultural identity of non-Western civilizations has been articulated in a process to challenge Westcentrism, it has more to do with bipolarization than the homogenization thesis. With regard to this, some observers have noticed the almost simultaneous rise or resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, Asian values discourse and Christian fundamentalism in the United States in the midst of globalization since the early 1970s.¹⁰⁾ Here the Asian values discourse, Islam fundamentalism and Christian fundamentalism share some attributes of religious fundamentalism.¹¹⁾

10) Sometimes Hinduism is added to the list.

11) However, Confucianism as Asian values is secular, pragmatic, rational and this world-oriented, so that the theocratic and radical attributes which characterize the other two kinds of religious fundamentalism are absent from it.

Noting this trend, Arif Dirlik views the Asian values discourse as the reemergence of nationality brought about by globalization, and the resurrection of Confucianism as the outcome of economic success of East Asia and the subsequent expression of long-endured discontent with Westcentrism which has suppressed the East Asian tradition(Dirlik n.d., 74, 76). Dirlik's view has something to do with the concept of "glocalization" coined and advocated by Roland Robertson. Just as modern nation-states are ultimately the product of modern international process, the Asian values or East Asian discourse might well be interpreted as the outcome of regionalization or localization accompanying globalization (Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 301).

Manuel Castells suggests an overarching explanation about the coincidental rise of these religious fundamentalisms by arguing that religious fundamentalism is the most important source of constructing identity in the network society. He finds the coincidence of the birth date of the IT revolution in the 1970s with a beginning of global capitalist restructuring and a beginning of the period of Islamic revival and purification in the Islamic world(Castells 1997, 13-14). Seen from this perspective, fundamental believers of Christianity, Islam and Confucianism may well be interpreted as participants in movements to recover and maintain their collective identities threatened by globalization and informationalization, so that their response to them has been conservative and reactionary.

An interesting contrast here is that whereas the Islam fundamentalism in the Arab world rose in reaction to the failed modernization, either in right-wing or left-wing version, the Asian values discourse emerged later as a response to the success of capitalist industrialization. Thus, just as there exists a strong possibility that Islamic fundamentalism will be strengthened if the Islamic countries further fail in the task of modernization, so does there exist a high probability that the discourse of Asian values will be dampened as the economies of East Asian countries stagnate or deteriorate, as we actually observed in the financial crises of East Asian countries in late 1990s. Such contrast may in part be related to the different orientation of the two: Islamic fundamentalism is more tied to transcendental values regardless of secular success and Asian values are more oriented to the secular success of this world.

While Islamic fundamentalism and Asian values are characterized by strong anti-Westcentrism, the Christian fundamentalism existing in the United States during the Cold War era retained the attributes of anti-Communism, Westcentrism and racism. However, the Christian fundamentalism which has resurged in America in the post-Cold War era has replaced anti-Communism with technophobia to IT—technology as a Satanic force--and hostility to the control of the country by a world government which the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have most

notably enacted and all the more so with the spur of globalization. To Christian fundamentalists, the emergence of such a new global order appears to be a threatening new uncertainty over the control of America's destiny(Castells 1997, 25-26).

2. Economic Effect of Globalization: Regionalization of Global Economy

As the globalization becomes more pronounced with the collapse of the socialist regimes, the global economy seems to go through rapid regionalization with the formation of tripolar regional economies: the European Union, North America and East Asia (Gamble and Payne 1996, 251). The notably successful formation of the European Union has in turn spurred the movement towards regionalization in other areas, for the pressure on a region to seek another regionalization increases in relation to the successful integration of other regions. Various factors have worked in the shift of the United States towards the formation of the NAFTA. The increasing U.S. perception of its own declining ability to act as a global hegemon has played an important role. Thus, the increasing conflict with Japan over the latter's "unfair trade" and the uncertainty about the future intention of the E.U., combined with sober awareness of the importance of the regional market to the U.S. economy, have led the U.S. to create the NAFTA(Gamble and Payne 1996, 254-257).

In East Asia two regionalist projects are competing: the East Asia Economic Caucus and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(Sum 1996; Gamble and Payne 1996). In comparison with these two regionalist projects, however, most observers agree that the regionalist project in East Asia is the least well-defined, and the least advanced. Geographically and ideologically, East Asia shows a complex composition: Japan as an advanced economy, NIEs(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), the ASEAN, and (post-)socialist regimes comprising China, North Korea and the countries of Indochina. Besides, there is no single center which could shape a regionalist project into a coherent form with vigor. The willingness or the capacity of the two potential regional hegemon—i.e., Japan and China—to take the leadership is still uncertain or dubious. Besides, two other great powers, the United States and Russia are involved in the region.

In regard to the subject of this paper, thus, the sub-regionalization of East Asian economy in the Great South China Region(GSCR) and the Bohai Rim Region(BRR) merits special attention. These cases show clearly how globalization, informationalization and cultural homogeneity are interwoven into shaping a subregional economic integration without forming any formal institutional mechanisms, bypassing the thorny issue of the sovereignty of the states involved. To be more specific about the role these factors bring into play, globalization dictates the need for mutually beneficial economic division of labor

in the area to meet the challenge of restructuring the capitalism of the countries involved. Cultural homogeneity which is absent from the APEC and the EAEC is provided by ethnic ties and the Asian values. Informationalization facilitates the economic integration and the cohesiveness of Asian values. The cases also show that the Asian values are effective not only in promoting economic development in the state level, but also in forging synergic economic integration beyond it.

To illustrate this point, a brief summary of Myung-Rae Cho's excellent research on what he calls "transborder network capitalism" in the GSCR and the BRR seems mandatory, without going into technical details of political economy at the same time. According to Cho, these two regions are governed and integrated increasingly by transborder networks and geogovernance. By "transborder networks" Cho refers to "the economic networks which extend and function across the different national systems of production, trade and finance, each system at work within the regulatory bound of a sovereign economy." By "geogovernance" he means "the underlying mechanisms which govern the transborder flows of materials, information and commodities through the networks of intra-, inter- and extra-firm relations." According to him, "[t]he mechanisms of geogovernance include, for instance, technical and managerial integration, financial and trade regulation, ethnic and personal ties, political mediations, inter-governmental agreements, all underpinning a national governance system and its articulation with others"(Cho 1997, 1).

On the basis of these key concepts, Cho examines the formation of transborder network capitalism in the two regions. First, the network capitalism in the GSCR which incorporates China's Guandong, Fujian and Jiansu provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan is composed of the tripartite combination of Taiwanese capital and manufacturing technology, Chinese cheap labor and materials, and Hong Kong's financial and trading mediation as the economic division of labor. Here, the major actors in the joint ventures are the small and medium sized firms from Taiwan and Hong Kong, the local/provincial Chinese governments, and quasi-public enterprises(Cho 1997, 5-7).¹²⁾ The main mechanisms of geogovernance in the region are the market and local community(Cho 1997, 10-11). And According to Cho, these are complemented by the two subsidiary mechanisms, the Asian values and informationalization, in the following way:

One is cultural, ethnic and linguistic commonalities which are embedded in

12) However, as Hong Kong was returned to China 1997, although functionally not much changed, the original tripartite relationship was transformed into the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and the southern Chinese provinces including Hong Kong, Guangdong and Fujian(Cho 1997, 5).

interpersonal ties, family life, community practices and the sense of territory... In the Chinese business system, their traditional relational mechanism called *guanxi* makes up for a lack in the rule of law, and transparency in rules and regulation... The other is telecommunication infrastructures which give support to the trans-spatial and -temporal coordination through the cyberspace. The GSCR is world-widely famous for the good or rapidly improving infrastructural systems which include wider trunk-road connections, hitech-based telecommunication networks, excellent hub ports (teleports, airports, seaports) and the like... Both mechanisms are combined to create [an] ethnic-spatial bond which works as the force of meta-geogovernance over the space of the GSCR (Cho 1997, 11).

In contrast, the transborder network capitalism in the BRR incorporates China's three northeastern provinces (Shandong, Laoning, Hebei) and two provincial-level cities there (Beijing and Tianjin), and the central west coastal region (especially, Kyunggi province) of Korea. The transnational space in the region has been constructed since the early 1990s, especially after the historic Korea-China diplomatic normalization in 1992. The construction was initiated primarily by Korean large companies (*chaebol*), on the one hand, and the Chinese central government and state-owned firms on the other, with the former's contribution of capital and technologies and the latter's provision of market (Cho 1997 12).

Korean firms prefer the northeastern provinces "primarily for geographical proximity (about 100 sea miles) and cultural and ethnic affinity, as well as for its regional production conditions complementary to Korea's new globalizing economy" (Cho 1997, 12). Korean companies there build networkings with Chinese partners to secure the hierarchical and integrative management system favorable to the market control, as they have done in Korea. The two main mechanisms for geogovernance in the region are hierarchy and the state (Cho 1997, 17-18).¹³⁾ There are two further mechanisms to complement them for their effective functioning in the BRR, which play the role similar to what as we find in the GSCR: "Korean ethnic community and the cyberspace of Korean multinationals." For Koreans, the Northeastern provinces of China constitute what Benedict Anderson has

13) According to Cho, hierarchy mechanism refers to "organizational principle which enforces the vertical integration of all associated business activities, thereby internalizing arm's-length transactions within the centralized ownership structure," and state mechanism to "political arrangements at a state level to govern and balance diverse and sometimes conflicting institutions, organizations, firms and workers involved in the transnational operations of Korean firms" (Cho 1997, 17-18).

called an "imagined community" because of the presence of two million ethnic Korean residents there. Thus, just as overseas Chinese prefer to invest in South China by taking advantage of their community networks, so do Koreans in the Northeastern provinces, for there live as many as two millions of ethnic Korean residents in the area(Cho 1997, 18). According to Cho, "[t]his imaginary spatial identity activates a strong geo-cultural mechanism to foster the cross-border interaction between Korea and China"(Cho 1997, 18). In addition, the cyberspace built through the electronic communication networks which link the Korean headquarters with local plants in China consolidates the governance mechanism which maintains and coordinates trans-border flows(Cho 1997, 18). According to Cho, thus, the GSCR and the BRR which have been incorporated into the cyberspace are no longer the exclusive domain for a sovereign state, but the "virtual space for multiple encounters among contending actors —small and large firms, Korean and Chinese, local and global players"—which also transmits and consolidates Asian values in terms of personal ties and business culture(Cho 1997, 18-19).

Cho's study shows how the global capitalism works out glocalization at the supranational level beyond the state by taking advantage of the universal mechanism of information technologies and combining them with cohesive "Asian Values," the particular business culture and human relationships unique to the region. Thus Cho predicts that the possibility for the emergence of East Asia as an economic bloc in the tripartite global capitalism depends upon the formation of network capitalism which articulates and shares similar mode of development and cultural identity through interactive learning process of regional actors(Cho 1997, 23).

IV. The "Asian Values" and the Cultural Identity of East Asia

The Asian Values (or East Asian) discourse has risen more vocally in East Asia since the early 1990s, in reaction to the American version of Westcentrism represented by modernization and globalization. From this perspective, Kwang-ok Kim interprets "East Asian discourse" as a "reactive product of critical reflection upon modernization theory based on the Western discourse"—a reflexive attempt to find explanation for a phenomenal economic growth in East Asia by East Asians who used to believe that the development is impossible without resort to what is Western—and/or as the discourse resulting from the desire and confidence of East Asian societies which seek to form a defensive community to counter the diffusion of Westcentric world system(Kwang-ok Kim 1998, 5-6). In the similar vein, Ki-bong Kim defines it as the "response to the challenge of

globalization, another name of imperialism" (Ki-bong Kim 2001, 13).

With this context in mind, let's examine the Asian values discourse more closely.¹⁴⁾ According to Je-gook Chon's succinct summary, the Asian values discourse refers to the argument that the communitarianism based on Confucian culture is much superior to Western individualism in creating and maintaining orderly and healthy society.¹⁵⁾ Thus, the advocates of Asian values criticize Western civilization, notably the United States, for its retrogressive phenomena rooted in individualism—i.e., extreme individualism, selfishness, lack of discipline and self-indulgence, the dissolution of family and the rapid increase of unwed motherhood and juvenile delinquency, rampant increase of drug use, violence and crimes, inferior education, the breakdown of civil society, etc. In contrast they assert that the relative superiority of Asian values enables Asians to maintain orderly and healthy society. For them, the superiority of Asian values consists of familism, filial piety and loyalty, the communitarianism which stresses the community and social order over individual members, respect for authority, stress on social order and discipline over individual freedom, preference for consensus and harmony over competition and confrontation, thrifty and diligent life-style, and so on(Chon 1999, 195-96).

The rise of the Asian values discourse requires the understanding of its political dimension as well as the economic one. Although the origin of globalization could be traced back to the period earlier than the 1990s, the breakdown of the socialist regimes and their subsequent liberalization in the 1990s appeared to be nothing more than the globalization of the triumphant capitalism and liberal democracy all over the world. Consequently, the U.S. offensive toward East Asian countries has been launched on a full scale, demanding respect for human rights and "fair" trade. In order to check the rise of Asian powers, the U.S. began to accuse authoritarian regimes in the region of violating human rights, and called for the abolition of "unfair" trade barriers and practices hitherto excused. Seen from this perspective, the most significant events triggering the Asian values discourse are, above all, the phenomenal economic growth of East Asian countries in contrast to economic stagnation in the West and the abrupt demise of socialist regimes, and the quarrels surrounding human rights issues between the United States and East Asian countries.

In order to counter such American offensive, some political leaders of Asian countries rejected the superiority and universality of Western values—i.e., the main assumptions of

14) See Kwang-ok Kim(1998), Han Suhl(2000), Ki-bong Kim(2001) for Korean scholars' critical review of the Asian Values discourse.

15) Although Asian values are commonly associated with Confucianism, they are not necessarily so, as political leaders of Malaysia whose predominant religion is Islam assert them as well. But in this paper I associate Asian values primarily with Confucianism, following common practice.

Westcentrism—and, instead, asserted the superiority and universality of Asian values. In particular, the Singaporean government and the so-called Singaporean school including Lee Kwan Yew, raised the Asian values discourse more vigorously on the basis of newly-attained pride coming from the economic success of the East Asian countries, as an effective slogan to counter Western pressures(Fukuyama 1998, 258).¹⁶⁾ Here the human rights issue came to the fore as a focal issue between the West and East Asia in the aftermath of the cold war. Subsequently, China joined in the Asian values discourse. Confronted with the U.S. initiated Western criticism of human rights violations in China, the Chinese government previously defended its position with the conventional socialist critique of human rights as bourgeois ideology, but it has now shifted to defend it in terms of Chinese cultural tradition(Moody 1996, 175-82). Thus in 1993, a caucus of Asian countries meeting in Bangkok prior to a major international human rights conference in Geneva proclaimed that "human rights are, in practice, contingent upon culture, history, the level of economic development and the like, and that the West has no business imposing its views on others"(Moody 1996, 166). In this way, the Asian values have been (ab)used actively by governments in Asia to defend themselves against Western criticism of their human rights violation and authoritarianism.

In addition, it should be noted that the Asian values discourse also contains the fear that Asian society would be plagued with Western pathological diseases as a consequence of the diffusion of Western values into Asian societies which has been made possible by economic development and subsequently accelerated by globalization and informationalization. If they were left unattended, Asian societies would fall into the decay and degeneracy of the contemporary American scene(Chon 1999, 166; Moody 1996, 188-92). As a matter of fact, many observers—even including Lee Kwan Yew—predict that the so-called Asian values will recede as rapid economic development enables Asian countries to reach affluent consumer society and globalization and informationalization proceed further in the future. In this regard, Dirlik also argues that the resurgence of Confucianism is in part a response provoked by the intrusion of a global consumer culture(Dirlik n.d., 80).

In order to find the link between Asian values discourse and Asian cultural identity in a more concrete way, the examination of the Asian values discourse in light of the three theses with regard to the cultural effect of globalization seems necessary.

16) With regard to the background for the emergence of Asian values dicourse in Singapore, see Myung-su Kim(2000). Kim stresses on domestic factors—i.e., attempt to solve the identity crisis of Chinese residents there through some cultural prescriptions— over external factors in his explanation of the emergence of Asian values discourse in Singapore.

First, considering the homogenization thesis, the Asian values discourse does not appear to accord well with the homogenization thesis and rather to confirm the bipolarization thesis, as it stresses the difference between Asian and Western values and the former's superiority over the latter. However, if the discourse suggests Asian values as the functional equivalent to Weber's famous Protestant ethic in the development of capitalism, then it might be interpreted as supportive of the homogenization thesis. In this regard, Dirlik explains some American scholars' enthusiastic applause of Asian values as the attempt to universalize and legitimate Western capitalism beyond the West in the age of global capitalism, contrary to their initial appearance as opposed to the Western values(Dirlik n.d., 81). If we take this interpretation, then, the discourse would boil down to nothing more than what Immanuel Wallerstein has called the "anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism," thereby paradoxically joining the homogenization thesis(Wallerstein 1997, 101-04).¹⁷⁾ Francis Fukuyama also supports the homogenization thesis by predicting that the Asian values will weaken or disappear with the further progress of economic development and globalization(Fukuyama 1998). This corresponds to his major argument presented in *The End of History* that the world history converges on liberalism and capitalism with the end of the Cold War. If we take Fukuyama's position, then, the Asian values discourse may well be interpreted as a nostalgic, reactionary discourse confessing that Asians have crossed a bridge of no return by rapid economic development and affluence. In this sense, the discourse could be interpreted as an expression of the traditional generation's discontent with the diffusion of Western values such as licentious libertinism and extreme individualism into their own society by way of modernization and globalization, than that of their active resistance to the external Western pressures. Then it turns out to be more for domestic consumption than for external defense against Western criticism.

Second, scholars such as Huntington and Barber may interpret the Asian values discourse as indicative of the bipolarization thesis. Huntington explicitly takes the discourse as evidence which proves the validity of the bipolarization thesis and he predicts the clash of civilizations between the Western and Confucian-Islamic civilizations in his *Clash of Civilizations*. However, in the case of Barber, it is not clear whether Barber thinks so with regard to the Asian values discourse, although he conceives of Islamic fundamentalism as opposed to Western civilization. Although the logic is loose, Tu Weiming seems to support

17) Following Wallerstein, I mean by "anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism" that the Asian values discourse accepts the significance of capitalism as positive value(or achievement) "in precisely the terms that Europe has defined it," although asserting that Asians can develop it as well as, or far better than, Europeans by taking advantage of Asian values as opposed to Western values(Wallerstein 1997, 103).

the bipolarization thesis as he argues that the Asian economic development suggests the model of a "third industrial civilization" as opposed to Western capitalist model and the Soviet socialist model, adding that there exists a thick cultural foundation for it(Tu Weiming 1995, 382).

Finally, we might ask whether the Asian values discourse constitutes the hybridization thesis. In connection with this, we need to be reminded that advocates of Asian values do not repudiate democracy, human rights and capitalism originated from the West, in a wholesale way, although they might display strong reservation about liberalism and individualism. They do not propose viable and explicit alternatives to capitalism and democracy, either. Besides, the advocates stress Asian values as favorable to capitalist industrialization, which means, after all, capitalism is the criterion against which the value of Asian values is evaluated. With regard to human rights, they seem to deny the universal application of human rights rather than the concept of human rights in itself. Furthermore they have not been successful in presenting a viable and coherent alternative to the Western notion of human rights. At most, they emphasize the need for some minor revision in concept and partial reservation in application.¹⁸⁾ All this considered, it seems difficult to interpret that they support the bipolarization thesis insofar as capitalism, human rights and democracy are concerned. Instead, the discourse seems to suggest that "the traditional value systems provide at least as good a foundation for modernity as do those derived from the West"(Moody 1996, 169). Then, as the hybrid concepts such as "Confucian capitalism," "Confucian democracy," and "Asian-style democracy" suggest,¹⁹⁾ the discourse supports the hybridization thesis and implies a hybrid cultural identity in the making.

Thus, theoretical attempts to hybridize capitalism and democracy with distinctive Asian values suggest the formation of hybrid cultural identity in East Asia, by stressing the contribution of Asian values to the development of capitalism and democracy and subsequently legitimizing capitalism and democracy of the Western origin in terms of Asian values.²⁰⁾ For example, with regard to capitalism, Il-gon Kim argues that "capitalism as a system, however universal it may be, cannot change particularities derived from cultural diversity and differences so completely as to make the world economic order monistic and uniform"(Il-gon Kim 1999, 48). On the basis of such an assumption we may well classify the types of capitalism in the world, for example, into the following three

18) However, the discourse usually takes negative attitude toward Western individualism and feminism, thereby approaching to bipolarization thesis in these aspects.

19) See Neher(1994), Yung-Myung Kim(1997) for the debate over "Asian-style democracy."

20) Remember that the legitimacy of capitalism and democracy was flatly denied by most of the traditional elites of East Asia in the nineteenth century.

models: the "competitive capitalism" of the U.S. kind, the "welfare capitalism" of the Western European kind, and the "Confucian symbiotic capitalism" of the East Asian kind (Il-gon Kim 1999) or the Anglo-American "free-market model," the European "politically bargained model," and the Japanese "socially integrated model" (Cho 1997, 2). If such classification is established with validity, then there opens room for supposing diverse models of capitalism, instead of insisting on the U.S. or European model as universal. Then, commonalities shared by American, European and East Asian models of capitalism—for example, the overall recognition of private property and enterprises, the existence of free market, etc.—may be recognized as universal traits of capitalism, while the differences—differences in social welfare system, the degree of state intervention, the relationship between the management and the labor, etc.—displayed by each model may constitute cultural identity for people belonging to it. In this way, capitalism existing in the United States and Europe as well as that in East Asia will be respectively conceived of as a subcategory of universal capitalism.²¹⁾

With regard to democracy, East Asia has not been successful in developing a distinct model. However, we are reminded that there have been diverse forms of democracies in the West and consequently various attempts to classify them—for example, liberal vs. social democracy, majoritarian vs. consensual democracy, liberal vs. communitarian democracy, and presidential vs. parliamentary system—have been made. Thus, as democracies in East Asia evolve into more mature ones, they may well develop a "third subtype" of democracy which is distinct from Western models, or close to some form of communitarian democracy, as East Asian countries have strong communal culture in contrast to Western individualist culture. In this vein, Daniel Bell, a professor of Hong Kong university, has already conceptualized democracies in East Asia as a type of communitarian democracy, calling it "illiberal democracy" (Bell 1995). However, some Western scholars have characterized current nascent democracies in East Asia as "Asian-style democracy" (Neher 1994) or "dominant party democracy" (Huntington 1991), both of which appear to characterize democracies in Asia as deviance from normal and

21) In regard to this, we may look back over monarchies in premodern ages. For example, there had universally been hereditary kingship in premodern Europe and East Asia. If we make a rough comparison, there were feudal and absolute monarchies in Europe, while there were Confucian and Japanese-style monarchies in East Asia. There must have been significant differences among them due to economic-cultural differences as well as commonalities as hereditary kinship. Thus it might be possible to conceive monarchies in Europe and East Asia on an equal base as subtypes of universal hereditary kingship without assigning hierarchical value to either of them. Following this reasoning, although capitalism and democracy originated in the West uniquely and then they were adopted derivatively later in East Asia, we may well categorize them equally as viable subtypes, as they develop in East Asia in a full-fledged form.

normative Western democracies. Such conceptualization, however, seems to be too cursory at best and too arrogant at worst, considering Asians' yet short-term experiments with democracy.²²⁾

In order to avoid such cursory theorization, it might be useful to note the Chinese accommodation of Buddhism in the past. In the first century or so, Buddhism was transmitted from India to China, and, consequently, China became Buddhist. However, as the Confucian and Taoist tradition remained strong and the Chinese adapted Buddhism to their purposes and needs, the indigenization of Buddhism went on, ultimately giving birth to the distinctive Chinese-style Buddhism, which would become the standard model for further variations in Korea and Japan. In a similar way, East Asian countries have experienced modernization—notably, the formation of nation-state, capitalist industrialization and democratization—belatedly and most intensely among non-Western civilizations in the last one hundred fifty years. At an early phase the Westernization of East Asia proceeded eagerly and, to certain extent, inevitably. At a later phase with the success of initial Westernization, the indigenization of Western institutions and values—the Asianization of Western modernity, capitalism and democracy—is bound to take place, either consciously or unconsciously. The rise of Asian values discourse is clear evidence supporting it. It will take more time for such process to give birth to distinctive varieties of capitalism and democracy in East Asia in the end. In that process, it will be found with the benefit of hindsight that universal and particular elements of Western capitalism and democracy are to be separated from each other and the former are to remain universal as before, while the latter are to be replaced by elements particular to East Asian varieties, so that hybrid forms may appear as another alternative type to the Western models. Seen from this perspective, we might say, contemporary East Asian civilization is in the making as a kind of hybrid one, going through dialectical process of "Westernization" of Asian civilization and "Asianization" of Western civilization.²³⁾

V. Conclusion

As the preceding examination suggests, it is difficult to develop a coherent position with regard to the effect of globalization upon the cultural identity of East Asia, as they vary with the area of examination, developmental stage, level of abstraction, and theorist's world-view.²⁴⁾ For example, we may find homogenization in sports, bipolarization in

22) See Kang(1999 & 2000) for a critique of such theoretical attempts.

23) Masakazu Yamazaki(1996) and Kishore Mahbubani(1995) develop reasoning similar to this.

religion, and hybridization in food and music. Initially homogenization may be predominant, later bipolarization, and finally hybridization.

If we evaluate the three theses in the abstract level, while the homogenization and bipolarization theses in their explanation of the cultural effect of globalization are so simplistic as to be falsified with ease, the hybridization thesis has difficulty in clarifying and specifying the terms of hybridization—that is, unevenness, asymmetry and inequality existing in combination—of Western and other civilizations—e.g., East Asian, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, African civilizations—so that it is open to the criticism that it is confusing and elusive and at best a *post hoc* explanation. However, considering long duration of cultural evolution, on the whole the hybridization thesis seems more reasonable and persuasive. Besides, the hybridization thesis has a progressive aspect, as it denies the essentialist assumption that civilization is fixed and unchangeable.

However, the three theses are not necessarily exclusive functionally and logically. For example, in the clashing and converging process of diverse cultures and civilizations made possible by globalization, the homogenization thesis confirms the universal elements, while the bipolarization thesis recognizes the unique elements which secure each civilization its cultural identity. Then hybridization thesis articulates or sums up the final synthesis of emulative homogenization and identity-forming differentiation(bipolarization). This insight suggests that the exploration of the cultural identity of East Asian civilization in a more systematic and concrete way requires further research on the theoretical and empirical aspects of the hybridization thesis.

24) This is all the more so as globalization is not a completed, but currently on-going process.

References

Materials in English

- Barber, Benjamin. 1996. *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine.
- Bell, Daniel. 1995. "Democracy in Confucian Societies: The Challenge of Justification." Daniel Bell *et al.*, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*, 17-40. New York: St. Martin's.
- Castells, Manuel. 1997. *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Cho, Myung-Rae. 1997 "Transborder Networks and Geogovernance: A Comparison of the Great South China Region and the Bohai Rim Region," 1-28(unpublished). Paper presented at the International Conference of Regional Studies Association held in Frankfurt, Germany, Sept. 20-23 1997.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Funabashi, Yoichi. 1993. "The Asianization of Asia." *Foreign Affairs* 72:5 (September/October), 75-85.
- Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne, eds. 1996. *Regionalism and World Order*. London: Macmillan
- Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne. 1996. "Conclusion: The New Regionalism." Gamble and Payne(1996), 247-64.
- Hay, Colin and David Marsh, eds. 2000. *Demystifying Globalization*. Polis, U.K.: University of Birmingham.
- Hay, Colin and David Marsh. 2000. "Introduction: Demystifying Globalization." Hay and Marsh (2000), 1-17.
- Holton, Robert J. 1998. *Globalization and the Nation-State*. London: Macmillan.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- _____. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kang, Jung In. 1999. "Confucianism and Democracy in East Asia: A Critique of Samuel P. Huntington's *Third Wave*." *Korea Journal* 39:3 (Autumn), 316-37.
- _____. 2000."Some Reflections on Recent Democratization in South Korea." *Korea Journal* 40:2 (Summer 2000), 195-224.
- _____. 2003. "Beyond Eurocentrism: Reexamining Cultural Discourse Strategies to Overcome Eurocentrism in the Context of Polycentric Multiculturalism"(unpublished). Paper presented at the international conference held in Kyungju, Korea, Sept. 22-24 2003.

- Kim, Yung-Myung. 1997. "'Asian-Style Democracy': A Critique from East Asia." *Asian Survey* 37:12 (December), 1119-1134.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. 1995. "The Pacific Way." *Foreign Affairs* 74:1 (Jan./Feb.), 100-111.
- Moody Peter R, Jr. 1996. "Asian Values." *Journal of International Affairs* 50:1 (Summer), 166-92.
- Neher, Clark D. 1994. "Asian Style Democracy." *Asian Survey* 34:11 (November), 949-61.
- The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), "Eurocentrism." (Vol. 5) Oxford: Clarendon.
- Scholte, Jan Aart. 2000. *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sum, Ngai-Ling. 1996. "The NICs and Competing Strategies of East Asian Regionalism." *Gamble and Payne*(1996), 207-45.
- Taylor, Peter J. 2000. "Ization of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization." *Hay and Marsh* (2000), 49-70.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1997. "Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science." *New Left Review* 226 (Nov./Dec.), 93-107.
- Yamazaki, Masakazu. 1996. "Asia, a Civilization in the Making." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (July/August), 106-18.

Materials in Korean

- Chon, Je-gook. 1999. "The Debates over 'Asian values' Reexamined." *Hankuk kwa Kukje Jongchi* [Korea and International Politics] 15:1 (Spring/Summer), 187-219.
- Dirlik, Arif. n.d. "Does Culture Oppose History?: the 'West' in East Asia's Quest of Identity."
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1998. "Asian Values Will Disappear after the Crisis." *Shindonga* [New East Asia] (May), 256-63.
- Kang, Jung In. 2004. *Beyond the Shadow of Westcentrism*. Seoul: Acanet.
- Kim, Il-gon. 1999. "The Respect of Human Dignity and the Principle of Symbiosis in Confucian Capitalism." *Dongasia Munhwa wa Sasang* [Culture and Thought of East Asia] 2, 28-60.
- Kim, Ki-bong. 2001. "Whither the East Asian Discourse?: From Imperialism Beyond Imperialism." *Dongasia Munhwa wa Sasang* [Culture and Thought of East Asia] 6, 12-38.
- Kim, Kwang-ok. 1998. "Cultural Meaning of the East Asian Discourse." *Chongsin Munhwa Yungu* [Journal of Spiritual Culture Studies] 21:1, 3-25.
- Kim, Kyung-il. 1998. "East Asia and the World Systems Theory." *Chongsin Munhwa Yungu* [Journal of Spiritual Culture Studies] 21:1, 27-45.
- Kim, Myung-su. 2000. "The Cultural Origin of Asian Values: the Identity Crisis of Chinese Residents in Singapore." *Jongtong kwa Hyundai* [The Traditional and the

Contemporary](spring), 268-89.

Müller, Harald. 1999. *The Coexistence of Civilizations*. tr. Lee Young-Hui. Seoul: Puren Sup.

Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 2000. "Globalization as Hybridization." Roland Roberstson et. al., Yun Jae-min, ed. and trans., *Keundaisong, Talkeundaisong gurigo Sekyehwa* [Modernity, Post-Modernity and Globalization], 294-324. Seoul: Sahoemunhwa Yunguso.

Suhl, Han. 2000. "The Debates over 'Asian Values': Their Universality and Particularity." *Dongbuka Yungu* [Journal of Northeast Asian Studies] 5, 299-329.

Tu, Weiming. 1995. "Confucian Philosophy and Modernization." Chung, Mun-kil et al., eds., *Dongasia, Munje wa Sigak*, [East Asia: Problems and Perspectives], 333-390. Seoul: Munhak kwa Jisongsa.